People v. TokolyPeople v. Tokoly
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Carter
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error was indicted, tried and found guilty of the crime of manslaughter and was sentenced to the penitentiary to serve an indeterminate sentence. The indictment was under an act passed in 1923 “to punish persons knowingly and willfully selling, bartering or furnishing for beverage purposes wood alcohol, compounds or preparations containing wood alcohol, or any poisonous liquor, which causes death, from
Plaintiff in error, with his two sons, conducted a soft drink parlor in the city of Pana at the time of his arrest, in October, 1923. George Baldwin, a resident of Pana, entered plaintiff in error’s place of business on October 11, 1923, and drank as a beverage some liquid which looked like whisky. Baldwin died the night of the day following. There was testimony of other deaths following drinking at plaintiff in error’s place of business. Some of the same liquor which was being sold at that place was analyzed and was found to contain 44.7 per. cent wood alcohol. There was testimony that others drank the liquor sold by plaintiff in error, following which they were made sick and became blind, for a time at least. It appears from the evidence that alcohol was purchased by plaintiff in error from Bob Smith, who apparently resided in the same city. He purchased five gallons at one time, for which he paid $37, and another five gallons later, which had not been paid for at the time of his arrest. It was testified that wood alcohol sold for $1.45 to $1.60 and up per gallon. There was some testimony to the effect that plaintiff in error had stated at the coroner’s inquest that he supposed he was getting grain alcohol, but there was no direct evidence at the time of the trial to indicate that he purchased what he” supposed was grain alcohol, except the price paid and what he had previously stated at the coroner’s inquest. ,
The indictment contained six counts, all of which were based upon the death of Baldwin from wood alcohol poisoning. The first question discussed is the constitutionality of the
.It is contended, also, that error was committed by the court in permitting evidence to be introduced of sales of liquor containing wood alcohol to other persons and that they died as a result thereof or became blind or nearly so; that such evidence had no tendency to prove motive or to fix.identity and was not inseparably connected with the offense charged. The general rule is that in a case of this kind the evidence must be confined to the point in issue, and therefore no evidence of a distinct substantive offense committed is admissible. (People v. King, 276 Ill. 138.) In the very nature of the offense created by the statute it became necessary to show that the wood alcohol was sold for beverage purposes, and when that proof was made it showed the intention was to sell for beverage purposes. While it may not have been necessary to go into any special details as to the circumstances surrounding the death, sickness or blindness, the showing of the symptoms of wood alcohol poisoning and the fact of death had some bearing upon the question at issue, even though it proved an independent substantive offense under this same act or another statute. The test of admissibility of evidence is the connection of the facts proved with the crime charged. What one is in the habit of doing or is doing at the time the offense is committed, as to the thing prohibited or indicated as constituting the crime, is pertinent. (People v. Moeller, 260 Ill. 375.) The sale to others was on the same day the sale was made to Baldwin and the day previous. If the introduction of the testimony had the effect of showing the absence of mistake or accident, which is a proper purpose, it was competent. (People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321.) Any circumstance may be put in evidence which tends to make the proposition at issue either more or less probable. (People v. Newsome, 291 Ill. 11.) We think there was a sufficient connection between the facts testified to as to other
Instruction r given for the People is criticised because it states that while the certain acts therein mentioned constitute murder, the instruction does not tell the jury what murder is. Plaintiff in error’s instruction 13 was given for that identical purpose. The instructions are to be considered as a series. It is not necessary that the whole law upon a given subject shall be stated in any particular instruction which is not intended as a direction to find a verdict. What we have heretofore stated as to the constitutionality of the law also has some bearing upon the further argument made against this instruction.
It is contended that instruction 6, which defined an accessor}‘, stating that an accessory could be convicted as a principal, was improperly given as there was no evidence upon which to base it, unless it be upon the theory that plaintiff in error furnished the wood alcohol and delivered it to the premises even though he may not have made the actual sales himself; that the sons could not have been considered as principals having a knowledge of the character of the liquor they sold, for they drank it themselves and were made sick by it. The evidence showed that plaintiff in error was the proprietor of the place and that he procured the alcohol and placed it on sale and the sons were working for him in selling the liquor. On these facts plaintiff in error would be considered in law as aiding, assisting and abetting the actual sales of liquor for beverage purposes even though he himself made no actual sale. If an instruction states the law correctly and is based upon legitimate evidence in the record, the propriety of its introduction is not made to depend upon the testimony actually showing a particular state of facts unless there is some further prejudicial reason disclosed. (People v. Everett, 242 Ill. 628.) In most important criminal cases where the evidence admits of morg than one conclusion,.
