People v. ValenciaPeople v. Valencia
INTRODUCTION
Aftеr being pulled over for a traffic violation, appellant Alejandro Valencia gave a Los Angeles police officer consent to search his pickup truck. The officer conducted a brief search and found nothing incriminating. During the search, a second officer discovered that Valencia might have outstanding arrest warrants. The officers transported Valencia and his vehicle to a local police station, where a third officer reinspected the truck and found a bindle containing approximately three grams of cocaine. Valencia was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale.
Valencia filed a motion to suppress arguing that the second search of his vehicle exceeded the scope of his consent. The trial court denied the motion and Valencia pled no contеst to the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd (a).)
On appeal, Valencia contends that the second search of his vehicle did not fall within the scope of his consent, and, as a result, the trial court should have granted his motion'to suppress. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Summary of Events Preceding Valencia’s Arrest
On April 15, 2010, Los Angeles Police Officer Ruben Banuelos and his partner, Officer Scott Costa, were driving down 45th Street in a marked police vehicle. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Officer Banuelos noticed that a blue pickup truck had a “broken tail light” and conducted a traffic stop.
Officer Banuelos ordered the driver, appellant Alejandro Valencia, to exit the vehicle and informed him that he “was stopped because of a broken tail light.” Officer Banuelos asked Valencia if he could search the truck and Valencia “gave [his] consent to do so.” Officer Banuelos performed a “cursory search” of the “front compartment and cargo area of the vehicle,” but “found nothing.”
While Officer Banuelos was searching the vehicle, Officer Costa conducted a warrant check on Valencia and determined that he might have outstanding arrest warrants. Officer Banuelos transported Valencia to the police station to investigate the matter further. Rather than leaving Valencia’s truck on the side
When Officer Banuelos and Valencia arrived at the station, Officer Banuelos told Officer Michael Hofmeyer that Valencia had consented to a search of his vehicle. Although Hofmeyer was aware that Officer Banuelos had already searched Valencia’s truck, he decided to conduct a second search at the police station. An officer assisting Officer Hofmeyer with the search found a bindle in the cab of the truck that contained approximately three grams of cocaine.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
On June 15, 2010, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an information charging Valencia with a single count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) During the trial court proceedings, Valencia filed a motion to suppress the cocaine recovered during the second search of his vehicle. Valencia argued that Officer Hofmeyer had failed to obtain consent prior to conducting the search and had no other lawful grounds to search the vehicle.
Officer Banuelos and Officer Hofmeyer were the only witnesses who testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Officer Banuelos stated that, during the traffic stop, he asked Valencia “Can I search your truck?” and Valencia “gave [his] consent to do so.” Officer Banuelos then conducted a brief search but “found nothing.” Officer Banuelos further testified that, after conducting the search, he transported Valencia to the station based on information Officer Costa had provided “regarding the status of the warrants [in relationship] to the defendant.”
Officer Hofmeyer testified that he had been “in the area” when Officer Banuelos and Officer Costa stopped Valencia’s truck and was aware that Officer Banuelos had searched the vehicle at the time of the initial stop. Defense counsel asked Officer Hofmeyer whether Officer Banuelos informed him that Valencia provided consent to search the truck “before or after the truck was taken to [the police s]tation.” Officer Hofmeyer explained that Officer Banuelos told him Valencia had given “consent [during the stop at] 45th” street both “prior to the [initial] search,” and again “at [the police s]tation.” Officer Hofmeyer further explained that he performed the second search of the vehicle shortly after Valencia’s initial stop “due to the fact we had consent.”
The district attorney argued that, based on the officers’ testimony, Officer Hofmeyer’s search fell within the scope of Valencia’s consent: “I don’t
Defense counsel, however, argued that Officer Hofmeyer was not permitted to conduct a second search of the vehicle because Valencia’s “consent ended when Officer Banuelos finished his search”: “No reasonable person would be able to give consent to every police officer. Officer Banuelos did not. . . even participate in the second search. The limited scope of this search was, ‘Can I search your car?’ No reasonable person would expect his car would be taken off the street, driven to a police station and searched by . . . other officers, [f] ... It is a limited consent. Once the consent was done, there was no justification to search his car again at [the police station], . . . [T]hat consent did not go along with him to [the police station].”
Thе trial court denied the motion, ruling that Officer Hofmeyer had not exceeded the scope of Valencia’s consent because “[t]here was no suggestion that there be any limitation on the search.”
After the trial court denied the motion, Valencia pled guilty to a single count of possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). At sentencing, the trial court found that Valencia was “eligible for sentencing pursuant to Prop. 36, Penal Code section 1210.1.” The court suspended imposition of a sentence and ordered that Valencia be “be placed on Proposition ... 36 for a period of 18 months.”
Valencia filed a timely appeal of the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Valencia argues that Officer Hofmeyer’s search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of his consent. Morе specifically, Valencia argues that his consent did not “extend to a second search conducted after police drove his truck to a police station.”
