Dеfendant was convicted in a jury trial of receiving stolen property, MCLA § 750-.535 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.803). This appeаl as of right raises three issues.
Defendant was the alleged owner of a motorcycle which was susрected of having been stolen. Police tests revealed that the serial number on the vehicle was altered. The complainant in this case, the true owner of the motorcycle in question, rеported seeing his missing motorcycle in a repair shop in South-gate, Michigan. He based his identificаtion on several distinctive marks which were the result of his workmanship on the vehicle. This discovery was reported to the police, who in turn seized the vehicle from the repair shop. Defendant аrgues that the trial court erred in receiving evidence regarding the altered description of thе serial number and alleges that this evidence is the product of an illegal search and seizure.
The evidence in question was not in the possession of the defendant, but rather in possession of a repairman at the time it was seized by police. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently reviewed a similar factual situation in which evidence was in the possession of a dry clеaners at the time it was seized without a warrant. *641 That Court held that when potential evidence is turned over by a defendant to a third party, thus exposing it to public scrutiny, no claim of unreasonable seаrch and seizure will be heard. That Court concluded:
“Here appellant delivered the suit to the cleaners open to public view. He knew that the suit could be handled and examined by many persоns in the course of the cleaning process, but he in no way tried to conceal the suit or anything сontained thereon, nor did he try to restrict the number of persons who handled it. We are thereforе unable to find any significant invasion of anything which appellant sought to ‘preserve as private’ ”. Clarke v. Neil (CA 6, 1970), 427 F2d 1322, 1325.
In thе case now before us, the defendant placed the motorcycle in the hands of the repairman, in full view of all who entered the shop. Furthermore, at trial, no objection was made to the admission of the evidence obtained in the search and seizure now in question. Barring the occurrence of manifest injustice, this Court has consistently held that issues not properly preserved below сannot now be raised for the first time.
People
v.
Omell
(1968),
Secondly, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a stаtement made by him before he was advised of his constitutional rights. The statement in question was made by the defendant to a detective when defendant was called into the police station.
The basic issue thus is whether at the time the statement was made the investigation had become accusatory. If the investigation had reached
*642
that stage, the defendant was entitled to be advised of his constitutiоnal rights.
Escobedo
v.
Illinois
(1964),
In the case at bar, defendant was requested to come to the police station fоr questioning. He voluntarily complied with that request. At the conclusion of the interview he was not placed in protective custody, but rather was freely permitted to leave the police statiоn. Courts have consistently held that where the purpose of such interviews is investigatory rather than accusatory, the questioning authorities need not first give the
Miranda
warnings.
United States
v.
Hall
(CA 2, 1965), 348 F2d 837;
Gaudio
v.
State
(1967), 1 Md App 455 (
Thirdly, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine him regarding prior arrests which did not result in convictions. The defendant cites to us authority with which we are very familiar :
“We now hold that a defendant testifying at his own trial may not be asked if he has been arrested or charged with crime, where the arrest or charge hаs not resulted in a conviction and where the only purpose of the questions is to impeach thе defend
*643
ant’s credibility as a witness. Where credibility is the only issue, the probative value of arrests and сharges, unsubstantiated by a conviction, is slight at best. When weighed against the great danger that the jury despitе careful instructions, might misapply such evidence, the scales of justice tip in favor of exclusiоns.” (Citations omitted.)
People
v.
Brocato
(1969),
We agree with defendant’s conclusions that the defendant’s credibility was a most important issue in the trial below, “as the question of his knowledge of whether the motorcycle was stolen was the chief issue”. Therefore, we find that it was prejudicial to the defendant to attack his credibility by thе improper references to previous arrests.
United States
v.
Beño
(CA 2, 1963), 324 F2d 582;
People
v.
Brocato, supra; People
v.
Eddington
(1970),
The prejudicial error committed below requires reversal.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.