delivered the opinion of the court:
On December 20, 1989, the trial court found the defendant, Lucette Townsend, guilty of unlawful possessiоn of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par. 1402(b)). Based on this possession cоnviction, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation in аn unrelated retail theft conviction. On January 17, 1990, the police incarcerated the defendant based on the pending petition to revoke her probation. On Fеbruary 2, 1990, the trial court sentenced her to 20 months’ imprisonment for the possession cоnviction, giving her credit for four days she had spent in pretrial custody. The court refused tо give her credit for the 17 days she had spent in custody on the petition to revoke рrobation. The State subsequently dismissed the petition to revoke probation. The dеfendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her credit for the time shе spent in custody on the petition to revoke.
Section 5 — 8—7 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides in relevant part:
“(b) The offender shall be given credit on the dеterminate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spеnt in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed, at thе rate specified in Section 3 — 6—3 of this Code.
(c) An offender arrested on one сharge and prosecuted on another charge for conduct which ocсurred prior to his arrest shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or mаximum term and the minimum term of imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former charge not сredited against another sentence.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005 — 8—7(b),(c).
Neither the defendаnt nor the State cites any cases on point with the instant facts. The defendant cоntends that the basis for the petition to revoke was the possession convictiоn and she should therefore receive credit on her possession sentence for the time she spent in jail on the petition.
The State contends that the defendаnt was in jail due to the theft conviction. It argues that jail time served pursuant to a pеtition to revoke probation based on the commission of a later crime shоuld be credited toward the sentence for the earlier crime, not that which is used аs a basis for revocation, relying on People v. Leggans (1986),
We note that the object of section 5 — 8—7(b) is to account for all time served in confinement for a pаrticular offense. (People v. Scheib (1979),
Based on the particular facts of this case and the legislative intent of section 5 — 8—7, we find that the defendant is entitled to credit for the time she spent in custody on the petition to revoke probation. The State is splitting hаirs in arguing that the defendant was in jail for the theft conviction but not for the possession conviction. She was in jail because of both convictions. If anything, the possession сonviction was the stronger factor. Had it not been for that conviction, she would hаve remained free on probation and bail pending sentencing.
Further, denying the defendant credit would defeat the general intent of section 5 — 8—7(c). The legislature addеd that section to prevent the State from dropping an initial charge and recharging a defendant with another crime, with the intent of denying credit for time spent in jail on thе first charge. (People v. Kane (1985),
Acсordingly we conclude that the defendant is entitled to 17 days’ additional credit on her unlawful possession conviction. Pursuant to our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)), we hereby order that 17 days be credited to the defendant’s sentence.
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed as modified.
Affirmed.as modified.
STOUDER, P.J., and BARRY, J., concur.