*1 first and That section taken. is not well 1.2(f)) 2A — provides that: foremost “* * * pursuant to voters submitted may be questions public otherwise or autho- required this Code special election any this pursuant be conducted by court order rized law added.) (Emphasis Code.” be question required case, unambiguously the Code
In the instant occurring at election regular general than the first no later bar, first the case at In petition. filing of the days least 78 after days after least regular election which occurred general or 4,1980, November was the 31,1979, petition filing date of December election. mootness.
Accordingly, appeal this dismissed Appeal dismissed. NASH, JJ.,
HOPF concur. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF TUELL, Defendant-Appellant. L. KEVIN District No. 80-667 Second 10, 1981. Opinion July filed *2 NASH, J., dissenting. Logli Nolte, North, Óhlson,
Paul A. and Logli, Boyd Peter B. both & Condon, Rockford, appellant. for Schumacher, Attorney, Dennis Oregon (Phyllis State’s and Martin Perko J. Moltz, Commission, Attorneys
P. both Appellate counsel), of State’s Service for People. Mr. HOPF opinion delivered of the court: JUSTICE appeals Defendant his driving (Ill. conviction for reckless Stat. Rev. 95)2, 503). par. 11— Defendant (1) raises three that produce issues: the State failed to that, sufficient conviction; to support given evidence his that (2) account, State’s witness was correct her defendant’s conduct did constitute the offense of driving; (3) and the court erred in rejecting defendant’s alibi evidence.
The sole to testify the events for which defendant was about convicted was the that the incident witness. She testified took Valley the business district of the town of Stillman between witness, 4:30 5 p.m. and to cross in the on December 1979. The about block, middle of stop sign noticed a car at the end of the block. She stated The car that she had time so started to across. to cross and walk had she moving she seen at the towards her as end block was started to It it cross. increased its as it came toward her and when get way. was five to its After eight quickly feet from her she to out of ran she crossed street car got she a clear view of the driver as the turned corner.
On out although stepped cross-examination she she had stated parked onto the street the middle of was free of cars. the block area accelerating She had reached the center of street when the car came car, testified, toward her. The street right she the center of the came down 30 mph, about her. eight she ran from it it was five to feet from when She added recognized that she clear him as had a view the driver and defendant, away lived a who few houses from her. all, question threshold there at so whether the defendant was
we address the last first. issue
Defendant and his parents presented upon an alibi based the time that marked the end of it working day defendant’s the amount of time took defendant According arrive home. to hand-written time card representing working family-owned defendant’s hours business and testimony by defendant parents, and his he had 4:30 p.m. worked until Defendant parents and his further his testified that he had arrived home in father’s truck no earlier than 4:50 p.m. They also that it his testified practice home; therefore, upon shower returning argues, defendant he *3 could not have left the house his An p.m. car unless some time after 5 examination parents’ of the testimony reveals that they had based their statements upon more familiarity their with defendant’s usual routine than upon specific question. recollection of the of events the afternoon in presents
Where a defendant alibi evidence that conflicts with evi State, dence by submitted the it is for the trier of fact to the resolve v. (People 723, 415 conflict. Garza (1981), App. 1328.) 92 Ill. It 3d N.E.2d People v. 857, 863, was held in Pickens 63 Ill. (1978), App. 3d 380 N.E.2d 868, that “In weighing testimony it is alibi must be remembered that it sufficient if the presence defense raises of a reasonable doubt of the defendant at the time proof of the crime. ‘The was on burden of the State to prove guilty beyond the a defendant of such offenses reasonable doubt.’ The trier is to believe required of fact not [Citation.]” accused, alibi testimony over positive though the even identification of the alibi testimony by be of given greater number witnesses. (People v. 168; Setzke v. 582, People (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 177 N.E.2d Pickens.) A court of finding by review will not the trier fact disturb the of unreasonable, concerning alibi unless is testimony finding improb that or unsatisfactory. People 583, able Smith 52 Ill. App. 756, cert. 399, N.E.2d denied 961, Ct. 436 U.S. 56 L. 98 S. Ed. 2d 2228. obviously found witness credible
The court believed the State’s guilt. Upon doubt of defendant’s testimony defense raised no reasonable rejection trial court’s testimony, conclude that the our review of all the we unsatisfactory. unreasonable, improbable or of alibi defendant’s guilty him prove that the State failed Defendant also contends doubt, was insufficient the State’s evidence beyond a reasonable did not complaining him by and that the action attributed to the driving. constitute the offense of reckless to corrobo- State no evidence argues
