Twо indictments were returned against de- ■ fendant, one charging 21 counts of grand theft, and one 2 counts of forgery. The two сases were consolidated and tried to a jury, which found defendant guilty of all 23 charges. She appeals from the judgments and from order denying new trial.
Appellant was executive director of the Monterey County Housing Authority. The 21 thefts charged against her are based on misappropriations of housing authority funds effected by false claims prеsented and paid for labor and materials which in fact were not furnished to the authority. One Sorensen, a partnеr of Custom Interiors, had pleaded guilty to charges of theft and was a witness for the prosecution in the ease at bar. His testimony was that the authority cheeks issued to Custom Interiors in payment of these fraudulent invoices were endorsed by him for his firm and were delivered to appellant. Appellant deposited these cheeks to the authority account. It is the prosecution’s theory that she derived personal profit either by using such deposits to cоver previous shortages in her accounts, or by substituting them for cash which she withdrew from authority funds. The principal evidenсe to support these theft charges is the testimony of Sorensen. Clearly he is an accomplice, and thе convictions can be sustained only if his testimony is corroborated. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
The accomplice need not be corroborated as to every fact to which he testifies.
(People
v.
Santo,
In the case at bar the evidence amply shows that the housing authority paid for goods and work which it did not receive.
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There is no denial that defendant signed the checks which paid these fаlse bills. The sole issue is whether she participated knowingly in these thefts, or whether she innocently signed the checks in an unknowing performance of her routine duties. It is upon this crucial issue of defendant’s guilty knowledge that the testimony of thе accomplice Sorensen is important and requires corroboration. The jury was fully and fairly instructed as to the necessity for corroboration and the tests of its adequacy. Appellant in no way criticizes these instructions. Thus the weight to be given the corroborating testimony and the resolution of conflicts therein was for the jury. This court will set aside the implied finding only if there is no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the jury.
(People
v.
Griffin, supra,
The evidence, wholly aside from the accomplice’s testimony, shows that the housing authority owned but 80 to 84 sofas, and had but 52 in use during the periоd the false invoices were paid. Yet Custom Interiors was paid for recovering 250 sofas in two years. Appellаnt was an experienced housing executive. She handled the invoices and signed the checks for these wholly disрroportionate recovering jobs. The jury clearly could infer from the mere number of recoverings that defеndant had guilty knowledge. Further, appellant’s own testimony attempted to explain this inculpatory circumstancе by pointing to a claimed use of the authority’s housing facilities by successive groups of army personnel who were short-term tenants. But there was evidence that sofas were not furnished to the apartments rented by these tenants. Thе jury could regard this misstatement by appellant as inculpatory. Also, there was evidence that the invoices аnd payments of Custom Interiors were handled in a different manner than those of other suppliers. All invoices went first to appellant. The invoices of all except Custom Interiors then went to the authority’s accountant, who prepared the checks. In the case of Custom Interiors, there is evidence that the checks were prepared by appellant. Still further, the only authority checks redeposited in its own bank account were those issuеd to Custom Interiors and to one painter. There is additional corroborating evidence, but we are satisfied thаt the testimony here summarized is ample, under the authorities, to meet the requirement of Penal Code, section 1111.
Aрpellant also asserts prejudicial misconduct of the prosecuting attorney. In his opening argument the prosecu
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tor pointed to the rule that the prosecution must prove its ease beyond a reasonable doubt, and referred to the fact that this is termed the burden of proof. He then said “It is not really a burden, because neithеr I nor anyone else, any conscientious person, would want to convict anyone of a crime unless we wеre sure beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the person were guilty-.” Appellant hеre interposed an objection and motion for mistrial. The court promptly and fully admonished the jury to disregard the remark, and denied the motion for mistrial. There was no repetition of this type of argument. Appellant relies upоn
People
v.
Edgar,
Judgments and order affirmed.
Kaufman, P. J., and Martinelli, J. pro tem., * concurred.
Notes
Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.