THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PHILIP VATAMANIUC, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-21-0665
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT
March 31, 2023
2023 IL App (2d) 210665-U
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
No. 13-CF-1611
Honorable Victoria A. Rossetti, Judge, Presiding.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant‘s 54-year sentence for first-degree murder is affirmed, where: (1) the sentence on remand was not more severe than the original sentence; and (2) the trial court properly considered defendant‘s youth and attendant characteristics.
¶ 2 This case comes before us following a remand for resentencing. After a bench trial, defendant, Philip Vatamaniuc, was convicted of first-degree murder (
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the reimposition of a 54-year sentence violates the statutory prohibition on increasing sentences on remand except for conduct occurring after the original sentencing hearing; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a de facto life sentence because, in defendant‘s view, the court misconstrued several of the sentencing factors and conducted an improper analysis. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Original Trial Proceedings
¶ 4 ¶ 5 ¶ 6 The facts were exhaustively recounted by this court in Vatamaniuc I. We briefly summarize the facts to give context to the instant appeal. The evidence at trial demonstrated that on the afternoon of June 3, 2013, defendant, age 17, and codefendants Michael Coffee and Benjamin Schenk, ages 17 and 20, respectively, were together in Highland Park at Lauren Hahn‘s house, who was then age 47. Defendant, Coffee, and Schenk passed a firearm back and forth between them. Coffee initiated a conversation regarding who they could rob to obtain drugs and money, and Colin Nutter‘s name came up. Coffee called Nutter, age 20, and arranged to meet him
¶ 7 As they walked to meet Nutter, Coffee stated that they needed Nutter‘s car because he wanted to go to the west side of Chicago. Schenk told Coffee that Nutter was not going to give them his car, so Coffee stated that they were “going to have to kill him.” Coffee told defendant that it was his turn to “prove[] himself,” and he gave defendant the gun. Defendant and Coffee then began “bandying Four Corner Hustler [(gang)] slogans back and forth and ‘fist bumped.’ ”
¶ 8 When the trio arrived at the meeting spot, they put on gloves and waited for Nutter. Nutter arrived in his Dodge Stratus shortly later, and they got into the vehicle. Coffee sat in the front passenger seat, Schenk sat in the back seat, behind Coffee, and defendant sat behind Nutter. Schenk testified that Coffee turned the volume up on the radio and yelled “do it,” at which point defendant shot Nutter in the back of the head.
¶ 9 Defendant did not testify, but he told investigators that he did not see the gun before they got into the car, and it surprised him when Schenk shot Nutter.
¶ 10 Defendant and Schenk then put Nutter‘s body into the trunk of the Dodge. Coffee drove the trio back to Hahn‘s house, where Schenk and Coffee cleaned the inside of the vehicle with bleach. The trio also smoked marijuana that they had taken from Nutter. After spending several hours at Hahn‘s house, Coffee drove the group in the Dodge to Schenk‘s residence, where they picked up towels, gardening gloves, and a shovel. They then headed toward the west side of Chicago. Schenk testified that they “began to get nervous about driving around with a body in the trunk.” Coffee found a secluded spot and pulled over, and defendant and Schenk placed Nutter‘s body in some brush and covered it with leaves and sticks. They drove away only to return
¶ 11 Early the next day, Schenk and Coffee burglarized the home where Nutter lived with his parents. They took marijuana from Nutter‘s bedroom, prescription medication for Nutter‘s dog from the kitchen counter, and a Ford Focus from the garage. Defendant met up with Shenk and Coffee later that day, and the trio drove back to Chicago. Schenk drove the Dodge while defendant and Coffee drove the Ford. The Ford stopped suddenly at one point, and Schenk rear ended it with the Dodge. They left the Dodge parked on the street, and Schenk entered the Ford. They continued to drive around the west side of Chicago before returning to Hahn‘s house. Police located the Dodge on a street in Chicago, the Ford in Hahn‘s driveway, and the murder weapon in Schenk‘s backyard. Defendant, Schenk, and Coffee were all arrested within a matter of days in connection with the murder.
