People v. TriplettPeople v. Triplett
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Coleman
(to reverse and remand). This matter requires us to resolve a conflict in our Court of Appeals 1 and determine whether the trial court reversibly erred in resentencing defendant without the benefit of a new or reasonably updated presentence report detailing, among other potential items, defendant’s prior prison behavior. We resolve this inquiry in the affirmative and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we remand this matter for resentencing before a different judge, who is to utilize a reasonably updated presentence report. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.
The facts of this case are quite simple although
At resentencing in 1976, defendant objected to the trial court’s reliance on the original presentence report which had been prepared in 1972 relative to defendant’s conviction that year. Defendant contested the alleged staleness of that report since it had not been updated to reflect defendant’s subsequent prison conduct and alleged progress toward rehabilitation spanning the five years of defendant’s incarceration, 1972 through 1976. Indeed, although documents from two prison officials who had observed defendant during the five years of his incarceration had been submitted for review on resentencing, neither of those materials were included in this report. Nor was there any indication that a further presentence investigation had been made of defendant covering that period.
The Court of Appeals recognized that “[a]n updated presentence report * * * would be a valuable tool in resentencing”, but ruled that the “failure to include the conduct in the presentence report was * * * not prejudicial” because the re-sentencing judge had been informally “apprised of the defendant’s prison conduct” and had “indicated the weight to be given thereto”. Id., 86. Presiding Judge Kaufman succinctly dissented and would have directed resentencing with an updated presentence report of defendant’s case since his 1971 plea-based conviction. Id., 88-89.
In People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 574; 208 NW2d 504 (1973), this Court emphasized its commitment to the principles that criminal punishment must fit the offender rather than the offense alone and that sound discretion must be exercised in sentencing matters. We stated:
“The modern view of sentencing is that the sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential. While the resources allocated for rehabilitation may be inadequate and some persons question whether rehabilitation can be achieved in the prison setting, this view of sentencing is the present policy of the state. A judge needs complete information to set a proper individualized sentence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
To effectuate these goals, it is patent that sentencing inquiries must not be undertaken in a vacuum. Rather such inquiries must be guided by complete and detailed information regarding the offender if the sentence prescribed is to fulfill society’s dual goals of rehabilitation and protection. See Williams, supra, 247.
The presentence report is a vital and necessary component of this effort to prescribe informed, individualized punishment in felony matters.
People v Lee,
391 Mich 618, 631-639; 218 NW2d 655 (1974). See generally Case Note,
Criminal Procedure
— Accuracy
of Presentence Reports,
22 Wayne L Rev 899 (1976). Indeed, unlike its discretionary predecessor, 1927 PA 175, ch XI, § 14, the present act mandates that “[b]efore sentencing any person charged with a felony, * * * the probation officer
shall
inquire into the antecedents, character and circumstances of such person or persons, and
shall
report thereon in writing to such court or magistrate”. (Emphasis supplied.)
Although this Court has not until today passed on the requirement that a reasonably updated presentence report must be utilized in sentencing for felonies, we have repeatedly indicated that such reports must be complete, accurate, and reliable. See
Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County,
15 Mich App 713, 725-726; 167 NW2d 337 (1969),
rev’d on other grounds
383 Mich 10; 172 NW2d 436 (1969);
People v Brown,
393 Mich 174, 180-181; 224 NW2d 38 (1974), citing
People v Amos,
42 Mich App 629; 202 NW2d 486 (1972);
People v Lee, supra,
635, 639;
People v Malkowski,
385 Mich 244, 249; 188 NW2d 559 (1971). Our holding that a reasonably updated report must be utilized at felony sentencing is merely a logical extension of such earlier indications. Indeed, our holding is a necessary corollary to the principle that sentencing must be individualized and tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender at the time of sentencing; “[sentencing a defendant without an adequate knowledge of his needs would thereby reduce the sentencing process from a first step toward rehabilitation to the dignity of a game of chance”.
People v Amos,
42 Mich App 629, 638; 202 NW2d 486 (1972), cited with approval in
People v Brown,
393 Mich 174, 180; 224 NW2d 38 (1974).
2
As correctly recognized by
“The sentencing court should make every effort to individualize sentences in order to further the goal of rehabilitation. In this regard a defendant’s conduct while in prison may shed considerable light on the prospect of rehabilitation. An updated presentence report which includes prison conduct would describe the defendant’s most recent behavior and would be a valuable tool in resentencing. Such a procedure would not be a burden on the probation department since records are kept at prison which could easily be made available.” Triplett (After Remand), supra, 86, 88. See People v Moore, 91 Mich App 319; 284 NW2d 483 (1979).
For the above reasons, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we rule that defendant’s sentence should be set aside and this matter remanded for resentencing before a different judge who is to utilize an updated presentence report. The decision of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed.
Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Notes
In People v Moore, 91 Mich App 319; 284 NW2d 483 (1979), Judge N. J. Kaufman authored an opinion remanding that matter for resentencing and directing the trial judge to secure an updated presentence report prior to resentencing in order to assure due consideration of defendant’s previous ten years of prison conduct. In the opinion of Judge Kaufman, such a step was “necessary to insure that the trial judge was fully and accurately acquainted with defendant’s background [citations omitted]”. Id., 321. Chief Judge Danhof dissented.
In the Court of Appeals below, People v Triplett (After Remand), 91 Mich App 82; 283 NW2d 658 (1979), the majority indicated its preference for an updated report but found that “[t]he failure to include the conduct in the presentence report was * * * not prejudicial”. Id., 86. Judge Kaufman dissented from this decision and would have remanded for resentencing with an updated report.
In People v Allen, 79 Mich App 100; 261 NW2d 225 (1977), a unanimous panel held that the failure to provide a new or updated presentence report was not error since consideration of subsequent prison conduct on resentencing would amount to a usurpation of the executive power to commute sentences. The rationale for this ruling was expressly rejected by both the Moore and Triplett panels. We too find that ratio decidendi fallacious.
While we here emphasize the critical role of the presentence report in a sentencing judge’s consideration of the rehabilitation goal, in People v Brown, supra, 181, we noted that “the Legislature, speaking for all the people”, has required its use. Then Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh, although in dissent, spoke the following general philosophy:
“Judges need this discretionary judgment in order to tailor the punishment to fit the needs of the individual case. The exercise of this judicial discretion at sentencing is essential to protect the interests of both the defendant and the public.” Id., 185.
See People v McFarlin, supra, 574.