THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. ADRIAN RAPHAEL VELA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. G052282
Fourth Dist., Div. Three.
Apr. 24, 2017
68
THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA GRANTED REVIEW IN THIS MATTER (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(e)(1)(B), 8.1115(e)) July 12, 2017, S242298.
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette Cavalier, Elizabeth M. Carino and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.—
I
INTRODUCTION
Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Raphael Vela and one of his fellow gang members “hit up” (confronted) two suspected rival gang members. Vela‘s
Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72-year-to-life sentence. In the unpublished parts of this opinion, we will find that the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela‘s sentence does not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment.
In the published portion of this opinion, we conditionally reverse the judgment. Due to the electorate‘s recent approval of Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an “adult” criminal court. Only a juvenile court judge can determine whether a minor can be prosecuted and sentenced as an adult, after conducting a transfer hearing, taking into account various factors such as the minor‘s age, maturity, criminal sophistication, and his or her likelihood of rehabilitation.
We find that Vela is retroactivеly entitled to a transfer hearing because his case is not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela‘s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determines that Vela is amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions will be deemed juvenile adjudications. The juvenile court is then to impose an appropriate disposition within its discretion under juvenile court law.
II*
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III
DISCUSSION
A.–C.*
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Although Vela was 16 years old when he committed these offenses, the Orange County District Attorney chose to file the charges directly in “adult” or criminal court. At that time, the district attorney was permitted to do so.
While this appeal was pending, Proposition 57, also known as “The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016,” became effective. Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the
After we filed an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment, Vela filed a petition for rehearing contending that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to his case. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).) Ordinarily, this court will not address an issue that has been raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 159, fn. 2.) However, for good cause we may do so. (Alameda County Management Employees Assn. v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 325, 338, fn. 10.) This court granted the petition.
We hold that (1) the amendments to the
1. Proposition 57 applies retroactively.
The Legislature ordinarily makes laws that will apply to events that will occur in the future. Accordingly, there is a presumption that laws apply prospectively rather than retroactively. But this presumption against retroactivity is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1224.) Therefore, the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either explicitly or by implication. (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 311
a. The purpose of the juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate minors.
Before we consider the intent of Proposition 57, a brief discussion of some of the distinctions between the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system is in order. Generally, all of the laws regarding juvenile delinquency proceedings are included within the
Genеrally, any person under the age of 18 who is charged with violating a law is considered a “minor.” (See
There is no “sentence,” per se, in juvenile court. Rather, a judge can impose a wide variety of rehabilitation alternatives after conducting a “dispositional hearing,” which is equivalent to a sentencing hearing in a criminal court. (
b. Discretionary direct filing by prosecutors began with Proposition 21.
Prior tо Proposition 57, rather than filing a juvenile petition, a prosecutor could, for certain offenses, choose to directly file a criminal complaint against a minor 14 years of age or older in criminal court. (Former § 707, subd. (d), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.2, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016), eff. Nov. 9, 2016.) Discretionary direct filing was the result of a previous ballot measure, Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998. (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 549, 574 (Manduley).) Among other provisions, “Proposition 21 revised the juvenile court law to broaden the circumstances in which minors 14 years of age and older can be prоsecuted in the criminal division of the superior court, rather than in juvenile court. [The initiative], authorize[d] specified charges against certain minors to be filed directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction, without a judicial determination of unfitness under the juvenile court law.” (Id. at p. 549, italics added.) In Manduley, the Supreme Court upheld Proposition 21 against a variety of challenges to the prosecutor‘s discretionary authority to directly file charges: “The decision to file charges in criminal court [against a minor] is analogous to a prosecutor‘s decision to pursue capital charges against a defendant.” (Manduley, at p. 570.)
Proposition 21 inсluded various findings and declarations, among them: “While overall crime is declining, juvenile crime has become a larger and more ominous threat“; “The rehabilitative/treatment juvenile court philosophy was adopted at a time when most juvenile crime consisted of petty offenses. The juvenile justice system is not well-equipped to adequately protect the public from violent and repeat serious juvenile offenders“; “Juvenile court resources are spent disproportionately on violent offenders with little chance to be rehabilitated“; “Dramatic changes are needed in the way we treat juvenile criminals . . . if we are to avoid the predicted, unprecedented surge in juvenile and gang violence.” (Text of Prop. 21 <http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/propositions/21text.htm> [as of Apr. 24, 2017].)
Sixteen years after Proposition 21, the electorate approved Proposition 57, which repealed both discretionary and mandatory direct filing by prosecutors and emphasized juvenile rehabilitation. During that time there had been a sea change in penology regarding the relative culрability and rehabilitation possibilities for juvenile offenders, as reflected in several judicial opinions. (See, e.g., Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 67 [a juvenile cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a nonhomicide offense ]; see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–472 (Miller) [no more mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, even a homicide offense; there must be a consideration of youth-related factors in sentencing].) In Miller, the United States Supreme Court took note of the practice of prosecutors directly filing charges against minors: “The States next argue that courts and prosecutors sufficiently consider a juvenile defendant‘s age, as well as his background and the circumstances of his crime, when deciding whether to try him as an adult. But this argument ignores that many States use mandatory transfer systems. In addition, some lodge the decision in the hands of the prosecutors, rather than courts.” (Id. at p. 463.)
