THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH VEAMATAHAU, Defendant and Appellant.
S249872
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
February 27, 2020
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
First Appellate District, Division One, A150689; San Mateo County Superior Court, SF398877A. This opinion follows companion case S248730, also filed on February 27, 2020. Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger and Groban concurred.
In this case, we determine whether an expert related impermissible case-specific hearsay. The expert told the jury that he identified the controlled
Defendant appealed, asserting that the expert testimony violated Sanchez‘s prohibition against communication of case-specific hearsay. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It concluded that the “testimony about the database, while hearsay, was not case specific, but the type of general background information which has always been admissible when related by an expert.” (People v. Veamatahau (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 68, 73 (Veamatahau).) The court further found sufficient evidence supported defendant‘s conviction for possession of alprazolam.
We agree with the Court of Appeal on both of these issues and affirm its judgment in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2015, an East Palo Alto police officer, Sergeant Clint Simmont, spotted defendant Joseph Veamatahau‘s vehicle making an unlawful turn. The officer activated his lights, and defendant fled but was eventually apprehended. A search of defendant‘s person and vehicle revealed a plastic bag containing what turned out to be cocaine base and — as is relevant for this appeal — pills wrapped in cellophane inside his pocket. Sergeant Simmont arrested defendant and interrogated him at the police station. A recording of the interview was played for the jury. During the interrogation, the officer asked defendant about the pills, saying, “What about the pills that you had, the bars? The Xanibars?” Defendant responded, “I take those,” and admitted to taking “a lot,” “four or five” pills “[e]very day,” “until I feel good.”
At trial, Sergeant Simmont testified concerning his experience in narcotics investigation and referred to the pills recovered as “Xanax pills.” Scott Rienhardt, a criminalist from the San Mateo County Sheriff‘s Office Forensic Laboratory, also testified. Rienhardt worked in the “controlled substances . . . and toxicology unit” at the laboratory, where he had been employed for seven years. Rienhardt held a degree in “chemistry, with an emphasis in analytical
Rienhardt then testified regarding the process by which “evidence comes into the lab to be tested after it‘s been seized by the police.” Rienhardt‘s testimony, along with Sergeant Simmont‘s, established that Rienhardt examined the pills recovered from defendant. The prosecutor then asked Rienhardt if he was “able to identify the contents” of the pills. Rienhardt responded affirmatively. When the prosecutor inquired about the method by which Rienhardt performed the identification, Rienhardt explained he used “a database that [he] searched against [] the logos that were on the tablets.” Following up on the explanation, the prosecutor asked, “Is that the generally accepted method of testing for this kind of substance in the scientific community?” Rienhardt confirmed that it was. He then opined that, as a result of following this method, he “found the tablets to contain alprazolam.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to cast doubt on Rienhardt‘s identification. Counsel first asked whether Rienhardt performed chemical tests on the pills. Rienhardt said he did not and explained that such tests were not the procedure followed by the San Mateo Forensic Laboratory. Counsel then suggested that a visual examination did not rule out the possibility that the tablets “could be something else.” Rienhardt‘s response indicated why he did not believe the tablets were “something else.” According to Rienhardt, when “there‘s a controlled substance in the tablet, the FDA requires companies to have a distinct imprint on those tablets to differentiate it from any other tablets. The FDA regulates that. [¶] And if there‘s a tablet that has — in this case GG32 or 249 [as an imprint] — you can look that up. And it‘s going to tell you that it contains alprazolam, 2 milligrams. And that‘s — we trust that, all those regulations being in place, to say that there‘s alprazolam in those tablets.” Rienhardt conceded, however, that he did not “know who put those little letters” on the tablets.
At the end of the prosecutor‘s presentation of evidence, and outside of the presence of the jury, defendant moved for acquittal under
Defendant appealed his conviction. Before the Court of Appeal, as here, defendant contended “his conviction must be reversed because Rienhardt‘s testimony relayed case-specific hearsay to the jury which was improper under Sanchez.” (Veamatahau, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 72.) The appellate court rejected the argument, finding that “the only ‘case-specific’ fact here concerned the markings Rienhardt saw on the pills recovered from defendant.” (Id. at p. 74.) However, Rienhardt‘s “testimony about the appearance of the pills was not hearsay because it was based on his personal observation.” (Ibid.) What was not based on Rienhardt‘s personal knowledge was information obtained from the database, but this information “was not about the specific pills seized from defendant, but generally about what pills containing certain chemicals look like.” (Id. at p. 75, fn. omitted.) Although the information “is clearly hearsay, it is the type of background information which has always been admissible under state evidentiary law.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
The Court of Appeal thus found that Rienhardt‘s testimony was properly admitted. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly disagreed with People v. Stamps (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 988 (Stamps), “a factually similar case” in which the court found that the expert‘s testimony was inadmissible. (Veamatahau, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.) In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Veamatahau court also rejected defendant‘s claim that insufficient evidence supported his conviction. It therefore affirmed defendant‘s conviction for possession of alprazolam.