¶ 12 Following a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of four counts of first-degree murder. The court stated that it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “was the actual shooter,” but it found that the State had proven that, during the commission of the offense, defendant or one whose conduct he was legally responsible for was armed with a firearm, and that “the penalties for said offense [are] an additional 15 years of imprisonment.” After a sentencing hearing, the court merged the first-degree murder convictions and sentenced defendant to 54 years’ imprisonment to be served at 100%, followed by a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release.
B. Direct Appeal
¶ 13 ¶ 14 We affirmed defendant‘s conviction on direct appeal but vacated his sentence and
¶ 15 Defendant, on direct appeal, had also asserted that the trial court was unaware that the imposition of the 15-year firearm enhancement was discretionary under
C. Resentencing Hearing
¶ 16 ¶ 17 On September 27, 2021, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing. It took judicial
¶ 18 In mitigation, and without objection, the court took judicial notice of the mitigation report prepared by Laurie Cashman that was presented at the original sentencing hearing.1 Daniel Vatamaniuc, defendant‘s father, testified at the resentencing hearing. He testified that, at one time, defendant was part of a family of five living under one roof in Highland Park. Defendant‘s mother eventually moved to Arizona, and the family planned to reunite there, but that never happened. Defendant was “a happy kid” before his mother moved away, but after she relocated, defendant “did change.” Daniel testified that he often worked 13 to 14 hours per day, during which defendant was left at home with his brother, who was two years older than defendant. Daniel would sometimes drop off fast food for his sons to eat for dinner before returning to work. He would often come home from work so late that defendant was already asleep. Daniel did not know what defendant and his brother did at home while he was working. He was unaware that defendant was bullied by his older brother, and he did not know that defendant‘s brother had set defendant‘s hair on fire or that he had submerged defendant‘s head underwater until defendant thought he would drown. Daniel acknowledged that a school psychologist recommended that defendant receive counseling and mental health treatment, but he did not act on the recommendation because he incorrectly believed that the school would provide those services. Daniel further testified that, because of his long hours, he “was not home to be a *** real good father,” but he did the best that he could.
¶ 19 Defendant made a statement in allocution. He addressed Nutter‘s family and stated that he
¶ 20 The State argued that the trial court appropriately considered defendant‘s youth and its attendant circumstances in fashioning defendant‘s original sentence. It contended that the purpose of the re-sentencing hearing was to provide the court with an opportunity for it to “rearticulate the reasons for why this sentence is appropriate.” The State argued that the reimposition of a 54-year sentence was warranted because defendant‘s conduct demonstrated irreparable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption, and it outlined each of the Miller factors and argued that the court should find none of them to be mitigating. Addressing the factors, the State emphasized that defendant was just 6 months shy of his 18th birthday at the time of the offense, and that he planned and concealed the murder, which were not impetuous acts. It continued that there was “nothing remarkable” about defendant‘s family and home environment, and there was nothing in defendant‘s background to explain why “a horrific crime was about to occur or could have occurred.” Concerning his degree of participation in the offense, the State argued that defendant was not an innocent bystander, but actively participated in Nutter‘s murder.
¶ 21 The State referred to the mitigation report prepared by Cashman and her opinion that defendant would not reoffend as “bunk,” noting that Cashman prepared the report without first reading the transcript of defendant‘s murder trial or the police reports, and she failed to view the recording of defendant‘s police interview. The State also minimized Cashman‘s reliance on defendant‘s “sincere[]” interest in ‘how she was doing’ as part of the basis for her ultimate opinion, arguing that he interacts with others in a “manner that is [most] beneficial to him.” The
¶ 22 At the conclusion of the parties’ arguments, the trial court announced its findings and re-imposed a 54-year sentence. It prefaced its remarks by noting that it had considered the facts of the case, the presentence investigation report, defendant‘s statements in allocution, the original sentencing hearing as stipulated, the victim impact statements, the mitigation report, the arguments of counsel, and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the additional mitigating factors applicable to juvenile offenders under
¶ 23 The court then recounted the testimony that two officers provided during the original March 2018 sentencing hearing. It noted that Officer Darren Graff of the Highland Park police department received a dispatch in August 2012 regarding suspicious subjects with pillowcases walking between houses. Defendant, Schenk, and a third individual were apprehended. Defendant was found to possess a large knife, a rubber glove, two GPS units, and an iPod. Defendant confessed that, while they were drinking alcohol, he asked the others if they wanted to make quick money by breaking into vehicles. The others agreed, and the group burglarized unlocked vehicles, from which defendant obtained the knife, the GPS units, and the iPod. The court also recounted the prior testimony of Officer Ed Biondi of the Highwood police department. During the very early morning in June 2013 (approximately 13 to 14 hours before Nutter‘s murder), he observed defendant, Schenk, and Coffee walking down the street. Coffee wore yellow surgical gloves, and Officer Biondi asked Coffee why he was wearing them. Coffee replied that it was cold outside and stated that they were headed to his house. Defendant and Schenk ran away in opposite directions and were not apprehended that night. The court also recounted the testimony of corrections officer Kim Crittendon of the Lake County sheriff‘s department. She testified that, from the time of defendant‘s arrest until the original sentencing hearing, defendant had 68 violations in the jail, including five violations for fighting.
