On the 6th day of May, 1880, an information for felony was presented and filed in the Superior Court of Colusa County, by which the dеfendants are charged with having, on the 22nd day of December, 1879, cut, broken, and injured a levee and embankment erected by Reclamation District No. 108. The information was demurred to by the defendants on several grounds, аnd the demurrer was sustained by the Court; and from the judgment this appeal is taken.
The main ground upon which the counsеl for the respondents relies, in support of the judgment, is, that the law which made the acts which the defendants are alleged to have committed a felony was repealed before this information was presented. The section (607) of the Penal Code by which the acts specified were made a felony was amended by an act approved April 12th, 1880, in several particulars, the most important of which was, so far as this сase is concerned, a reduction of the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, and of thе punishment from a
Assuming that by the “ indictment and punishment of an act ” is meant “ the indictment and punishment of a person who has committed an act in violation of law,” we would be compelled, in order to uphold the information filed against the respondents, to further assume that the Legislature also meant that the repeal of any law creating a criminal offense should not constitute a bar to a proceeding by information against a person who had violated such law before it" wаs repealed. As the Political Code which contains the provision referred to went into effect several years before any one could be proceeded against by information for any offense, it will not be claimed that the Legislature which enacted it intended that a person who had violated a lаw might be proceeded against after its repeal by information.
The rule for the construction of penal statutes we understand tu be as somewhat tersely stated by Bishop, that they “are to reаch no further in meaning than their words; no person can be made .subject to them by implication ; and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused.” (Stat. Crimеs, 194.) It will readily be observed that we cannot bring the case of these respondents, within the'provision of the Code which it is claimed reverses the common-law rule, in regard to the effect of a repeal of а statute upon offenses committed before its repeal, without interpolating several words into that рrovision. The rights of these respondents cannot be taken away by any means that are not strictly legal. Priоr to April 7th, 1880, they could only be proceeded against by indictment, and there is nothing in the statute passed on thаt day which indicates that the Legislature intended that it should have a retrospective effect. In the absence of any such indication, we would not be justified in giving such effect to it. We are aware that a trial may be had upon a pending indictment after a change in some-mere matter of procedure has been made by the Legislature. But no case has been brought to our attention in which it has been held, that a constitutiоnal guaranty, such as existed at the time these respondents are charged with the violation of a statute, could be taken away by any act of the Legislature. Such guaranties rest upon a basis more secure than acts of the Legislature, which relate to the mode of procedure in actions. We do not think that the respondents in this case could be held to answer for the offense with which they are charged, “ unless on presentment of a grand jury.”
Judgment affirmed.
Ross, J., Myrick, J., and Thornton, J., concurred.