ORDER
Entered May 8, 1975. — Reporter.
On order of the Court, the application by defendants-appellants for leave to appeal is considered and the same is granted. The Court, sua sponte, reverses the conviction and discharges the defendants.
Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion. MCLA 750.14, 750.157a; MSA 28.204, 28.354(1). They could not have been convicted of the substantive abortion offense because pregnancy of the woman is a necessary element of that offense. 1 Am Jur 2d, Abortion, § 6, p 191.
Cf. People v Jones,
The somewhat indeterminate common-law definition of conspiracy, as a combination to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose or end or to accomplish a lawful purpose or end by criminal or unlawful means
(People v Tenerowicz,
While the crime of conspiracy is distinct from the substantive offense
(People v Chambers,
There are two statutory patterns prevalent in this country: one requiring that the woman be pregnant (Michigan and other states), the other requiring only that the person to be aborted be a woman. 1 Am Jur 2d, Abortion, § 7, pp 191-192. The Legislature, having elected the pattern requiring that the person to be aborted be pregnant, has rejected prosecutions where the person is not pregnant. It has indicated that an attempted abortion which does not or cannot succeed because the person is not pregnant is not a crime. The Legislature has not, as to most other offenses, so similarly indicated that impossibility is not a defense.
In this statutory pattern, the crime of conspiracy to commit abortion cannot be committed with respect to a person who is not pregnant.
