People v. VazquezPeople v. Vazquez
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Rarick
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Jose A. Vazquez, was convicted after a jury trial in the circuit court of Franklin County of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of phencyclidine and unlawful possession of lysergic acid diethylamide in connection with an incident that occurred in May of 1988. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and three years’ imprisonment for each of the possession convictions, all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentences.
Defendant was apprehended on May 22, 1988, by Officer Mandrell of the West Frankfort police department, apparently in connection with the investigation of a possible hijacking of a truck on 1-57. Defendant was found in the area walking along a dirt road. When Mandrell approached defendant and ordered him to put his hands up against a tree, defendant informed him he had a gun in his back pocket. Mandrell patted down defendant and found the gun. After additional pat-downs, eight or nine loose bullets and a pill bottle containing drugs were retrieved from the pocket and lining of defendant’s lightweight, windbreaker jacket. Defendant’s theory of defense was that the officers found the gun and drugs in a car a half mile away. The jury, however, chose not to believe defendant’s theory.
Defendant first argues on appeal all three of his convictions must be reversed because the testimony of the State’s witnesses was so improbable and contradictory as to not remove all reasonable doubt of his guilt. Defendant first points to the testimony of Mandrell. According to defendant, Mandrell first testified he found the pistol in defendant’s back pocket, then later in his back hip area, and then later again, from inside defendant’s pants, as defendant claims in an apparent attempt to maneuver around the realization defendant’s pants
As his second issue on appeal, defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel, depriving him of a fair trial. Based on the peculiar posture of the record before us, we must agree. Defendant points to three instances of alleged ineffective assistance. We, however, need address only one, defense counsel’s failure to take advantage of a prior favorable ruling prohibiting the State from mentioning to the jury any specifics of defendant’s prior felony conviction.
Generally speaking, a defendant is entitled to competent but not perfect representation. (See People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92, 473 N.E.2d 1227, 1240.) Consequently, mistakes in judgment or in trial strategy or tactics do not of themselves render representation incompetent. (Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d at 492, 473 N.E.2d at 1240.) Rather, a defendant must prove that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255.
Here, the record reveals that early in the trial, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled the State was not to mention to the jury the nature of defendant’s prior felony conviction for possession of controlled substances in proving a felony conviction for purposes of the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charge. The court specifically stated it believed “it is highly prejudicial to start naming prior offenses *** when the man is standing trial for the same offense.” The court concluded the jury would not see the prior conviction but would be instructed as to its existence without getting into any particulars. At the close of all the evidence during the instruction conference, however, the court asked the prosecution if all exhibits, including the record of defendant’s prior conviction, were to go to the jury. The certified statement of conviction clearly identified the nature of that conviction. The prosecutor responded “yes” without objection by defense counsel or any reminder of the court’s prior ruling excluding such information. The court subsequently instructed the jury that the parties stipulated defendant’s prior conviction for possession of controlled substances was a felony. For some reason, any explanation being completely absent from the record, the trial court totally changed its position. Whether or not the court’s initial ruling was erroneous,
We further note that should the jury find defendant guilty on both possession charges, only one conviction can stand. Simultaneous possession of more than one type of controlled substance constitutes a single offense, supporting only one conviction. See People v. Manning (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 132, 137, 374 N.E.2d 200, 202; Hunter, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 464 N.E.2d at 684.
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse defendant’s convictions and remand this cause to the circuit court of Franklin County for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
CHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.