It is contended that instruction 7, defining manslaughter, was improperly given because the act under which the indictment was drawn made the offense there stated murder and ■ no lesser offense constituting manslaughter was provided, and that as the indictment in every count charged murder and not manslaughter, if the proof failed in some of the elements necessary to be shown to constitute murder it would not show the lesser crime of manslaughter but the proof would fail altogether. Under an indictment for murder a conviction for manslaughter will be sustained. (Howard v. People, 185 Ill. 552; Earll v. People, supra; Graff v. People, 208 Ill. 312.) Where the evidence admits of only one conclusion, and that conclusion is that the crime charged was committed, it is error to give an instruction authorizing a verdict for a lesser offense. (People v. Moore, 276 Ill. 393.) Ordinarily, under an indictment for murder the accused may be convicted of manslaughter if there is any evidence tending to prove the commission of that crime. The rule is otherwise if there is no such evidence. (People v. Schultz, 267 Ill. 147; Davis v. People; 114 id. 86.) There was some evidence, the weight of which we do not pass upon, which had a tendency to show plaintiff in error did not know the alcohol he was obtaining was wood alcohol. He knew the sales of liquor were unlawful, therefore an instruction which omitted one of the essential ingredients of the crime of murder still charged that he unlawfully sold wood alcohol as a beverage, and would be a sufficient statement of the law to warrant a conviction of manslaughter. If it is no objection that a statute may provide that an offense shall be murder without incorporating all the elements which constitute murder and
Two instructions which it is conceded state the law correctly are objected to because it is contended they have no application to the case, and the general statement is made that they tended to prejudice the jury. One of these instructions discussed different tests as to the credibility of witnesses, and the other was upon circumstantial evidence. Without discussing either instruction, we think it is sufficient to say that under the evidence neither instruction was prejudicial to plaintiff in error.
Counsel also object to instruction 11, which had the effect of advising the jury that if plaintiff in error furnished wood alcohol, by himself or agent, to George Baldwin, in manner and form as charged in the indictment, he was engaged in an unlawful act which might produce the killing of a human being, and if the jury believed such unlawful act resulted in the killing of Baldwin, they could take such fact into consideration in determining whether plaintiff in error was guilty of manslaughter. It is stated the instruction omits an essential ingredient of the crime, namely, that he knowingly or willfully sold or furnished the wood alcohol. What was said in discussing instruction 7 answers a part of the argument made as to this instruction. If the act charged is unlawful, it is not essential that the proof show all the elements necessary to convict for murder. There was not in the instruction an attempt to hold the plaintiff in error responsible for an independent act of the agent, but the wording of the instruction is such as to directly connect the act of any other person with the plaintiff in error. The wording is,
Instruction 12 is criticised because it told the jury that they might determine the question of the knowledge and intention of plaintiff in error from all the facts and circumstances. What we have heretofore said substantially answers this objection. The sale to other persons tended to show the knowledge and intention of the plaintiff in error, and the instruction was applicable and the giving of it was not error.
It is contended that numerous other instructions should have been given. One of these instructions told the jury that if the evidence disclosed that deceased drank liquor at another place, not furnished by plaintiff in error, and such evidence left in the jury’s mind a reasonable doubt as to whether wood alcohol or other poisonous substance was furnished by plaintiff in error, or that the particular wood alcohol or other poisonous substance furnished by him occasioned the death of the deceased, then the jury should find
A number of other instructions requested and refused contained statements of the law covered in instructions given, and there was no reason to repeat them in somewhat varying language. Instruction 50 requested by plaintiff in error, intended as a cautionary instruction concerning certain evidence, gave undue prominence to the same, and there was no error in refusing to give it.
The objection that improper evidence was admitted of sales to other people has been heretofore passed upon in discussing instruction 11. This case is distinguished from People v. Gotler, 311 Ill. 387, and People v. Meisner, 311 id. 40. In those and other cases cited it appeared as a fact that the evidence objected to as to other offenses was immaterial as to the offense charged. The rule was recognized in those cases that the test of admissibility of evidence is the connection of the facts proved with the offense charged. Under the wording of the statute the evidence as to other persons drinking had the effect of showing the absence of mistake or accident as to the sale to Baldwin and tended to make more probable the proof oí the charge in issue.
It is contended further that the evidence was insufficient to convict; that there was nothing to show that plaintiff in error knew he was receiving or selling wood alcohol until he found it out from the effect upon those he had sold to. While there was some evidence, first, as to the price which he paid for the alcohol, which was more nearly the price, as testified, at which grain alcohol sold than the price of wood alcohol, and some further testimony that plaintiff in error stated at the coroner’s inquest that he supposed he
The judgment of the circuit court of Christian county will be affirmed. .
T , Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring:
We agree that the judgment of conviction of manslaughter should be affirmed. The new statute is a useless piece of legislation, because the crime which it was designed to define was already .fully defined by existing statutes. It is of no consequence, therefore, whether the new act is valid. Some counts of the indictment are sufficient to support a conviction for murder or manslaughter under the provisions of sections 140 and 145 of the Criminal Code. Plaintiff in error was engaged in the unlawful business of selling intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes and the liquor he sold Baldwin was poisonous. The natural consequence of drinking the quantity of poisonous liquor sold by the bar-tenders employed for the purpose by plaintiff in error, to be drunk by Baldwin, was death, and the killing naturally resulting from the act of selling the poison for beverage purposes is murder. That the jury favored plaintiff in error by convicting him of the lesser included offense is an act of grace of which he cannot complain. It was error to permit witnesses to detail the serious results to others who drank the poison sold by plaintiff in error, because such details were not relevant. The guilt of plaintiff in error is so clearly established, however, that the errors occurring on the trial should not result in a reversal.