We granted review to resolve the conflict between the decision below and Stamps.
II. ANALYSIS
Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We begin by examining whether the expert related inadmissible case-specific hearsay in testifying to the contents of a database used to identify the chemical composition of the pills recovered from defendant. After resolving this question, we consider whether substantial
A. Whether the Expert Related Inadmissible Case-Specific Hearsay
As a preliminary matter, we note that defendant did not object at trial to the introduction of Rienhardt‘s testimony. However, defendant was convicted two days before we issued Sanchez, and, as we have recently decided, the failure to object in such circumstances does not forfeit a defendant‘s Sanchez claim. (People v. Perez (Feb. 27, 2020, S082101) _ Cal.5th _.)
In Sanchez, we clarified the “proper application” of our evidentiary law as it relates to the intersection of hearsay and expert testimony. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 670.) We began by explaining that “[t]he hearsay rule has traditionally not barred an expert‘s testimony regarding his general knowledge in his field of expertise.” (Id. at p. 676.) The reason for this is pragmatic: because “experts frequently acquired their knowledge from hearsay, . . . ‘to reject a professional physician or mathematician because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known to him only upon the authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of professional work and to insist on . . . impossible standards.‘” (Ibid.; accord, e.g., Imwinkelried, The Bases of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony (1988) 67 N.C. L.Rev. 1, 9 [“As one court has put it, it would be ‘virtually impossible’ for a scientist to avoid relying on hearsay sources of information. That observation is an understatement“].) Because experts rely on hearsay knowledge and because a jury “must independently evaluate the probative value of an expert‘s testimony,” including by assessing the basis of the expert‘s opinion, the expert is entitled to tell the jury the basis or “‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686.) Hence, “[i]n addition to matters within their own personal knowledge, experts may relate information acquired through their training and experience, even though that information may have been derived from conversations with others, lectures, study of learned treatises, etc.” (Id. at p. 675.)
The Legislature codified this common law rule when it enacted the
By contrast, an expert may not relate inadmissible “case-specific facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) “Case-specific facts are those relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” (Ibid.) Testimony relating such facts, unlike testimony about non-case-specific background information, is subject to exclusion on hearsay grounds. (Id. at p. 684, fn. omitted [“If an expert testifies to case-specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for his opinion, those statements are necessarily considered by the jury for their truth, thus rendering them hearsay. Like any other hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an applicable hearsay exception“].) The distinction between case-specific facts and background information thus is crucial — the former may be excluded as hearsay, the latter may not.
Relying on Sanchez, defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because it was based on inadmissible hearsay “conveyed through expert testimony.” We disagree. As Sanchez made clear, the part of the expert‘s testimony that may be excluded on hearsay ground is that relating “case-specific facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) None of Rienhardt‘s statements falls in this category of impermissible testimony.
On direct examination, Rienhardt testified that, in his field, it is standard practice to identify pharmaceutical pills by visual inspection, whereby one compares markings found on the pills against a database of imprints that the Food and Drug Administration requires to be placed on tablets containing controlled substances. He then testified that he performed this visual inspection on the pills seized from defendant and formed the opinion that they
On the other hand, some of Rienhardt‘s testimony elicited on cross-examination constituted hearsay. In response to questioning by defense counsel, Rienhardt explained that the database he used “tell[s] you” that pills displaying a certain imprint “contain[] alprazolam, 2 milligrams.” This information was hearsay but, crucially, not case specific.2
Rienhardt‘s statement concerning what the database “tell[s] you” related general background information relied upon in the criminalist‘s field. The facts disclosed by the database, and conveyed by Rienhardt, are “about what [any generic] pills containing certain chemicals look like.” (Veamatahau, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 75, fn. omitted.) The database revealed nothing about “the particular events . . . in the case being tried,” i.e., the particular pills that Sergeant Simmont seized from defendant. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) Any information about the specific pills seized from defendant came from Rienhardt‘s personal observation (that they contained the logos “GG32 or 249“) and his ultimate opinion (that they contained alprazolam), not from the database. In short, information from the database is not case specific but is the kind of background information experts have traditionally been able to rely on and relate to the jury. (See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686; People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 506-507; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1131; People v. Espinoza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 317, 321 (Espinoza); People v. Blessett (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 903, 943; Iraheta, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1243; Vega-Robles, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 408; Meraz, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1174-1175.)