A. Standard of Review and Summary of Fourth Amendment Legal Principles
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings,
“A search without a warrant is presumed to be illegal. [Citation.] Once a defendant shows the search was warrantless, the burden shifts to the People to justify the search by establishing the search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. [Citation.] One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is the defendаnt’s voluntary consent to the search.” (People v. Bishop (1996)
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” (Florida v. Jimeno (1991)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Ruling That Hoftneyer’s Search Fell Within the Scope of Valencia’s Consent
To determine whether Officer Hofmeyer’s search exceeded the scope of Valencia’s consent, we must decide two issues. First, we must determine whether, as a matter of law, it is ever reasonable to conduct more than one search pursuant to a single grant of consent. Second, to the extent the Fourth Amendment permits such conduct, we must decide whether Officer Hofmeyer’s search was objectively reasonable under the circumstances presented in this case.
1. A single grant of consent does not, as a matter of law, prohibit more than one search
The parties have not identified any California case that has held that, as a matter of law, law enforcement may conduct more than one search based on a single grant of consent. Although this appears to be an issue of first impression in this state, Valencia and the district attorney nonetheless agree that an officer may conduct more than one search if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that any subsequent search fell within the boundaries of the defendant’s consent.
In Pinizzotto, supra,
The appellate court began its analysis by stating that “[a] consent to one search does not authorize a subsequent second search.” (Pinizzotto, supra,
In Gorg, supra,
The defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that “he did not consent to the search of his room.” (Gorg, supra,
The court did, however, express doubt as to whether the second search of the defendant’s room fell within the scope of the defendant’s consent: “[U]nder the facts and circumstances related therein, it is doubtful . . . whether such consent . . . included consent to repeated searches or was limited to the first search for other stolen articles. Thus, if that issue were crucial it is doubtful whether the People sustained their burden of proving that defendant . . . consented to the searches of his room.” (Gorg, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 782-783, fn. omitted.) Although this portion of the opinion was immaterial to the ruling and therefore dicta, the Supreme Court’s analysis constitutes persuasive authority that a single grant of consent may support “repeated searches” depending on the “facts and circumstances” of each case. (See County of Fresno v. Superior Court (1978)
Several other jurisdictions have concluded that a second search may be appropriate depending on the specific circumstances of the case. For example, in People v. Logsdon (1991)
Numerous other jurisdictions have applied a test of objective reasonableness to determine whether an officer’s repeated search of a single location fell within the scope of the defendant’s consent.
Based on the authorities above, we conclude that, at least in some circumstances, a defendant’s consent to a search may justify law enforcement
2. Officer Hofmeyer’s search fell within the scope of Valencia’s consent
Having determined that law enforcement officials are not categorically prohibited from conducting more than one search based on a single grant of consent, we must next decide whether Officer Hofmeyer’s decision to conduct a second search of Valencia’s truck was objectively reasonable under the specific facts presented in this case.
a. Summary of relevant case law from other jurisdictions
Before making this evaluation, we еxamine the circumstances under which other jurisdictions have permitted multiple searches arising from a single grant of consent. (Rappaport v. Gelfand (2011)
Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently approved of vehicular searches conducted under circumstances analogous to those presented here. In Reid, supra,
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the second search of his vehicle. The defendant argued that his initial consent “ended once he was taken into custody for violating the [restraining order]” and, as a result, the second “search of his truck . . . was outside the scope of his consent.” (Reid, supra,
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejеcted the argument, concluding that the search fell within the boundaries of the defendant’s consent: “Given that [defendant] did not at any point revoke his consent to allow the police to search his truck and that [the second search occurred] within a relatively short time span after [defendant] provided his consent, we conclude that [the] search was within the scope of [defendant’s] consent.” (Reid, supra,
In People v. Nawrocki (1967)
The appellate court ruled that the second search fell within the scope of the defendant’s consent. The court explained that the defendant had given permission to search his vehicle “at any time” and was aware that his vehicle was going to be transported to the police station. As one legal commentator
Finally, in Trujillo, supra,
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers’ second search fell outside the boundaries of his consent. The appellate court upheld the search: “[defendant knew that the police had impounded his car when he consented to the search on August 9. Since that consent was not limited to a particular time, and since the defendant should have foreseen that the car would remain impounded for a reasonable length of time, we agree with the trial court that the later search was supported by the initial consent.” (Trujillo, supra,
ii. Multiple searches of residences
Courts have generally applied a greater level of scrutiny in cases where officers conducted multiple searches of a residence based on a single grant of consent. In Douglas, supra,
The court began its analysis by explaining that “ ‘[p]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Douglas, supra,
The Supreme Court of Maine addressed analogous facts in State of Maine v. Brochu (Me. 1967)
