12 N.Y.S. 303 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1890
We have nothing to do in this case with the alleged bad faith •or breach of contract in the dealings of the Rondout & Osyvego Railroad with-the town of Harpersfield. That town is not the plaintiff. The only question ■is whether the people have a right to annul the charter of the Ulster & Delaware Railroad' Company for the failure to construct a certain part of the route originally laid out. We do not consider it necessary to decide the question whether the defendant, taking title under the foreclosure of a mortgage ■made by the Rondout & Oswego Railroad Company, (or New York, Kingston ■& Syracuse Railroad Company,) and organizing under chapter 430 of the Laws of 1874, became bound to complete the road as originally laid out. We ■have great doubt whether it came under any such liability. But, as we think
Further, the plaintiff insists that this act is unconstitutional, in giving judicial power to the board of railroad commissioners. We do not see that judicial power is given to the board. Administrative duties often require an administrative officer to decide on the proper course of action, and for that, purpose to ascertain what are the facts in the matter before him. But he is. not therefore exercising judicial functions. In the present case, the people-have the right to annul the charter, if they show good cause. The legislature-has the right, in behalf of the people, to refuse to annul the. charter, even if there be good cause. And it has a right to say that the charter shall not be annulled, and that the corporation shall be relieved from any obligation which it might have owed to the state to do a certain act. Such being the right of the legislature, we see no reason why it may not authorize a board of its administrative officers to inquire what the public interests demand in that respect, and to decide whether the public interests do, or do not, require the corporation to do a certain act. The only parties are the people, speaking through the legislature on the one hand, and the corporation on the other. We have no occasion to say, if there was a controversy between the corporation on-the one side, and some individual on the other, whether the legislature could compel the submission of that controversy to this board. That does not arise-here. It is only the state itself which says: “If our board of railroad commissioners certify that the public interests do not require the building of a certain piece of road, then it need not be built.” Very possibly the legislature could not declare that a certificate of the railroad commissioners should be a bar to ari action by one private ¡individual against another. But it is. certainly competent for the state to (surrender any right of action which it may have. It could declare that no action on its behalf for the annulling of a charter should be further prosecuted. So here the legislature has declared that, if the board of railroad commissioners give a certificate, then the state will not further prosecute its action. The legislature is certainly competent to stop a litigation which is prosecuted on behalf of the state. There-
The plaintiff further insists that the reasons given by the board of railroad commissioners for its certificate are not satisfactory. It was not bound to give any reasons, though this was a very proper course. But it is not in our power to review the action of the board, even if we thought its reasons improper or insufficient, which we do not. It is enough that the statute makes the certificate, not the reasons, conclusive and a bar. The judgment of the learned justice is correct, and should be affirmed, with costs.
Another question is presented by the appeal from the order granting an extra allowance. There is no doubt that the case is one in which an extra allowance was proper. But the plaintiff urges that there was no proof of the value of the corporate franchise, and that only upon that value could the allowance be based. Conaughty v. Bank, 92 N. Y. 401. The defendant, to show the value of this franchise, showed the taxes which it had paid for several years, under the statutes. Chapter 361, Laws 1881. The defendant claims that these statutes impose a tax on corporate franchises, and not on corporate property, (People v. Insurance Co., 92 N. Y. 328;) that hence the valuation on which the tax is assessed, must be a measure for the franchise taxed. Now, the statute may impose a tax on an amount which shall greatly exceed the real value of the franchise. The mode in which a corporation is assessed under these statutes, merely determines the amount at which, for the purpose of taxation, its franchise shall be estimated. We think that this assessment does not bind the state as to the actual value of the franchise, when such value had to be ascertained on the motion. Hot only does it not bind the state, but we do not see that it is evidence. The question before the learned justice was, what was the value involved? that is, what was the value of the franchise? And upon that point these several taxations of the defendant do not seem to us to be evidence. We think therefore that the order