People v. Two Roulette Wheels & TablesPeople v. Two Roulette Wheels & Tables
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Burke
delivered the opinion of the court.
On October 30, 1943, the grand jury returned an indictment to the criminal court of Cook county charging that Sam Romano and 11 other persons on or about October 7, 1943, conspired to keep a gambling house at 4730 West Cermak Road in the Town of Cicero. On March 13, 1944 Romano filed a petition in the case representing that on October 7, 1943, he occupied the second floor of the premises at 4730 West Cermak
On April 17, 1944, the state’s attorney in a petition entitled People of the State of Illinois vs. Two Roulette Wheels, et ah, and filed in the same case and bearing the same number as the indictment hereinbefore mentioned, represented that ‘ ‘ On October 7,1943, upon information received, one Nicholas Disteldorf, a police officer of the City of Chicago, attached to the office of the State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, entered the premises at 4738 West Cermak Road in the Town of Cicero, Illinois, and there found the following gambling equipment: 2 roulette wheels and tables, 4 black jack tables, 1 dice table, 1 chuck-a-luck cage, 36 decks of playing cards, 6 dice racks and 4 chip racks, which articles are gambling equipment per se, upon the action of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won ór lost; that the said gambling equipment was seized by the said Nicholas Disteldorf and is now in the custody of the State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois”; and prayed the court to enter an order authorizing him to destroy such articles. No older was sought or entered requiring either the People or the petitioner to answer either petition. Apparently, the parties and the court treated the People’s petition as an answer to Romano’s petition, with the addition of a prayer for destruction of the articles. On June
The record does not show that the court ruled on the petition of the state’s attorney for an order authorizing him to destroy the alleged gambling equipment. However, as the court entered an order directing that the seized articles be returned to Romano, this inferentially amounted to a denial of the state’s attorney’s petition for an order to destroy the articles. Appellant states that this is a proceeding in rem and has none of the elements of a criminal case. From a recitation of
In urging a reversal of the order, the People state that it is elementary that gambling devices which are capable of no use for lawful purpose are not the subject of property, relying on Frost v. People, 193 Ill. 635; Bobel v. People, 173 Ill. 19; People v. One Pinball Machine Owned by Henry Fox, 316 Ill. App. 161. The Frost and Bobel cases involve the application of division VIII of the Criminal Code (pars. 691-699,
In People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, the question arose in our Supreme Court for the first time whether it is the duty of the court to determine if property and papers of a defendant were obtained by unlawful search and seizure when application has been made in apt time for their exclusion, and answering, the court said (456):
“ ... and it is our duty, in view of our obligations to support the constitution, to hold that it was the duty of the trial court to inquire into the truth of the charge of defendant, and, if it be found to be true, to sustain his objection to the introduction of all exhibits that were claimed by him as his property and taken from his home by means of unlawful search and seizure. ’ ’
In the Brocamp case the court also said (453):
“There.was a legal way for the State to proceed by its officers in the search of his premises, by first making a showing that they were entitled to a warrant authorizing them to search for and seize the particular articles named, if they could’ make a prima facie showing that either the State or the prosecuting witnesses had the right to forcibly seize the articles for their purpose and use. Such action of the officers in forcibly or unlawfully and without a warrant entering the plaintiff in error’s home and searching it and seizing the articles aforesaid has in unmistakable terms been condemned by the courts of this country. If an American’s constitutional rightscannot he protected against ruthless and unlawful acts of the character disposed in this record, then the constitution guaranteeing such rights is a mere nullity and our boasted rights óf liberty are vain boastings. ’ ’
The Brocamp case has been followed in People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, and numerous other cases. With the advent of the opinion in the Brocamp case, Illinois has followed the federal rule first announced in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, and followed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266. It has sometimes been stated that no search-warrant is necessary to search and seize gambling equipment. However, in People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, where defendant was convicted on a charge of knowingly possessing a policy book, numbers and slips, and where proper steps were taken to suppress the evidence because it had been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure in contravention of her rights under the federal and state constitutions, which the trial court declined to do, our Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion of defendant to suppress the evidence. It therefore appears that at least since the Brocamp case, our Supreme Court has applied the same rule to the seizure by unlawful search of gambling equipment as to other property.
The People rely on the provisions of sec. 2 of an Act defining a gambling device for gambling purposes (par. 342, ch. 38, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 37.272]), that “every clock, tape machine, slot machine or other machine or device for the reception of money on chance or upon the action of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost is hereby declared a gambling device, and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and destruction by any municipal or other local authority within whose jurisdiction the same may
“It is not true, as seems to be supposed by counsel, that the statutes in question do not provide for or contemplate the service of any notice upon the owner or party in possession preliminary to the condemnation and destruction of the property seized. Section 3 provides for a search in the day time, and that the warrant shall commandthe officer, among other things, ‘to bring such stolen property or other things, when found, and the person in whose possession they are found, to the judge or justice of the peace who issued the warrant, or to some other judge or justice of the peace or court having cognizance of the case.’ Section 4 provides for search in the nighttime, in which case the warrant is to be issued by two judges or justices, and, among other things, shall command the officer ‘to bring the property or things described in the warrant or summons, and the person in whose possession the¡y are found, before either of the judges or justices who issued the warrant, or some other judge or justice of the peace of the county. ’ Section 7 provides that the property seized under the search warrant, for which search is allowed by the act, ‘shall be safely kept, by direction of the judge, justice or court, so long as necessary, for the purpose of being produced or used as evidence on any trial,’ and that, as soon as may be afterward, stolen or embezzled property is to be returned to the owner, and all other things seized by virtue of such warrants to be burned or otherwise destroyed, under the direction of the judge, justice or court. Section 8 provides: ‘If, on the hearing, it appears there was no probable cause for suing out the warrant, the whole cost may be taxed against the complainant, ’ etc.