An example we gave in Sanchez illustrates this point. In Sanchez, we said, “[t]hat an associate of the defendant had a diamond tattooed on his arm would be a case-specific fact that could be established by a witness who saw the tattoo, or by an authenticated photograph. That the diamond is a symbol adopted by a given street gang would be background information about which a gang expert could testify. The expert could also be allowed to give an opinion that the presence of a diamond tattoo shows the person belongs to the gang.”
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.)3 The example may be readily analogized to the case at hand. Just as information that diamonds are a symbol of a certain gang is background knowledge, information that the designation “GG32 or 249” engraved on pharmaceutical tablets indicates that the tablets contain alprazolam is “background information about which a[n] . . . expert could testify.” (Ibid.) To be sure, street gangs and the symbols they use might or might not be the kind of information stored in a searchable database. Yet the location of a piece of information cannot change its nature. Simply because an expert obtained information from a database — instead of, say, a list of gang symbols maintained by a law enforcement agency — does not metamorphose that information from background knowledge into case-specific facts.
Defendant resists this conclusion, arguing that information obtained from a specific database cannot be background knowledge. According to defendant, background or general knowledge refers to “overall knowledge acquired from sources too numerous to distinguish and quantify.” Because “[a]n expert‘s general background knowledge is the commingled result of experience and educational hearsay that is impracticable to disentangle,” experts relating background knowledge “likely could not cite the specific textbook . . . or the
We reject defendant‘s crabbed view of expert knowledge. Defendant makes his assertion without any analysis of the relevant provisions of the
Again, the examples we used in Sanchez shed light on the matter. There we said that general background information encompasses the following: (1) in an automobile accident case, “that a given equation can be used to estimate speed based on [skid] marks“; (2) in a case involving suspected foul play, the “circumstances [that] might cause . . . hemorrhaging” in the eyes; and (3) in a personal injury case, the “potential long-term effects” of a serious head injury. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 677.) Examining each of these types of information, we observe that the relevant equation and the fact that it can “be used to estimate speed” may be found in physics textbooks, circumstances causing hemorrhaging in medical treatises, and the long term effects of an injury in research papers. (Ibid.) As these examples make clear, an expert may consult specific sources in a case — a textbook, a treatise, or an academic paper — and supply the information found therein to the jury as background information without running afoul of the hearsay rules.
Subdivision (b) of
Insofar as defendant argues that specific reference sources constitute background information only if the expert happened to know the information off-hand and did not review the source materials in preparing for a particular case, we reject the argument. It is untenable that the same information would be background knowledge when conveyed by one expert but case-specific information when provided by another solely because one of the experts consulted a resource containing that information before testifying. We cannot accept a framework under which the standard for admitting expert testimony would, as the Attorney General says, “turn on the expert‘s memory rather than on the reliability of the underlying material.”
To reiterate, the relevant hearsay analysis under Sanchez is whether the expert is relating general or case-specific out-of-court statements. The focus of the inquiry is on the information conveyed by the expert‘s testimony, not how the expert came to learn of such information. Thus, regardless of whether an expert testified to certain facts based on composite knowledge “acquired from sources too numerous to distinguish and quantify” or if the expert simply looked up the facts in a specific reference as part of his or her duties in a particular case, the facts remain the same. The background or case-specific character of the information does not change because of the source from which an expert acquired his or her knowledge.
Defendant also seeks to rely on Stamps, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 988. In that case, the prosecution‘s expert had identified pills recovered from the defendant “as oxycodone and dihydrocodeinone based solely on a visual comparison of the seized pills to those displayed on the Ident-A-Drug Web site.” (Stamps, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) The Court of Appeal found that the expert‘s testimony was inadmissible hearsay because the “Ident-A-Drug content . . . was case specific.” (Id. at p. 997.) The court explained its reasoning in succinct terms, stating, “We think it undeniable that the chemical composition of the pills Stamps possessed must be considered case specific. Indeed, the
We are not persuaded.4 Simply because the Ident-A-Drug web site served as the basis for the expert‘s ultimate opinion does not make information from the site case-specific. The expert‘s opinion that the seized pills were prescription opioids was not hearsay and not otherwise objectionable. (
Defendant further contends that the existence of other statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule — specifically
As the Attorney General points out, however, “evidence is often admissible under more than one theory.” Thus, the existence of one statutory provision allowing for admission of a piece of evidence does not preclude that evidence from being admitted under a different provision. (See, e.g., Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 5 West‘s Ann.