¶ 24 After noting the Nutters’ heartfelt victim impact statements, the judge turned her attention to the mitigation report. The court noted the discussion in the report of various aspects of defendant‘s life prior to the instant offense, including his home life where he felt isolated and abused by his older brother, educational background, and challenging school life due to bullying
¶ 25 The trial court also reiterated the testimony of defendant‘s parents from the original sentencing hearing, including his mother‘s testimony that she devastated defendant when she moved out of state, as well as his father‘s testimony that he worked long hours and was not at home much of the time defendant was growing up. Finally, the court reiterated the salient points of defendant‘s statements in allocution from both sentencing hearings.
¶ 26 It then considered the mitigating sentencing factors mandated under the youth sentencing provisions in
¶ 27 Regarding the second factor, outside pressure, the court found that defendant acted voluntarily on the day of the murder as well as in the days that followed. It disagreed with Cashman‘s opinion that defendant was a “follower” who was afraid of Schenk, emphasizing that, after the shooting, he returned to Hahn‘s house several times, both with Schenk and Coffee, and of his own accord. It stated that these were “[n]ot the actions of someone afraid or a follower.” It also noted that defendant had spent time with Schenk since at least August 2012, when defendant concocted a plan to make easy money by burglarizing vehicles with Schenk. Defendant “did just whatever [he] wanted.”
¶ 28 The third factor, defendant‘s family and home environment, was also not mitigating. The court acknowledged that defendant was bullied at school, as well as at home by his older brother. However, it emphasized that even the mitigation report described defendant‘s parents as “loving,”
¶ 29 The court appeared to consider the fifth and sixth youth sentencing factors, the circumstances of the offense and the defendant‘s degree of participation in the offense, in tandem. It reiterated that it was unable to find that defendant was the actual shooter, but it stated that defendant was nevertheless an active participant in the murder because he “was there, planned it, set it up, had the gun, and got in the car.” The court recalled that, during his statement in allocution during the original sentencing hearing, defendant apologized for not having the courage to save Nutter, which the court viewed as confirming that defendant “knew it was going to happen and *** did nothing to stop it.” It further recounted that, after Nutter was murdered, defendant helped “put the body in the trunk” and “dumped it on the side of the road.”
¶ 30 The seventh factor, whether the defendant was able to meaningfully participate in his defense, did not apply. The court stated that defendant was engaged throughout the proceedings, was “capable [during the trial,]” and understood what [his] rights were and voiced [his] opinion.” The eighth factor, defendant‘s prior juvenile or criminal history, was mitigating, because he had “no real criminal background other than the car burglary and the unlawful possession of cannabis
¶ 31 The ninth factor allows the court to consider “any other information that the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate.
¶ 32 The trial court then indicated that it would exercise its discretion under
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 ¶ 34 As noted, defendant argues on appeal that (1) the reimposition of a 54-year sentence violates the statutory prohibition on increasing sentences on remand except for conduct occurring after the original sentencing hearing; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a de facto life sentence because, in defendant‘s view, the court misconstrued several of the sentencing factors and conducted an improper analysis. We address each issue in turn.
