THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. B152891
Second Dist., Div. Five.
July 25, 2002
99 Cal. App. 4th 590
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Jim E. Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GRIGNON, J.—A defendant on felony probation absconded from supervision and fled to Alabama. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He was arrested in Alabama and extradited to California. The costs of extradition totaled $5,603.49. Defendant admitted he was in violation of probation for desertion of probation supervision. The trial court revoked probation, but reinstated it on certain additional conditions. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay the costs of extradition. Defendant appeals, challenging the order requiring payment of the costs of extradition as statutorily unauthorized. We conclude the trial court was authorized to order payment of the costs of extradition as a “reasonable cost of any probation supervision” within the meaning of
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 6, 2000, defendant and appellant Brian Washington pleaded nolo contendere to sexual intercourse with a minor (
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the order to pay the costs of extradition is statutorily unauthorized. The prosecution responds that the order is authorized as a cost of probation supervision under
The phrase “cost of any probation supervision” is not otherwise defined. It most certainly includes the normal cost of probation supervision. (See People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 321].) The question presented is whether it includes the costs of returning an absconding probationer from out of state. We conclude that it does. Defendant was required to report to his probation officer for supervision as a condition of probation. Defendant failed to report to his probation officer and absconded to Alabama. The probation officer in California could not supervise a probationer who had deserted probation and fled to another state. Thus, in order to maintain supervision of defendant, it was necessary to cause defendant to be returned to California. This was accomplished by the issuance of a bench warrant and the utilization of extradition procedures. The costs associated with the extradition under these circumstances were necessary to maintain probation supervision.
The conclusion that probation supervision costs within the meaning of
The reasoning of the Baker court was followed by this division in People v. Burnett (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 320, 322-323 [150 Cal.Rptr. 126]. In Burnett, a trial court reinstated probation for a probationer, who had absconded out of state, on condition the defendant reimburse the county $1,216.79 for the costs of extradition. This division concluded the costs of extradition were not authorized conditions of probation under
In express response to the Baker case and implicit response to the Burnett case, Orange County requested enactment of a statute authorizing a trial court to assess a probationer the costs of probation supervision. (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency—Corrections, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) July 11, 1980, p. 1.) “Orange County Superior Courts used to impose probation costs in selected cases, however, the court stopped the practice in 1976 because there was no statutory basis for doing it. This bill would provide the statutory authority.” (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency—Youth Authority, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) July 11, 1980, pp. 1-2.) “Most persons convicted of criminal violations find probation preferable to the prison sentence for which probation is an alternative. The effect of [Assembly Bill No.] 3323 is to require the convicted criminal to pay the costs of his rehabilitative program which otherwise would be borne by the general
Assembly Bill No. 3323 enacted
In 1987, this division acknowledged that the Legislature had effectively overruled the holding of People v. Baker, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 550, as to reimbursement for probation supervision costs, by enacting
In summary,
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Turner, P. J., concurred.
MOSK, J.—I respectfully dissent.
“[G]eneral costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals” are not recoverable absent express statutory authority to the contrary. (People v. Baker (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 550, 559-560 [113 Cal.Rptr. 248] (Baker) [power to require reimbursement to the state for costs of prosecution and of probation supervision is a function of statute]; People v. Burnett (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 320 [150 Cal.Rptr. 126] (Burnett) [extradition costs are general costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals]; People v. Rugamas (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 518, 523 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 271] [citing Baker for proposition that government is entitled to restitution only if it has incurred actual loss due to the crime, “excluding those general costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals“].)
The term “cost of any probation supervision” is not defined and does not manifestly include the costs of extraditing or otherwise apprehending a probationer. Extradition is not the type of probation department service provided for by
In enacting
To interpret
Although a court has said that “[p]olicy considerations . . . support a more flexible interpretation of the [recoupment] statute” (People v. Phillips, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 69), our Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] rule of strict construction of penal statutes has generally been applied in this state to criminal statutes.” (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 312 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042]; People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [“true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant‘s favor” if the appellate court cannot “fairly discern a contrary legislative intent“].) The defendant “must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to whether the statute was applicable to him.” (In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 668 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840].)
Because there is no express statutory authority to impose extradition costs on a probationer, the trial court should not be able to require Brian Washington to pay extradition costs.
On August 15, 2002, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 2, 2002. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