In order to determine the intent of Proposition 57, we not only look to its provisions, but we may also look to the ballot materials in support of its passage. (See, e.g., Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901 [official ballot pamphlet useful in interpreting voter initiatives].) Here, the ballot pamphlet “supporting Proposition 57 contains two express purposes relatеd to juvenile offenders: ‘Stop the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles‘; and ‘Require a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.’ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, § 2, p. 141.) In addition, the legislative analysis supporting Proposition 57 went so far as to state: ‘the only way a youth could be tried in adult court is if the juvenile court judge in the hearing [under
d. The implied intent of Proposition 57 was to retroаctively extend its emphasis on juvenile rehabilitation to every minor to whom it could constitutionally apply.
Although Proposition 57 plainly applies to minors whose charges are filed after its effective date, we must now determine whether it also applies retroactively. That is, does the electorate‘s express intent to emphasize juvenile rehabilitation extend to minors—such as Vela—who have been directly filed upon in criminal court by a prosecutor, but who were not given the benefit of a juvenile transfer hearing, and whose cases are not yet final on appeal?
Whеn analyzing questions regarding retroactivity, we look primarily to our Supreme Court‘s opinion in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, for guidance. In Estrada, the defendant was initially convicted of a drug offense and was committed to a rehabilitation center. (Id. at pp. 742-743.) Estrada left the center at some point and was later captured and pleaded guilty to escape without force or violence. (Id. at p. 744.) At the time of his escape, the punishment for an escape was at least one consecutive year in prison. Further, there was also a statutory delay in an inmate‘s parole eligibility. But in Estrada‘s case, after his escape, but bеfore his conviction, the Legislature amended the applicable statutes. An escape without force or violence was now punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than six months, nor more than five years, with no delay in parole eligibility. (Id. at pp. 743-744.)
The Supreme Court reasoned that Estrada was “entitled to the ameliorating benefits of the statutes” as they had been amended. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) The Supreme Court recognized “the general rule of construction, coming to us from the common law, that when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not retroactively. That rule of construction, however, is not a straitjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent.” (Id. at p. 746.)
The Supreme Court further explained that: ” ‘A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a рronouncement; the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance. As to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the legislative design that the lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently reach the courts.’ ” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 745–746.)
Here, for a minor accused of a crime, it is a potential “ameliorating benefit” to have a neutral judge, rather than a district attorney, determine that he or she is unfit for rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. While a district attorney has an obligation to be objeсtive and impartial, the duty of that position is also to act as a zealous advocate. (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 590.) And the impact of the decision to prosecute a minor in criminal court rather than juvenile court can spell the difference between a 16-year-old minor such as Vela being sentenced to prison for 72 years to life, or a discharge from the DJJ‘s custody at a maximum of 23 years of age. After the passage of Proposition 57, a juvenile court judge can only make that irrevocable decision after receiving a probation report and after conducting a full hearing considering thе minor‘s prior history, the circumstances of the offense, and several other factors relating to his or her youth and immaturity. (
e. The possibility for a minor‘s rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system is analogous to the possible reduction of a criminal defendant‘s sentence.
The Attorney General argues that ”Estrada‘s retroactivity rule only applies in the specific situation where the law unambiguously reduces a sentence or liability for a particular crime.” The Attorney General contеnds that since Proposition 57 does not “unambiguously” reduce a sentence for a particular crime, the reasoning of Estrada does not apply. We disagree.
We recognize, of course, that we are bound by the opinions of the California Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) However, we do not interpret the holding, or ratio decidendi, of Estrada to be limited to its particular facts. “The fundamental rule for determining the precedential force and applicability of a case is to ascertain its true holding or ratio decidendi. The rule has been summarized as follows: ‘The ratio decidendi is the principle or rule which constitutes the ground of the decision, and it is this principle or rule which has the effect of a precedent.’ ” (Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033.) But a close reading of Estrada reveals that the Legislature did not unambiguously reduce the sentence for Estrada‘s particular crime: an escape without force or violence. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 743.)
Again, in Estrada, the defendant had been convicted of an escape without force or violence under the then existing version of the escape statute. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 743.) On the day of Estrada‘s escape, the statute made no distinction between escapes with force or violence and escapes without force or violence. Every defendant was required tо be sentenced to a term of not less than one year in state prison consecutive to his
However, the sentence for Estrada‘s particular crime—an escape without force or violence—was not “unambiguously reduced” by the amendment. That is, after the Legislature amended the escape statute, a court could still sentence a particular defendant to a one-year or greater consecutive sentence for a nonviolent escape and still have remained within the five-year sentencing range. Thus, the actual effect of the amendment was to create the possibility for a reduction in a defendant‘s sentence based on the discretion of the court and a defendant‘s particular circumstances.
