*844 Opinion
Mary Elizabeth Trantow appeals from the trial court’s denial of a writ of error coram nobis brought to set aside felony convictions for selling amphetamines and marijuana. For the rеasons specified below, we deny the appellant’s request and affirm the denial of the writ of error coram nobis.
Procedural and Factual Background
In an information filed by the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles in 1970, appellant Mary Elizabeth Trantow was charged with six felony drug related violations. Counts I and III alleged the sale of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code sectiоn 11531. Counts II and IV alleged sales of a dangerous drug, amphetamine sulphate, in violation of the Health and Safety Code section 11912. Count V alleged possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11530.5. Count VI alleged possession for sale of a dangerous drug, amphetamine sulphate, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11911.
Trantow entered pleas of not guilty to all six counts. She subsequently withdrew her not guilty pleas as to counts I and II, alleging sales of marijuanа and amphetamines respectively, and entered pleas of guilty to both counts on October 7, 1970. At the time she entered her pleas of guilty to counts I and II, Trantow was not advised by her attorney, the court or the district attorney that convictions for those offenses could result in deportation from the United States. 1 When she pleaded guilty, Trаntow was a legal resident alien in this country. Counts III, IV, V and VI were dismissed by the People in the furtherance of justice at sentencing. Trantow was granted probation for a pеriod of three years upon condition that the first four weekends be spent in county jail.
In October 1973, probation was terminated pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.3. Trantоw’s pleas of guilty were set aside, pleas of not guilty were entered and counts I and II were dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.
In 1976, Trantow filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the issue of her possible deportation. On September 2, 1976, her writ of habeas corpus was argued and denied.
*845 On February 17, 1984, Trantow’s hearing оn her petition for writ of error coram nobis was heard. On March 8, 1984, the court denied the petition for writ of error coram nobis.
This appeal was timely filed.
Contentions on Appeal
Appellant Trantow contends that the trial court abused its discretion аnd erroneously denied her writ of error coram nobis.
Discussion
The requirements which must be met before granting a writ of
coram nobis
are set forth in
People
v.
Shipman
(1965)
The first requirement under Shipman, has two elements. The first is that there be an error of fact at the time of judgment. The second is that such error of fact would have prevented the rendition of the judgment. Trantow asserts thаt her alien status is the error of fact that was not presented to the court. Trantow argues that had the trial court known of her alien status and the possibility of deportаtion, it would not have rendered the judgment which it did.
Assuming that the mistake of “fact” was that Trantow did not know her alien status might result in deportation, it does not necessarily follow that this would have “prevented” the judgment. Trantow’s alien status is a fact irrelevant to her conviction on the two felony charges.
Respondent cites examples of casеs where the error of fact claimed would have been a legal impediment to the rendition of the judgment. For example,
*846
the “fact” that the defendant was insane аt the time of a guilty plea would make the plea invalid and therefore, if the fact were known, it would have prevented the rendition of judgment.
(People
v.
Welch
(1964)
Appellant Trantow has mistakenly confused facts which would “prevent” the rendition of judgment with facts which might engender sympathy. In support of her position, Trantow relies upon
People
v.
Wiedersperg
(1975)
In
Wiedersperg, supra,
As to thе second requirement, there is no dispute. Trantow’s alien status was not previously adjudicated and did not go to the merits of the judgment. Therefore, the second requirement is sаtisfied.
The third requirement also has two parts. First, the facts upon which Trantow relies must not have been known to her and second, could not, in the exercise of due diligencе, have been discovered by her at any time substantially earlier than the time of her motion for the writ. Trantow asserts *847 that the mistake of fact is the consequence of deportation. Trantow has established that the fact (consequence of deportation) was unknown to her at the time of plea and sentence. The issue therеfore is whether, with the exercise of due diligence, Trantow could have discovered the consequence of deportation at any time substantially earlier thаn the bringing of this motion for the writ.
Trantow claims that the delay of some 14 years between conviction and motion for the writ is excusable. We disagree. The only delay which might be рermissible is the delay between judgment and the acquisition of the previously unknown information. Even assuming that such information was not known by her at the time of the judgment, it was clearly known by Trantow when she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1976, raising the issue of her possible deportation. She still waited an additional eight years before seeking а writ of error coram nobis. She argues that the delay between time of conviction in 1970 and filing of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1976 is to be excused because she did not knоw the deportation consequences of her conviction. She argues that the eight years between 1976 and the eventual filing of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis is to bе excused because of her lack of knowledge as to the proper legal means of seeking redress for her 1970 conviction.
We conclude that Trantow has made an insufficient showing that the facts upon which she relies could not have been discovered by her, in the exercise of due diligence, at any time substantially earliеr than the time of her request for relief under coram nobis.
Trantow having failed to meet the first and third requirements specified in the three part Shipman standard, we conclude that the trial court did nоt abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief. Since Trantow’s failure to meet the Shipman requirements precludes the granting of relief, we need not address Trantow’s additional arguments.
The denial of the writ of error coram nobis is affirmed.
Lui, Acting P. J., and Danielson, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 9, 1986, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 28, 1986.