Finally, defendant cites policy reasons for treating sources “consulted by an expert as case-specific hearsay rather than as general background knowledge.” Defendant asserts that only if “the consulted sources are . . . treated as [case-specific] hearsay,” would “the trial court . . . be able to vet the reliability of the sources before the hearsay is presented to the jury.” If the information is instead considered a “part of the expert‘s general knowledge,” the vetting process would be “undercut” because the expert would be permitted to “essentially vouch for the reliability of a source.”
Defendant‘s argument paints a false dichotomy. In fact, in law, and in practice, testimony admitted under
Defendant could have objected to or otherwise challenged this assertion. (See
treated as supplying general information or case-specific facts, the courts are fully empowered to “vet the reliability of the sources” underpinning that testimony. (See Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 770-772.)
Defendant glosses over the court‘s gatekeeping power. Instead, he asserts that the reliability of “reference materials consulted by the expert for a particular case . . . cannot be tested” and, therefore, testimony relying on such materials “cannot fall within the background knowledge exception.” To build his case, defendant constructs what he calls the “surrogate problem.” According to defendant, when an expert consults a reference guide, “the expert witness is not actually the expert providing the expertise.” “Rather, the expert [witness] is acting as a surrogate conveying the expertise of someone else — the author of the reference source.” As such, there can be no “assurance of the reliability” of the surrogate statement.
We disagree. Simply because an expert is relying on information supplied by “someone else” does not mean the trustworthiness of that information cannot be explored through examination. Most directly, that “someone else” “may be called and examined” by the defendant if he so chooses. (
Reliability probes are also not the only tool a trial court has to exclude improper expert testimony. Should an expert attempt to take the stand
In addition, the court has authority under
Defendant in this case did not avail himself of any of these protections offered by the Evidence Code, choosing instead to rely on his closing statements to cast doubt on the reliability of the drug identification procedure.6 Yet simply because defendant did not test Rienhardt‘s testimony — offering no voir dire of the expert, no probing question about the acceptability
In short, the asserted “surrogate problem” offers no reason for us to treat general knowledge as anything but what it is. In the context of cases such as this one, if no chemical testing has been performed, the defense can poke holes in the prosecution‘s case on that basis and argue reliability, or lack thereof, to the jury, as happened here. What the defense cannot do is claim that the expert‘s testimony concerning the identification procedure he followed in lieu of chemical testing should be excluded on hearsay grounds merely because the defense did not scrutinize the reliability of said procedure.
For these reasons, we reject defendant‘s arguments. Consistent with our statutory rules of evidence and case law, we hold that Rienhardt related no inadmissible case-specific hearsay in testifying to the contents of a drug identification database.
B. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant‘s Conviction
Independent of the admissibility of Rienhardt‘s testimony, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal pursuant to
We review the denial of a
In this case, defendant contests only one element of the misdemeanor possession charge: that the pills he possessed actually contained the controlled substance alprazolam. We have concluded that Rienhardt was properly allowed to give his opinion to that effect. In addition, our case law is clear that the element may be established by circumstantial evidence — that is, by evidence other than direct, chemical testing. (People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72 [“the narcotic character of a substance may, of course, be proved by circumstantial evidence“]; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242 (Palaschak) [similar]; People v. Sonleitner (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 364, 369 (Sonleitner) [similar]; People v. Galfund (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 317, 320 [similar].)7
We agree with the Court of Appeal that substantial circumstantial evidence supports defendant‘s conviction. In addition to Rienhardt‘s testimony, the jury heard Sergeant Simmont‘s identification of the pills. The sergeant made this identification twice, once at trial when he referred to the pills by the brand name of Xanax and once during the interrogation when he referred to them as Xanibars. Sergeant Simmont is an experienced police officer, with experience in narcotics investigation, and a rational jury could credit his testimony that defendant possessed Xanax, or more formally, alprazolam. (See People v. Bailey (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 459, 462-463 (Bailey) [concluding that a trained narcotics officer‘s “testimony establishes that the substance in question was cocaine base“]; Sonleitner, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 369-370 [“the nature of a substance . . . may be proved . . . by the expert
The jury also heard defendant‘s admission. When questioned about the “the pills that [he] had, the bars[,] the Xanibars,” defendant said, “I take those.” Defendant admitted that he had taken “a lot” of the pills and that they helped him “feel good.” Defendant‘s own statements constituted “‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value‘” evidence that the pills are “Xanibars,” or the controlled substance alprazolam. (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 278; see Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 [crediting as part of the evidence against the defendant the fact that “[o]n being arrested, defendant readily admitted ingesting the drug [LSD]“]; People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 216 [“knowledge of the character of dangerous drugs or narcotics may be shown by acts or declarations of the accused“].)
