Opinion
While defendant Lonnie Louis Warinner was free on bail on two felony offenses, he committed another felony. We affirm the conviction and hold that the trial court may impose two consecutive enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.1, 1 which provides that a defendant’s sentenсe may be enhanced if he commits a felony while on bail for another felony. *
*1354 Facts
The issue here arises from three cases. Case No. 1 - Warinner was charged with various felonies including burglary and fraudulent usе of a credit card. Case No. 2 - Warinner was again charged with various felonies which also included burglary and fraudulent use of a credit card. Warinner was rеleased on bail pending trial on both cases Nos. 1 and 2. Case No. 3 - While on bail on cases Nos. 1 and 2, Warinner committed another felony, burglary.
Warinner pleaded guilty to felonies in case No. 1, and was found guilty of felonies in cases Nos. 2 and 3. He was sentenced on all three cases at the same time. The trial judge sentenced him to a total prison term of twelve years: a four-year principal term in case No. 3; sixteen months consecutive sentence for case No. 1; eight months consecutive sentence for case No. 2; two 1-year consecutive terms for serviсe of prior prison terms within section 667.5, subdivision (b); and two 2-year consecutive terms for violation of bail status within section 12022.1.
On appeal Warinner argues that the trial judge erred by imposing sentence on both bail enhancements. We disagree and conclude that the Legislature intended multiplе enhancements under section 12022.1.
Discussion
Warinner argues that he was twice punished for the single act of burglary in case No. 3 by the imposition of two bail enhancements. He contends that this sentence violates section 654 and ignores the reasoning of
In re Culbreth
(1976)
Section 12022.1 рrovides in part: “Any person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to have been committed while that person was rеleased from custody on a primary offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years in state prisоn which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the court.” The section defines a “primary offense” as “a felony offense for which a person has been released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance prior to the judgment becoming finаl, including the disposition of any appeal, or for which release on bail or his or her own recognizance has been revoked.” A “seсondary offense” is “a felony offense alleged to have been committed while the person is released from custody for a primary offense.” The section also describes pleading and proof requirements. Under section *1355 12022.1, both the burglaries and credit card forgeries in cases Nos. 1 and 2 constitute primary offenses, and the burglary committed in case No. 3 constitutes a secondary offense.
We disagree with Warinner’s сontention that section 654 prevents the imposition of two bail enhancements here. That section provides in part: “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished undеr more than one . . . .” Section 654 has long been construed as inapplicable to enhancements because enhancements do nоt define an offense. Instead, they prescribe increased punishment in certain circumstances.
(People
v.
Walker
(1976)
Neither is the reasoning of
In re Culbreth, supra,
Section 12022.1, subdivision (b), compels an enhancement where a defendant, released from custody “on
a
primary offense,” commits another offеnse. By its language, the section permits the two enhancements imposed, despite the omission of the word “each” as stated in other enhancement statutes. (See §§ 667, 667.5 and 667.6.) The established rules of statutory interpretation require us to apply a statute without further construction if it is not ambiguous or uncertain.
(People
v.
Overstreet
(1986)
The legislative intent of section 12022.1 was to punish recidivists with additional penalties. The increased penalties here are due to Warinner’s status
as a repeat offender
and arise as an incident of the subsequent offense.
(People
v.
Jackson
(1985)
This rationale is not changed by
People
v.
Tassell
(1984)
Our holding permitting Warinner’s sentence to be enhanсed for each pending case from which he was released from custody is not inconsistent with section 1170.1, subdivision (a) or Tassell. Each enhancement may be added once in arriving at the aggregate sentence. As the People point out, and individual with two or more prior prison terms is more culpable and may be punished more severely than an individual with only one prior prison term. So too here, a person released from сustody on more than one pending case who commits an offense is more culpable than a person who commits an offense while bеing out on bail on only one case. As culpability increases, additional punishment follows. The purpose of section 12022.1 is to penalize recidivists. This is accomplished by increasing punishment for one who commits an additional offense while released from custody on earlier offenses.
*1357 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Stone (S. J.), P. J., and Abbe, J., concurred.