Following a jury trial in the Detroit Recorder’s Court, defendant was found to be guilty as charged of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 2), MCL 750.520c(l)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(a) (sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age), and was sentenced to a term of from 5 to 15 years imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right.
The complainant was a 12-year-old boy who had met defendant at a public swimming pool in 1980. He stated that defendant came to the poоl most days.
The complainant testified that on June 11, 1981, defendant grabbed his genitals on two occasions. The first time defendant did not reach under the complainant’s bathing suit, the second time he allegedly did. The complainant also alleged that defendant had grabbed his genitals on eight or nine other occasions.
On cross-examination, the complainant admitted that he had told Officer Karl Wenk only about the first grabbing "incident on June 11. The complainant attributed this to nervousness whеn he was talking to the officer.
While the complainant stated that he had told *443 his mother about what happened at the pool on June 11, 1981, he admitted that he had never told his mother about any of the other alleged sexual contacts.
Three other boys testified that defendant hаd grabbed their genitals while they were at the pool. These incidents did not form the basis of any charge against the defendant but, rather, were introduced as similar-acts evidence.
The defense called no witnesses, and the defendant, аgainst his counsel’s advice, delivered his own closing argument. Defendant stated that playing keep-away in the water necessarily involved some body contact. Defendant also referred to the prosecution’s obligation in a CSC 2 case to prove that any touching was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification.
Defendant first asserts that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor was permitted to ask the potential jurоrs whether the facts that defendant had once been a Catholic priest and was, at the time of trial, a member of the State Bar of Michigan would affect their ability to be imparital. Defense counsel objected to the questiоn concerning his client’s former status as a Catholic priest only after one potential juror indicated that she associated Catholic brothers with homosexuality and implied that her views were the same in respect to Catholic priests. Immediately after the prosecutor asked the potential jurors whether defendant’s current status as a lawyer would affect their ability to fairly render a verdict, defense counsel replied, "I have a similar objection. I will аrticulate that at a later time if I may.” Taken in context, it appears that defense counsel may well have been indicating that he had a question similar to the one the prosecutor had just posed which *444 he planned to ask the potential jurors. Although a serious question exists as to whether defendant’s objection to the voir dire questions has been properly preserved for appellate review, we nonetheless choose to address this assignment оf error on its merits.
The purpose of voir dire of prospective jurors is to afford counsel the opportunity to develop a rational basis for exercising both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, and the scope of voir dire is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge.
People v Harrell,
Defendant cites
People v Hall,
Defendant cites no authorities to support his contention that it was improper to allow the jurors to be questioned about his status as an attorney. Moreover, defendant points to nothing in the reсord which even suggests that any juror was biased against him because he was an attorney. Thus, even if the question had been improper (which it was not), this would not be a basis for reversal. GCR 1963, 529.1.
Defendant next asserts that his conviction must be reversed beсause the prosecution did not produce various res gestae witnesses at the trial. However, as defendant never objected to the non-production of these witnesses or moved for a new trial or evidentiary hearing on this basis, this claim is not properly presented to this Court for review.
People v Willie Pearson,
Defendant’s final, and most troubling, assignment of error is that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of similar-acts testimony which, if believed, showed that defendant had grabbed the genitals оf others boys in the past. In
People v Golochowicz,
The trial court instructed the jury that it was only to consider the similar-acts evidence to aid it in determining whether defendant had acted "purposely” in touching the complainant, "that is, his acts wеre the result of a characteristic scheme or plan or system”.
On appeal the prosecution argues that the similar-acts evidence was admissible to show that defendant had intentionally touched the complainant fоr the purpose of sexual gratification — an element which must be proved to obtain a conviction under MCL 750.520a(g); MSA 28.788(l)(g). The prosecution has apparently abandoned the other basis upon which it argued for admissibility below, namely, to shоw "evidence probative of a design, scheme or plan”. This decision is well founded. 2
*447
In may respects, the scenario we are presented with is similar to the one posed in
People v Major,
In Major, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant’s intent and motive were not genuinely in issue in that case. The Court specifically noted that defendant had not asserted that the kiss was unintentional or done for some innocent purpose. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that, had the defendant asserted lack of intent or an innocent purpose in the kiss, the prior sexual acts may have been admissible.
In the instant case, in his opening argument, *448 defense counsel noted that the prosecution had to prove an intentional touching for the purpose of sexual gratification. Moreover, in his closing argument, defendant рersonally argued that playing keep-away in the water necessarily involved bodily contact with other participants. The existence of these arguments, unlike the scenario in Major, materially raised the question of whether defendаnt had committed an intentional touching for the purpose of sexual gratification. We further note the inherent improbability that the defendant in Major could have had any intention other than sexual gratification in raising the shirt of the 11-year-old complainant there and kissing her breast. In this case, to the contrary, without more, an incidental touching during the course of horseplay in a swimming pool was entirely plausible. Suffice it to say that on the facts of this case the defense had to do very little to raise a genuine question of whether there had been an intentional touching for the purpose of sexual gratification.
Defendant also assigns error to the fact that the trial court never found on the record that the probative value of the similar-acts evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The prosecution denies this contention, asserting that defendant has simply failed to provide this Court with the relevant transcript. We need nоt resolve this dispute because the Supreme Court has never required the trial courts to make this determination on the record, even though at least one panel of this Court has suggested that it should.
People v Nabers,
Affirmed.
Notes
Defendant also argues that his status as a former priest was irrelevant and that he would not have been allowеd to give testimony about his religious beliefs. However, the fact that defendant could not give testimony about his religious beliefs certainly would not preclude defense counsel from bringing to the jury’s attention that his client was at one time a priest. The prosecution had reason to be concerned about how the jury might react after learning this fact alone, wholly apart from defendant’s professed religious beliefs.
In
People v Oliphant,