104 Mich. 337 | Mich. | 1895
The respondent was charged with forgery. The information contains two counts. The first count 'charges the forgery of an order for the payment of money, which reads as follows:
“East Tawas, Mach., March 13, 1893. -“J. H. Schmeck & Co., Bankers:
“Pay to the order of George Demming ($87.00) eighty-seven dollars. R. J. Norton.”
The second count charges the uttering of the order.
The respondent was arrested by the sheriff with the ■order in his possession, and while attempting to pass it .and get money upon it. The firm of Schmeck & Co. had failed some time before. The respondent went to the .store of one Piser, wanted to buy some goods, and offered the check. Mr. Piser did not know the respondent, nor any of the parties named in the check. He went into a barber shop near by to ascertain if the check was good. The day after respondent’s arrest the sheriff went to Hewistoon, to see if he could find such a man as R. J.
“ The defendant is entitled to the benefit of all doubts.*340 When he' enters the trial, -he has the right to stand before you as an innocent man, until the people have produced evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, and force you to believe, and convince’you beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty; and after hearing all the evidence in the case, if, by looking it over and considering it, .you could find any other way whereby it could be-construed consistent with'his innocence, it is your duty to-do so, — that is, after looking at the evidence and considering it, if it can be so construed and passed upon as to be consistent with innocence, it is your duty to give him that right. In other words, before you can convict him the evidence must be such that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt, and overcomes every presumption of innocence, when most favorably construed in his favor.”
As to the other points, it is sufficient to say that the-attention of the court was not called to them by the respondent's counsel.
“ Signing fictitious names, or the names of non-existing firms or persons, to an instrument, with an intention to-defraud, is a false making, and constitutes a forgery.” 8 Amer.. & Eng. Enc. Law, 469, and .authorities there cited.
• The judgment is affirmed.