THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-23-2143B
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
February 1, 2024
2024 IL App (1st) 23-2143-U
PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 22CR11691 Honorable Kenneth J. Wadas, Judge, presiding. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court‘s order denying defendant‘s pretrial release is affirmed where its findings that defendant committed an eligible offense, posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community, and that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate that threat were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the decision to detain was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 2 Defendant, Jerome Watson, appeals from an order granting the State‘s petition to deny his pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the
¶ 4 On October 11, 2023, defendant filed a petition to remove a financial condition of pretrial release because of his inability to post bond, pursuant to sections 110-5(e) and 110-7.5(b) of the Code.
¶ 5 On October 20, 2023, the State filed a verified petition seeking to deny defendant pretrial release pursuant to sections 110-2, 110-6.1(a)(6), and 110-(a)(6.5) of the Code.
¶ 6 On October 26, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on both petitions. Defense counsel advised the court that defendant had been in custody for over a year. Prior to his arrest, defendant was employed and starting a business. If released, defendant would be able to care for his aging parents.
¶ 7 The State proffered that on September 19, 2022, officers responded to calls of a person with a gun who was threatening people. The officers observed a person on the scene matching the description of defendant. When the officers approached defendant, he began to flee. The officers pursued defendant on foot and saw that he was holding his waistband. As the officers approached defendant, he began to run toward them, and the officers saw a firearm in defendant‘s hand. The officers observed defendant throw the firearm over a nearby fence. The loaded firearm was found with one round in the chamber and the serial number defaced. The officers placed defendant into custody.
¶ 8 The State further proffered that defendant‘s criminal background included “a federal case from 2021, unlawful transfer of a firearm where he served 40 months in federal prison, a 2015 escape, a 2007 PSMV, and a 2005 PCS, and a misdemeanor from 2006, a domestic battery, where he got 18 months conditional discharge.” Defendant also had nine bond forfeitures and was on federal supervised release for a firearm conviction at the time of the current offense.
¶ 9 Defendant clarified that many of the bond forfeitures were due to defendant being in custody in Indiana.
¶ 10 The circuit court found that the State proved:
“by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an eligible offense listed in 725 ILCS, [UUWF] and defaced firearm offenses, that the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, to wit, that the defendant allegedly brandished a firearm, threatening various persons, and was ultimately arrested with a firearm.
Three: that no condition or combination of conditions as set forth in 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case.
“Less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on specific articulable facts as the defendant has a long history of prior offenses, including prior crimes of violence and prior gun-related offenses. He also has a prior history of bond forfeiture warrants and allegedly left the State of Illinois and triggered some of those bond forfeiture warrants by being—while on bond in Illinois, went to Indiana and picked up a case there.
*** The State has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an eligible offense listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) and no condition or combination of conditions set forth can mitigate the defendant‘s willful flight. Less restrictive conditions would not prevent the defendant‘s willful flight from prosecution because the defendant has prior multiple bond forfeiture warrants including a detention out of state while a case was pending in Illinois.”
¶ 11 The circuit court ordered defendant detained, and a written order reflecting its findings was entered the same day. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
¶ 12 In his notice of appeal under
¶ 13 In his memorandum, defendant presents an argument that the Act did not permit the State to file a petition to deny his release and even if it did, the petition was untimely. These issues were not included in his notice of appeal. Further, defendant acknowledges that he did not properly raise these issues before the circuit court, but asks us to consider the issues as plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 14
¶ 15 The notice of appeal contains no indication that defendant was challenging the State‘s authority to file the petition to deny pretrial release or asserting that the petition was untimely. According to Martin, a defendant cannot raise additional grounds for relief for the first time in an appellate memorandum and forfeits these issues by the failure to raise them in the notice of appeal. See 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 19 (holding that the issues not raised in a
¶ 16 However, the State does not claim on appeal that defendant forfeited these issues, and the “rules of waiver and forfeiture are also applicable to the State.” People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 13. “The State may forfeit a claim of forfeiture by failing to raise it.” People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 47. In light of the State‘s failure to raise a forfeiture argument under Martin, we will not further discuss it.