“It is manifest that sections 3 and 4 contemplate that the officer empowered to execute the search warrant shall bring, not only the things described in the warrant and against which the complaint was made, but also the person in whose possession they are found, if found, before the judge or justice. Notice of the proceedings, by service of the search warrant and bringing the person in possession of the property before the court, is clearly intended by the statute, and is doubtless required for the purpose of giving the owner or other person interested an opportunity to claim theproperty, as well as, perhaps, to ascertain whether the party in possession has committed an offense. . . . The words ‘trial’ and ‘hearing,’ as here used, are familiar terms, and are generally understood as meaning a judicial examination of the issues between the parties, whether of law or of fact. . . . Statutes of the character of those in question are enacted upon the theory that the proceedings shall be against the thing or in rem, and the State and Federal reports abound in decided cases in which laws of this kind have been held constitutional and valid, where no service was had or contemplated other than that upon or against the offending thing and the person in whose possession it is found. . . . Searches and seizures of the character in the case at bar are not deemed unreasonable, and therefore are not within the inhibition of Federal and State constitutions, which guarantee to the citizen immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . The exercise of the power should be properly guarded, and every proper means adopted in order to prevent abuses and infringement upon the rights of the citizen under the constitution. To this end, we think, the evident purpose and intent of the legislature in requiring that not only the property, but also the person in whose possession it is found, shall be brought before the court, were to acquaint parties who might be interested, with the proceeding, and give opportunity to be heard concerning the disposition that should be ultimately made of the property. The legislature has seen fit to require this form of notice, which they, in their discretion, must have deemed sufficient for the summary purposes and objects of the act, and we do not feel inclined to hold that it is insufficient, or that any other or further notice should be given.”
The court, finding that the act concerning search warrants was valid, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, which held to the contrary.
In the instant case the court sustained the motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that there was an unlawful search and seizure. The People, not having sought to exercise the machinery of division VIII of the Criminal Code, cannot now seek the aid of the court in an order to destroy the alleged gambling paraphernalia. In the matter of the disposition of the articles, this was not before the court. In our opinion, the court did not have jurisdiction over the disposition of the articles and it should not have entertained that part of the petition of Romano to return the articles to him, or the petition of the state’s attorney to destroy the same. The legislature having provided under division VIII of the Criminal Code the manner in
Paragraph 342, ch. 38, does not designate what device shall be considered a gambling device per se. For instance, it does not say that a roulette wheel or a pack of playing cards shall be considered a gaming device. To be inhibited it must be a machine
“The judgment being in favor of plaintiff in error except as to the two crap tables, one faro lay-out and one roulette wheel and table, which the evidence showed to be purely gambling apparatus and implements and to have no value or use for any other purpose, the only questions to be considered relate to the alleged errors in seizing them and rendering judgment against them.”
In Bobel v. People, 173 Ill. 19, the court said (27):
“We are satisfied, as before stated, that the indictment is good, and are also of the opinion that the testimony was properly received. If for no other purpose, this evidence was proper to prove the character and purpose of the machine, — that is, that it was a device upon which money is staked or hazarded, or upon the result of the action of which money is staked, bet, hazarded, won or lost, — in other words, that it was a gambling device.”
In the case of Question Game Co., Inc. v. Ploner, 273 Ill. App. 187, the court said (191):
“The statute did not contemplate that the articles enumerated were unlawful per se as gambling devices, but declares in plain terms that the articles mentioned, or any others not specified, are and become unlawfulif they are devices ‘upon which money is staked or hazarded, or into which money is paid or played upon chance, or upon the result of the action of which money or other valuable thing is staked, bet, hazarded, won or lost’.”
In the instant case no evidence was offered or introduced that the articles were machines or devices for the reception of money on chance or upon which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost. The court could not take judicial notice that the articles described are gambling devices. It will be noted that in all the cases cited, evidence was introduced that the articles under discussion were gambling devices.
The People’s petition does not charge that the things were kept or used for unlawful gaming or other illegal purposes. The petition did charge that the articles were gambling equipment per se upon the action of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost. The Illinois statute does not define what is gambling equipment per se and no evidence was introduced that the articles were gambling equipment upon the action of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, won or lost. It ,is common knowledge that playing cards, dice, roulette wheels, poker chips, poker cards and poker tables and many other things which may be used in gambling are openly displayed and may be purchased in the well known department and sporting goods stores in Chicago, and that their sale is advertised .in the daily press. In arriving at our conclusions we have considered, among others, the recent cases of People v. Three Roulette Wheels, 325 Ill. App. 502, and Weis v. Allman, 325 Ill. App. 554.
For the reasons stated, the order of the criminal court of Cook county is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to expunge the order directing the restoration of the articles and to strike the petition of the state’s attorney.
Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Kiley and Lupe, JJ., concur.