Defendant protests that this evidence shows only that defendant “believed he possessed ‘Xanibar.‘” This is insubstantial, according to defendant, because “[t]here was no testimony that Xanibar and Xanax are synonymous.” But on review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we draw every reasonable inference in support of the verdict. (E.g., Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) In light of Sergeant Simmont‘s use of the term “Xanibars” and “Xanax” to refer to the same pills, a rational jury could have drawn the inference that both are names for the controlled substance alprazolam. Defendant further argues that he may have been mistaken in his belief that he had been taking alprazolam, because “counterfeit drugs are typically sold on the street to unsuspecting users who believe they are real.” Although that might have been possible, such an argument “simply present[s] one interpretation of the evidence“;8 it does not suggest that a reasonable jury could not “draw the opposite inference from the evidence.” (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 308.) Put differently, a reasonable jury was not precluded from taking defendant‘s candid confession at face value — that defendant acquired what he identified as alprazolam, took it, and felt good because the drug was indeed alprazolam. In sum, defendant‘s own statement — along with the testimony of an experienced police officer and a criminalist — provides substantial evidence that defendant possessed the controlled substance alprazolam.
In contesting the above, defendant draws our attention to an out-of-jurisdiction case, State v. Ward (2010) 364 N.C. 133 [694 S.E.2d 738]. The court in Ward held that, under North Carolina‘s evidentiary rules, expert testimony relying solely on visual inspection for drug identification is insufficiently reliable to be admitted. (Id. at p. 739.) Ward is accordingly a case about reliability, not sufficiency of the evidence. As defendant never challenged Rienhardt‘s testimony on reliability grounds under
Although he attempts to rely on Ward, defendant concedes that he does not “claim that chemical analysis is required in every case.” When a chemical analysis is not offered, however, defendant asserts that “because of the prevalence of counterfeit drugs on the street that do not contain active ingredients,” “there must be some additional circumstantial evidence in the record that a particular pill is legitimate.” According to defendant, had the pills been “found in a prescription bottle or in a container bearing information about the producer,” then perhaps “a visual identification [would have been] sufficient.” But because the pills were found wrapped in cellophane, defendant suggests that chemical testing was needed. Yet, it is unclear why a prescription bottle — which may be as easily counterfeited as the drugs themselves — should serve as sufficient “additional circumstantial evidence” when defendant‘s admission that the pills were “Xanibars” and made him feel good does not. Because both circumstances tend to make it less likely that the pills were “counterfeit drugs . . . that do not contain active ingredients,” we reject defendant‘s attempt to draw a rigid distinction between the two.
Finally, defendant faults Rienhardt for not ruling out the possibility of counterfeits by testifying, for example, “that the pills had distinguishing characteristics that differentiated them from counterfeit pills.” On direct examination, Rienhardt stated his opinion that the pills contained alprazolam and the basis for his opinion. He was not required at that point to anticipate and address possible challenges to the basis of his opinion. In other words, it was incumbent on defendant to elicit from Rienhardt whether “the pills had distinguishing characteristics that differentiated them from counterfeit pills” if he wished the jury to draw the conclusion that the drugs were counterfeits. This defendant did not do.
In sum, having found that the trial court did not err in admitting the criminalist‘s testimony, we further find that his testimony and other circumstantial evidence support defendant‘s conviction.
III. DISPOSITION
For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
We Concur:
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Veamatahau
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 24 Cal.App.5th 68
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S249872
Date Filed: February 27, 2020
Court: Superior
County: San Mateo
Judge: Barbara J. Mallach
Counsel:
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, and William Whaley, Deputy State Public Defender, for the Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Donna M. Provenzano, Eric D. Share and Huy T. Luong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Cynthia M. Jones
19363 Willamette Dr., #194
West Linn, OR 97068
(858) 793-9800
Donna M. Provenzano
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 510-3844