A. Whether Defendant‘s Sentence Violates Section 5-5-4(a) of the Code
¶ 35 ¶ 36 On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing
¶ 37 In the instant appeal, defendant contends that his sentence violates the statutory prohibition against the court imposing a more severe sentence on resentencing except for conduct occurring subsequent to the original sentence. Defendant acknowledges that the “total number of years of incarceration remained unchanged,” but he maintains that the trial court nevertheless impermissibly “increased” his sentence on remand because, in his view, his original sentence consisted of “a 39-year base sentence for first-degree murder and a 15-year firearm enhancement,” whereas his new sentence consists of a 54-year base sentence and no enhancement. Defendant concludes that the sentencing judge “remov[ed] the 15-year sentencing enhancement [but] *** increased his base sentence by 15 years.”
¶ 38
“Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different
offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4(a) (West 2020).
¶ 39 The “purpose of section 5-5-4 of the Code is to ensure the due process rights set forth in Pearce by preventing vindictiveness in resentencing a defendant for having exercised his appeal rights or his right to file a post-judgment motion.” People v. Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710 (1996); citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort“).
¶ 40 Defendant relies exclusively on our supreme court‘s holding in People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995), in support of his argument that the trial court improperly increased the unenhanced portion of his sentence on remand. In Kilpatrick, the defendant was originally sentenced to consecutive terms of six years’ imprisonment and nine years’ imprisonment for home invasion and attempted murder, respectively. Id. at 441. The defendant moved to reconsider, arguing that the imposition of consecutive sentences was unwarranted. Id. The court granted the motion and vacated the defendant‘s sentences, but it then imposed a “single sentence” of 15 years’ imprisonment on the two offenses. Id. On review, the supreme court held that the court had “impermissibly increased the sentences for defendant‘s two convictions, from six and nine years for each offense, to 15 years’ incarceration,” in violation of what was then
¶ 41 Defendant asserts that the “same reasoning should apply in this case.” He emphasizes that, in his direct appeal, he challenged his 54-year sentence, in part, because the record suggested that the trial court was unaware that the imposition of the 15-year firearm enhancement was discretionary. See Vatamaniuc I, 2021 IL App (2d) 180379, ¶ 88. Defendant contends that, because his sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing, his “underlying sentence of 39 years should not have been increased *** to make up for the fact that the judge [in her discretion] did not impose the add-on.” Defendant contends that, here, “[t]he judge‘s action is exactly like that of the [sentencing] judge in Kilpatrick, who made the defendant‘s sentences concurrent, but then raised each sentence to 15 years so that the total years of imprisonment remained the same.”
¶ 42 Kilpatrick is distinguishable from the instant matter and therefore does not support defendant‘s argument. Kilpatrick, as discussed, involved a defendant who was originally sentenced to consecutive sentences of six years and nine years but, on reconsideration, was resentenced to a single 15-year sentence for both offenses. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d at 441. In other words, the sentencing court increased a single sentence to make up for the lack of consecutive sentencing. Our supreme court found this circumstance constituted an impermissible increase in
¶ 43 Defendant‘s argument represents an attempt to transmute his original 54-year sentence for first-degree murder into consecutive sentences of 39-years for the underlying offense and 15-years for the firearm enhancement in order to invoke Kilpatrick and argue that his sentence following the remand is more severe than his original sentence. However, defendant cites no authority, nor did our research reveal any, to support his implied argument that a single sentence that includes a statutory enhancement should be treated as an aggregate sentence, with each component analyzed as a discrete sentence, for purposes of evaluating compliance with section 5-5-4(a). If anything, the opposite is true. In People v. Barnes, 364 Ill. App. 3d 888 (2006), the appellate court recognized that a trial court‘s original sentence constitutes a single sentence that is not reducible to component parts. There, the defendant was originally sentenced to 25 years for attempted murder, or 10 years for the underlying offense and 15 years for a firearm enhancement. Id. at 893. The defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, correctly noting that the particular enhancement at issue had been ruled unconstitutional. Id. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion to reconsider his 25-year sentence and resentenced him to 17 years’ imprisonment. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that his 17-year sentence constituted an improper sentencing increase. Id. at
¶ 44 Barnes cited with approval the remedy analysis in People v. Ridley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1092 (2004), vacated on other grounds, to refute the defendant‘s argument that People v. Baker, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1083 (2003), mandated that where a sentencing enhancement is deemed invalid the court must vacate it and leave undisturbed the base sentence. In Ridley, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment, which consisted of 6 years for the underlying offense and a 15-year enhancement. The appellate court affirmed the defendant‘s conviction but, in light of a recent supreme court holding, vacated the 15-year enhancement and remanded the matter for resentencing. On remand, the defendant received a 15-year sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have sentenced him to six