¶ 17 We will consider under plain error whether we may excuse defendant‘s failure to raise these challenges to the State‘s petition before the circuit court. Under the plain error doctrine, we may review errors that have not been preserved for review where those errors affect substantial rights. See People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d 239, 242 (1990) (invoking the plain error doctrine where defendant alleged a violation of his due process rights during a probation hearing). The plain error doctrine allows us to remedy a “clear and obvious error” in two instances, (1) where the evidence in the case is so closely balanced, the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against
¶ 18 Defendant maintains that the plain language of the Act does not authorize the State to petition to detain defendants who were previously ordered released on monetary bail before the effective date of the Act, but remained detained because they failed to post bond. He further argues that even if the State was permitted to file a petition to detain, it was required to do so either without notice at a defendant‘s first appearance date or with notice within 21 calendar days after a defendant‘s arrest and release.
¶ 19 Similar arguments have been raised and reviewed by this court. Although there is not uniformity in those decisions, we find most persuasive the line of cases which have held that the Act does not prevent the State from petitioning to detain a defendant where the court is hearing a petition by that defendant for release under section 110-7.5(b) (
¶ 20 We conclude that the State was permitted to file a responding petition for detention in cases such as the one at issue—where defendant was arrested and detained prior to the Act‘s effective date and remained in detention after monetary bail was set and seeks review of his bail status. Accordingly, because we have found the State was permitted to file a responding petition for detention and there was no issue as to timeliness under the circumstances, our plain error analysis need go no further. See Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 24 (citing People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18). ” ‘Additionally, the absence of error nullifies any ineffective assistance of counsel argument because counsel‘s performance is not deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue.’ ” Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Stone, 2018 IL App (3d) 160171, ¶ 20).
¶ 21 Before addressing defendant‘s other arguments, we set forth the applicable legal framework.
¶ 22 Pursuant to article 110 of the Code, as amended, “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release,” and pretrial release may only be denied in certain specific situations.
¶ 23 Appeals of bail orders under
¶ 24 An abuse of discretion occurs where the court‘s judgment is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would agree with the court‘s position. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9. In conducting this review, we will not substitute the circuit court‘s factual and credibility findings with our own. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).
¶ 25 In his notice of appeal, defendant contests that the proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed a detainable offense. Defendant does not address this issue in his memorandum or provide any support for his position. Defendant was charged with UUWF, which is a detainable offense.
¶ 26 We next consider defendant‘s arguments that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community and no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community
¶ 28 In mitigation, defense counsel argued that prior to his arrest defendant was employed and was working on starting a business. If he was released, he would be able to take care of his “aging” parents. Defense counsel further clarified that many of defendant‘s bond forfeitures were due to the fact that he was in custody in Indiana.
¶ 29 In granting the State‘s petition, the court addressed each of the factors required under the Act and found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant was a threat to safety of any person or persons or the community because of the facts of the case where he brandished a firearm, threatening various persons. The proffer also showed that defendant, at first fled from police, but then showed the gun while running toward the approaching officers. Defendant had other charges related to guns and a domestic battery offense. The court further found that less restrictive conditions would not mitigate the threat because he had a history of bond forfeitures, some of which were triggered because he “went to Indiana and picked up a case there,” while he was on bond in Illinois. The State‘s proffer included other evidence showing that conditions would not mitigate the threat to safety where defendant has an escape charge in his
¶ 30 Based on the proffered evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court‘s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. On appeal, defendant advances the same arguments as to the mitigating factors as he did in the circuit court. The circuit court considered those mitigating factors and found that the State satisfied its burden. On review, we do not reweigh such factors and substitute our own judgment for that of the circuit court. People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 24.
¶ 31 Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in ordering her detained where the State did not allege or proffer a risk of willful flight. We need not address this issue where the decision to detain defendant may be affirmed solely based on the risk to a person or persons or a community, as discussed above. See
¶ 32 In that the circuit court‘s findings that defendant committed a detainable offense, poses a threat to the safety of the community, and less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of the community and no conditions could mitigate that threat, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that defendant be detained.
¶ 33 For the following reasons, we affirm the order of detention.
¶ 34 Affirmed.