100 Mich. App. 214 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1980
Lead Opinion
On Remand
The defendant, Byron Turner, a/k/ a Michael Whitmore, was tried by a jury and found guilty of delivery of heroin, MCL 335.341(l)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(a), and conspiracy to deliver heroin, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions. People v Turner, 86 Mich App 177; 272 NW2d 346 (1978). The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment and remanded for our consideration of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conspiracy conviction. 407 Mich 890 (1979). Having reviewed the record, we again affirm the defendant’s conspiracy conviction.
Because of the nature of the order of remand, a review of the evidence against the defendant is necessary. The complainant and chief prosecution witness against the defendant was an undercover
This Court views this evidence as sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of delivery of heroin. In People v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220 NW2d 465 (1974), the Supreme Court held that two intents must be shown to sustain a conspiracy conviction. First, one must establish the intent to commit the wrong act (here, the delivery of heroin), and, secondly, one must establish the intent to enter into an agreement to commit the wrongful act with another. Where the above facts are taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
In the case at bar, there was evidence to show both the intent to perform the substantive offense and intent to enter the agreement. The defendant’s intent to deliver heroin is shown by the defendant’s conducting a "fitness test”, his pronouncement that the officer was "okay” and "cool”, and his inferred exchange of the tinfoil package for the prerecorded funds. The defendant’s intent to enter into the agreement is established by the statements of Byars that the officer was being taken to his bagman, that the defendant would not sell her the stuff before she "snorted” it, and Byars’ request for money to buy the defendant’s heroin. Furthermore, the defendant did not deal directly with the undercover officer, but only through Byars as the middleman. The defendant took the prerecorded funds from Byars and, we may infer, returned heroin for the money. Although the narcotics officer could not testify that the defendant gave narcotics to Byars, the inference can be drawn easily from the circumstances. The officer did see a "shiny” object passed from defendant to Byars. He subsequently turned over a tinfoil package of heroin to the officer.
Given these facts, this Court concludes that a reasonable trier of fact could well have found defendant guilty of conspiracy. Cf. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I have considered the majority opinion, but I find nothing in it that causes me to alter my original impression of this case. See, People v Turner, 86 Mich App 177, 184-185; 272 NW2d 346 (1978), opinion vacated 407 Mich 890 (1979). As I stated in my prior dissenting opinion in this matter, there is no such thing as a one-person conspiracy. Because conspiracy charges against the only other person who could have been found guilty of them in this case have been dismissed, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of Michigan law to support defendant’s conspiracy conviction. I would reverse this conviction.