¶ 45 Defendant attempts to distinguish Barnes and Ridley on the grounds that, in those cases, the defendants were resentenced after the firearm enhancement included in their respective sentences was found to be unconstitutional, whereas here, the sentencing judge on remand opted to exercise her discretion to not impose a valid enhancement. He emphasizes that section 5-5-4(a) was held not to apply to those cases, because the use of an unconstitutional sentencing enhancement renders a sentence voidable, and “our supreme court has held that only valid sentences may serve as the baseline for assessment of compliance with prohibitions against [sentencing] increase[s].” Barnes, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 898. In other words, “section 5-5-4 of the Code does not apply to the correction of an illegal sentence,” but rather, it applies only “to an original sentence within statutory limits imposed upon an erroneously obtained conviction or to an original sentence within statutory limits later held to have been obtained or aggravated in error.” People v. Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710 (1996). Defendant emphasizes that, here, section 5-5-4(a) does apply, presumably because his original sentence did not include an unconstitutional sentencing enhancement, as was the case in Barnes and Ridley.
B. Whether the Sentencing Determination Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion
¶ 47 ¶ 48 Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 54-year de facto life sentence. Specifically, he asserts that the court erred by “ignoring guidance from this Court” in Vatamaniuc I, erred in its application of the statutory factors in mitigation set forth in
¶ 49 It is well established that the trial court‘s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). This is so because “the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant‘s credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. Still, the court‘s discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence is not limitless. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. The weight the court should attribute to each factor in aggravation and mitigation depends on the circumstances of each case. People v. Hernandez, 204 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740 (1990). As long as the court “does not consider incompetent evidence, improper aggravating factors, or ignore pertinent mitigating factors, it has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant to any term within the statutory term prescribed for the offense.” Id. The trial court is not required to recite and assign value to each factor during a sentencing hearing. People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely where we would have weighed the factors differently. Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, a sentence may not be altered on review. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210. A sentence that is within statutory limits will be deemed excessive and an abuse of discretion where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id.
¶ 50 A sentencing court must consider the relevant statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation in sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2(a) of the Code (
¶ 52 Subsequent to Miller and Montgomery, the Illinois Supreme Court expanded Miller to apply to juveniles who receive mandatory de facto life sentences, meaning “[a] mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime.” People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. It later defined a de facto life sentence for a juvenile offender as being greater than 40 years’ imprisonment. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42.
¶ 53 In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, our supreme court expanded Miller and held that, in addition to mandatory life sentences, Miller applies to discretionary life sentences. In support of its holding, it relied on the sweeping language used in Miller, which the supreme court observed “is significantly broader than its core holding” and is not “specific to only mandatory life sentences.” Id. ¶ 38. Thus, the Holman court held that ”Miller applies to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile defendants (id. ¶ 40), and that such a defendant “may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but only if the trial court determines that the defendant‘s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation” (id. ¶ 46). It continued that the sentencing court may make that determination “only after considering the defendant‘s youth and its attendant characteristics,” and it provided a non-exhaustive list of factors for the sentencing court to consider, namely:
“(1) the juvenile defendant‘s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant‘s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant‘s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that
may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant‘s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; (5) the juvenile defendant‘s prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46.
¶ 54 Holman also noted that “consideration of the Miller factors is consistent with section
“(1) the person‘s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;
(3) the person‘s family, home environment, educational and social background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;
(4) the person‘s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;
(5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) the person‘s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;
(8) the person‘s prior juvenile or criminal history;
(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make
a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020).
¶ 55 Subsequent to Holman, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021). There, the court held that the eighth amendment does not require trial courts to make an express finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible or provide an on-the-record explanation for the sentence with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole. Instead, the eighth amendment allows for the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender as long as the sentence is not mandatory, and the sentencing court had discretion to consider youth and attendant characteristics. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 40 (discussing Jones).
