3 Wend. 120 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1829
By the Court,
This case came before us heretofore on a demurrer to the indictment. (6 Cowen, 512.) We then considered the indictment good, and it was carried down to the oyer and terminer for trial; the jury have passed on the fact of the purchase of the note, charged in the first count. The question is again presented, whether the indictment charges any offence punishable by law.
The substance of the first section of the act rejecting superfluous verbage is, that no attorney or counsellor shall buy any bond, bill, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt or other chose in action; nor shall any such 'attorney or counsellor, directly or indirectly, lend or advance any money to any person as an inducement to the placing in the hands of such attorney or counsellor any debt, demand or chose in action against any other person for collection: then follows the penalty and the proviso, which is, that it is not intended to prohibit the receiving in payment by any attorney or counsellor, any bond, &c. for estate, real or personal, or for services actually rendered, or for a debt antecedently contracted, or from buying or receiving any bill of exchang, draft, or other chose in action, for the purpose of remittance, or without any intent to evade or violate this act. As I read the act, it creates two offences; first, the act of purchasing a note by an attorney or counsellor is prohibited ; secondly,
As long since as 1807, the legislature considered the purchasing ofnotes for collection an evil requiring their interposition ; and they then, (sess. 30, ch. 107, sect. 4,) enacted, “That if any attorney of the supreme court, or of any court of common pleas, shall purchase or receive, by way of pledge or security for money lent, any bond, note or other writing with intent to commence a suit thereon, and shall commence such suit accordingly, every such attorney shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” This section was re-enacted in the same words in the seventh section of the act concerning counsellors, attornies and solicitors, in the revision of 1813, (1 R. L. 417 ;) and so the law remained until 1818, when the statute now under consideration was passed. The object of the. legislature undoubtedly was to prevent the officers of courts from purchasing notes, or loaning money upon
It is contended, if such is the true construction of the act, that it is oppressive and unconstitional. There is nothing in the constitution to prohibit the legislature from imposing restrictions upon certain classes of citizens. The constitution itself has set the example, by prohibiting certain persons from holding any civil office, as being incompatible with the duties of their professions. The legislature, no doubt, thought it derogatory to the character of an attorney or counsellor to be soliciting or purchasing business, and thereby causing distress in the community by numberless unnecessary prosecutions ; and they said, (and properly so, in my judgment,) that no man who is capable of resorting to such expedients shall hold the office of attorney or counsellor in this state. They judged correctly, also, in concluding that to remedy the evil, there must be no difficulty about proving the intent. They no doubt asked, for what purpose does an attorney buy a note, unless for prosecution? and answered by saying, he buys it for no other purpose, unless he brings himself within the exceptions contained in the proviso. ' They accordingly
'• ^ am therefore of opinion that the court of oyer and terminer be advised to render judgment against the defendant UP0n the conviction.