The court ruled that although the first search was consensual, the defendant’s “consent . . . had ended . . .” when officers placed him under arrest: “The officers [initially] entered the defendant’s home . . . under the protection of his consent. By nightfall, however, the defendant had ceased to be the husband assisting in the solution of his wife’s death and had become the man accused of his wife’s murder . . . held under arrest for hearing. [][] When the defendant became the accused, the protective cloak of the Constitution became more closely wrapped about him. . . . There is a particularly heavy burden on the State to show consent to a search and seizure without a warrant when the defendant is under arrest.” (Brochu, supra,
However, in Grega, supra,
The Georgia Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Ferguson, supra,
The court ruled that the subsequent search was lawful: “An investigation for evidence regarding the homicide was the sole and continuing purpose of the search here and was well within the contemplation of the consent by appellant when given. There is no reason to assume that this consent did not apply to the second search as it was conducted within a brief and reasonable time later for the same purpose, and there is no evidence that appellant ever withdrew or limited the original consent to search which he gave the officers. We find no illegal search and seizure took place under these circumstances.” (Ferguson, supra,
iii. Summary of factors courts have used to assess the reasonableness of conducting multiple searches
The cases above demonstrate that courts have considered a variety of factors in assessing the reasonableness of conducting more than one search
This list is not exhaustive; because the reasonableness of a search must be based on the totality of circumstances, any number of other factors might be relevant depending on the individual facts of the case under review. Moreover, the presence or absence of any one factor should not be treated as dispositive. Like other multifactor reasonableness tests, the list must be tailored to the unique circumstances of each case. (Cf. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008)
When applying the factors above, courts should also remain cognizant that, as a general matter, a consent to search usually involves an “understanding that the search will be conducted forthwith and that only a single search will be made.” (Logsdon, supra,
b. Officer Hofmeyer’s search fell within the scope of Valencia’s consent
In this case, the evidence at the hearing on Valencia’s motion to suppress showed that Officer Banuelos asked Valencia if he could search the vehicle and Valencia “gave [his] consent to do so.” Officer Banuelos conducted a brief search of the vehicle, but found nothing incriminating. After
Our decision is based on several factors. First, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrates that the second search did not cause any appreciable diminution in Valencia’s expectation of privacy with respect to his vehicle. By consenting to Officer Banuelos’s search, Valencia waived any expectation of privacy he had to the interior of his truck. (See U.S. v. Rubio (9th Cir. 1983)
Second, we find it significant that this case involved the search of a vehicle, rather than a residence. (See People v. Magee (2011)
Third, there is no evidence indicating that Valencia was detained or arrested between the time he gave his consent and the time Officer Hofmeyer conducted his search. An intervening detention or arrest may, at least in some circumstances, effectively terminate a grant of consent. (See Brochu, supra,
Fourth, the record indicates that Officer Hofmeyer’s search occurred shortly after Valencia’s grant of consent. Officer Banuelos testified that he stopped Valencia and obtained his consent to search the vehicle at approximately 5:15 p.m. Officer Hofmeyer, in turn, testified that he conducted the second search of the vehicle around 5:15 p.m. or “shortly thereafter.” Based
Fifth, as the trial court explained, the evidence showed that Valencia gave a general grant of consent that was not limited to a particular time or place. Although a general grant of consent does not, standing alone, normally justify multiple searches (Logsdon, supra,
Ordinarily, we would also consider whether the defendant was aware that law enforcement had impounded the vehicle after the first search, creating an opportunity to withdraw or limit the scope of the consent before the second search was conducted. (Cf. Nawrocki, supra,
Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we hold that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Hofmeyer to conclude that his search fell within the scope of Valencia’s consent.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Woods, Acting P. J., and Jackson, J., concurred.
Notes
(See State v. Grega (1998)
Our analysis has no application where the search is based on a warrant, rather than on consent. Like most jurisdictions, California has adopted a “ ‘one warrant, one search’ ” rule that prohibits law enforcement from conducting more than one search on the same warrant. (People v. James (1990)
For example, it is clear that if “a defendant were to consent to a search of his nearby car, this could hardly be viewed as authorizing the police to wait and search that car some weeks later if they were then to see it parked on the street.” (4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 8.1(c), p. 42.)
Valencia has not argued that Officer Costa’s decision to transport the vehicle to the police station constituted an unlawful seizure. As a result, we need not consider whether the second search was rendered unlawful because it was facilitated by an intervening, illegal act. (See U.S. v. Ibarra (10th Cir. 1992)
The primary argument set forth in Valencia’s appellate briefs is that Officer Hofmeyer’s search was not objectively reasonable because, at the time of consent, Valencia could not have foreseen that his vehicle was going to be transported to the police station. As we have discussed, the record shows that, after obtaining a general grant of consent, officers conducted two searches of defendant’s vehicle within a close timeframe, while maintaining continuous control over the area that was searched. We do not believe that, under these circumstances, the officers’ act of moving the truck to a new location rendered the second search unreasonable.