¶ 56 Our supreme court, in Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 41, commented that its holding in Holman “that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary life without parole sentences” imposed on juvenile offenders is “questionable in light of Jones.” Indeed, as this court recently recognized, “[g]iven the court‘s comments in Dorsey, it is now questionable whether Miller‘s principles could ever apply to a discretionary life sentence.” People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 51.
¶ 57 In the instant case, however, we need not substantively address the viability of Holman in the wake of Jones. This is so because, notwithstanding his citation to Miller, defendant raises no constitutional (eighth amendment or otherwise) challenge to his sentence. Instead, he challenges the trial court‘s application of the statutory factors in section
¶ 58 The State concedes that defendant‘s 54-year sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence under Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (holding that a prison sentence of more than 40 years imposed on a juvenile offender is a de facto life sentence), but it maintains that the sentence did not result from an abuse of the sentencing judge‘s discretion.
¶ 59 We agree with the State. Consistent with our instruction that the trial court “make a more thorough record of how it weighs each of the relevant factors in evaluating defendant‘s youth and its attendant circumstances” (Vatamaniuc I, 2021 IL App (2d) 180379, ¶ 110), the trial court, on remand, thoroughly evaluated each of the nine mitigating youth sentencing factors in section
¶ 60 Defendant challenges the trial court‘s application of several sentencing factors. These arguments amount to little more than an invitation to reweigh the factors, which we may not do. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209 (2000) (“reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently“). To the extent defendant‘s arguments do not ask us to reweigh the factors, we address his claims of error below.
¶ 62 Defendant‘s argument is misguided. In discussing this factor, the trial court emphasized the planning of the offense, as opposed to the commission of the offense. The planning of an offense certainly has bearing on the person‘s impetuosity at the time of the offense, as contemplated in section
¶ 64 Lastly, defendant takes issue with the court‘s application of the ninth youth sentencing factor, which allows for the consideration of “any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate.”
¶ 65 We reject defendant‘s argument. The report of proceedings reveals that the trial court‘s comments concerning defendant‘s expression of remorse were limited to its statement that it did “take into consideration [defendant‘s] statement both in 2018 and here this afternoon, and your expression of remorse.” No error accrued by the brevity of the court‘s comment on this factor because it is unnecessary for the court to specifically address each factor or assign value to each factor on the record. People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74. Moreover, the statements defendant complains of do not suggest any conflation of the factors. Rather, the statements were a prelude to the court‘s finding that defendant is “the rare individual who is irretrievably depraved, permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt beyond rehabilitation.” We perceive no error.
¶ 66 In a similar vein, defendant argues that the trial court‘s analysis was flawed because it “ignore[ed] guidance from this Court” regarding how the sentencing factors should have been weighed on remand. Indeed, he raises this assertion repeatedly throughout his briefs. Contrary to defendant‘s view, we offered no such guidance regarding how the trial court should weigh any of the sentencing factors. This much should have been clear based on our statement in Vatamaniuc I that “[w]e express no opinion as to what sentence defendant should receive on remand.” Vatamaniuc I, 2021 IL App (2d) 180379, ¶ 111. Defendant highlights our statement in Vatamaniuc I that, during the original sentencing hearing, there was “no indication that the circuit court specifically considered the recommendation included in the PSI that defendant ‘seek substance abuse/mental health/or any educational or vocational programing available.‘” Although we stated that the recommendations in the PSI suggested that defendant would benefit from those services
¶ 67 Similarly, defendant argues that the trial court “largely ignored this Court‘s guidance” regarding Cashman‘s ultimate opinion that defendant would not reoffend because he was no longer self-medicating with drugs and alcohol. See Vatamaniuc I, 2021 IL App (2d) 180379, ¶ 107. Defendant interprets our comment regarding the trial court‘s failure to acknowledge Cashman‘s opinion in the first sentencing hearing as a tacit endorsement of that opinion by this court. Defendant is mistaken. Again, we did not state in our prior disposition how the trial court should weigh any of the youth sentencing factors, including the factor pertaining to rehabilitative potential. See
¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 69 For the above reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
¶ 70 Affirmed.