Defendant that the that the He also contends testimony complaining rate the witness. further, and, the proper lane evidence shows that he drove the limit. speed evidence the does not show he exceeded identification, the credibility of the sufficiency eye-witness be witnesses, inferences to testimony and the weight given the to be the finder of province the testimony drawn from the are matters within reasonable doubt Only improbable fact. if that it raises a evidence so v. Thomas guilt reviewing (People will a court set aside a verdict. Further, 28, of reckless 1316.) 72 Ill. a conviction App. 3d 389 N.E.2d (People single of a witness. driving may solely testimony be based on the 330, v. Burch Brady (1974), 318 N.E.2d clearly found court 410.) The trial App. 3d N.E.2d to enable and sufficient testimony witness’ credible agree this assessment. place. court to took We with determine what he had contentions, show that evidence did not Defendant’s that the lane, had exceeded it not show he proper driven out of his and that did limit, First, had stated complaining witness speed are without merit. two-way center of the unequivocally that defendant had driven limit addition, exceeding speed specify In street. the statute does not driving, and therefore necessary of reckless as element of the offense prove prosecution failure to limit was not fatal to with a any he “drives vehicle One commits when (Ill. property.” safety persons disregard willful or wanton for the 95/2, damage persons 503.) Actual Rev. Stat. 11— (See People finding guilt for this offense. property necessary is not to a whether of fact to determine Brady; Burch.) It is for the trier and wanton willful allegations and the evidence constituted mis conduct defendant. v. Burch. that defendant by the trial court established accepted
The evidence *4 a to within approached he speed such stop accelerated from a with would and who witness, the street in the center of few feet of the who was had defendant pace normal safely at a have had sufficient time to cross lane proper out of one’s think that to drive carefully. driven more We street so the in the center of pedestrian a is in clear view toward who for the disregard as to her out the willful way force to run of shows meaning driving the of pedestrian’s safety and amounts to reckless within the statute. the circuit foregoing judgment
For reasons we affirm the of the court.
Affirmed.
LINDBERG, J., concurs. NASH, Mr. dissenting: JUSTICE
I respectfully driving driving “with a dissent. Reckless involves disregard (Ill. willful or safety persons property” wanton for the of or 1979, 95/á, Rev. Stat. 503). The State’s evidence consisted 11— witness, solely of testimony by 20-year-old the a who woman had no physical impairment might ability her which affect to walk. witness began portion stated she the cross street the middle the block, protected cross-walk, stop sign light, a traffic or observed an at sign automobile the nearest feet left. On stop to her direct examination she testified the car her approached the center the driving narrow lanes of the street and when she was the center the street it speed way. increased its out get and she moved to of the On cross-examination, however, sign stop she testified car left an average rate of speed and were about same “we both * * street, about the suggestion side the street There was no the automobile legal speed ever exceeded the limit and speed estimated its maximum at 30 hour. per miles A finding of support “recklessness” sufficient to a reckless or reckless homicide conviction a requires proof defendant acted with con disregard scious safety for the persons property constituting of other gross deviation from the person standard of care reasonable would (People Ziegler exercise. 3d 430, 434, Chambers (1972), 8 Ill. App. sub nom. Todd aff'd 534.) every 59 Ill. 2d negligence Not act of violation recklessness, traffic only laws constitutes as conduct of a evi character dencing disregard safety statutory an utter meets others definition. (People Lynn v. Parr 165, 168; 133 Ill. App. 87.) The evidence disclosed at most that a portion imaginary of defendant’s center automobile have crossed street, line of a narrow limit proceeding while he within from a standing position eight stop sign, at a and moved to within five feet of a point woman crossing who had been the street at a where no cross-walk or proper traffic control device made it for her to do so. Under *5 circumstances, cannot be defendant’s conviction for 322;
sustained. Ill. Burgard See Friesen 974; App. 30 Ill. App. v. Johnson compare People 3d 747. Griffith I would reverse. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
THE PEOPLE OF THE OF STATE GARDNER, Defendant-Appellant. WILLIAM District Fourth No. July Opinion filed 1981. appellant. Jennings Thompson, Bloomington, for & , Dozier, (Robert Biderman and Bloomington Attorney, of Ronald C. State’s J. Commission, of Horstman, Attorneys Appellate Service K. both of State’s James counsel), People. for