45 N.Y.2d 856
NY
1978

Lead Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

In this case the court, without request from the defendant, charged the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify at the trial. At the conclusion of the charge defendant objected to the court’s submission of this instruction absent a request from the defendant to do so.

Under CPL 300.10 (subd 2), the court "must deliver” a "no inference” charge to the jury when requested by the defense (People v Britt, 43 NY2d 111). We do not read the statute conversely as establishing an absolute prohibition against the court exercising its discretion in submitting such a charge without a request from the defendant. This discretion, however, should be rarely exercised, since defense counsel, as a tactical matter, in many cases, may wish the charge not given.

Additionally, because of the significant difference from the standpoint of a defendant between the denial of a request for the "no inference” charge and the giving of that charge without request, there is a difference as to the availability of harmless error analysis. Where the request for the charge has been denied there can be no harmless error (People v Britt, supra). Where, however, as here the charge was given without request, there may be an application of the constitutional harmless error doctrine (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237). In this case, since the proof of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, the error committed in submitting the charge, if even it be, was harmless.

We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing, since the court, having heard the testimony of the identifying officer, found that the identification was untainted by his observation of defendant’s photograph and was based instead on his independent recollection (People v Ramos, 42 NY2d 834, 835).





Dissenting Opinion

Fuchsberg, J.

(dissenting). It can hardly be disputed that CPL 300.10 (subd 2) is both a recognition of and an attempt to deal with the sensitive problem that a defendant in a criminal case faces when he chooses not to take the stand. Though no unfavorable inferences are to flow from the exercise of that constitutional privilege (cf. Brooks v Tennessee, 406 US 605; Griffin v California, 380 US 609), failure to recognize that that ideal is seldom achieved would be to ignore reality.

Whether to give or not to give a "no inference” charge in order to attempt to eradicate a lurking adverse inference has long been an unanswerable question (see People v Britt, 52 AD2d 811, 813 [Birns, J., dissenting], revd 43 NY2d 111; 18 ALR3d 1335). Experienced Judges and lawyers know that one course or the other will not necessarily quell whatever degree of prejudice may exist, but, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, indeed may heighten it.

Confronted with this dilemma, the defendant — the person directly affected — should be the only one empowered to make the tactical decision as to whether a trial court should of should not deliver a "no inference” instruction (see Lakeside v Oregon, 435 US 333, 342 [Stevens, J., dissenting]; Gross v State, 261 Ind 489; Russell v State, 240 Ark 97; People v Molano, 253 Cal App 2d 841).

Section 300.10 (subd 2), deliberately worded in terms of responsiveness to a defendant’s request alone, is a vigorous statement consonant with this view. By conditioning the "no inference” charge on a defendant’s request "but not otherwise”, the statute implies the converse as well: not only must the Trial Judge give the charge when a defendant asks for it, but he is not to do so when a defendant fails to so request, usually for fear that spotlighting his failure to testify will cause the jury to believe he has something to hide.

And now a word as to harmless error. I fail to see why, when a refusal to give a "no inference” charge over a defendant’s request is authoritatively regarded as reversible error (People v Britt, 52 AD2d 811, supra), the converse situation which we face here can be characterized as harmless (People v Mulligan, 40 AD2d 165). How can it be said that the statutory mandate has been more obviously violated or that the judicial interference with the defendant’s trial strategy is of greater dimension in the one case than it is in the other?

I would, therefore, vote to reverse and order a new trial.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler and Cooke concur in memorandum; Judge Fuchs-berg dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion.

Order affirmed.