When a change in the law allows a court to exercise its sentencing discretion more favorably for a particular defendant, the reasoning of Estrada applies. (People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75–76 (Francis).) In Francis, the defendant had no prior record of narcotic offenses, but was convicted of possessing “four ‘sandwich bag packages’ ” of marijuana. (Id. at p. 70.) The court denied probation and sentenced the defendant to state prison for one to 10 years. (Id. at p. 75.) “While the instant case was pending on appeal, [the Health and Safety Code section] was amended to provide for alternative sentences of imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison for one to ten years where no prior narcotics offenses are shown [citation].” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, and remanded the defendant‘s case “to the trial court to reconsider the matter of probation and sentence.” (Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 75.)
In Francis, the Attorney General argued that Estrada was distinguishable because the Legislature had not unambiguously reduced the defendant‘s sentence; rather, it had changed the crime from a straight felony to a “wobbler.” (Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 76.) The Supreme Court disagreed. “Here, unlike Estrada, the amendment does not revoke one penalty and provide for a lesser one but rather vests in the trial court discretion to impose either the same penalty as under the former law or a lesser penalty.” (Ibid., italics added.) The Supreme Court was persuaded that “the mere fact that the Legislature changed the offense from a felony to a felony-misdemeаnor conceivably might cause a trial court to impose a county jail
Here, the electorate has taken away from prosecutors the discretion to directly file cases against minors in criminal courts. As a result—similar to the discretion of a judge to reduce a crime from a felony to a misdemeanor in some cases—a juvenile court judge can now exercise his or her discretion in some cases and determine that a minor should remain in the juvenile justice system rather than face prosecution and sentencing in the criminal courts. For those minors who remain in the juvenile court, with its primary emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment, the potential effect of that “ameliorating benefit” is analogous to the potential reduction in a criminal defendant‘s sentence as in Estrada and Francis.
Our colleagues in the First District Court of Appeal, Division Four, recently addressed Proposition 57 under similar circumstances. (People v. Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569 (Cervantes).) In Cervantes, a 14-year-old defendant had been tried and convicted in an “adult” criminal court, prior to the passage of Proposition 57, without a “transfer” or “fitness” hearing. The court reversed eight of the defendant‘s 15 convictions. (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.) The court held that Proposition 57 affords the defendant an opportunity for a fitness hearing on remаnd as to any counts to be retried, but Cervantes did not find that Proposition 57 applies retroactively under Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740. Cervantes held that “the Supreme Court has limited Estrada to statutory changes that mitigate the penalty for a particular offense.” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 600, some capitalization omitted.) We respectfully disagree. Again, in Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 76, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Estrada in a situation where a statutory change converted a crime from a straight felony into a wobbler. That is, in Francis, the Supreme Court applied the statutory change retroactively, even though it did not necessarily mitigate the penalty for that particular crime for that particular defendant.
In Cervantes, the court also relied on People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 (Brown), for the proposition that the reasoning of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, cannot be extended to any situation other than the reduction of a defendant‘s sentence for a particular
But under Proposition 57, a transfer hearing conducted by a juvenile cоurt judge does not address future conduct or provide incentives for good behavior as in Brown. Rather, the potential benefit of a juvenile transfer hearing is that it may, in fact, dramatically alter a minor‘s effective sentence or “juvenile disposition” for past criminal conduct. Thus, just as the Supreme Court reasoned in Estrada and Francis, we infer that the electorate intended the possible ameliorating benefits of Proposition 57 to apply to every minor to whom it may constitutionally apply, including Vela.
2. Vela is entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing.
Having found that the statutory amendments under Proposition 57 apply retroactively, we must now address what should happen with Vela‘s judgment. Not surprisingly, Vela urges that his convictions should be reversed. We disagree. The jury‘s convictions, as well as its true findings as to the sentencing enhancements, will remain in place. Nothing is to be gained by having a “jurisdictional hearing,” or effectively a second trial, in the juvenile court.
On the other hand, the Attorney General argues that the failure to provide Vela with a juvenile transfer hearing constitutes only “harmless error” given the nature of the charges and the underlying facts of this case. We disagree. This court is not in a position to evaluate the various factors to be considered at a juvеnile transfer hearing such as Vela‘s “physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense[s].” (
We will seek to strike a middle ground. An appellate court “may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.” (
Here, under these circumstances, Vela‘s conviction and sentence are conditionally reversed and we order the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing. (
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the criminal court is conditionally reversed. The cause is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to conduct a transfer hearing, as discussed within this opinion, no later than 90 days from the filing of the remittitur. If, at the transfer hearing, the juvenile court determines that it would have transferred Vela to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then the judgment shall be reinstated as of that date. The criminal court is then to conduct a limited “Franklin hearing” within 30 days as discussed within the unpublished portion of this opinion.
If, at the transfer hearing, the juvenile court determines that it would not have transferred Vela to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then Vela‘s criminal
Bedsworth, Acting P. J., and Thompson, J., concurred.
Respondent‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was granted July 12, 2017, S242298. Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 12, 2017, S242298. On February 28, 2018, cause transferred to Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, with directions. On March 5, 2018, opinion vacated by order of the California Supreme Court. See 21 Cal.App.5th 1099 for subsequent opinion.