THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERICSON TINGCUNGCO, Defendant; ALLEGHENY CASUALTY COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
No. B253003
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eight, California
May 29, 2015
237 Cal.App.4th 249
John M. Rorabaugh for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
OPINION
RUBIN, J.—Allegheny Casualty Company appeals from the order denying its motion to vacate its forfeiture of a bail bond, contending that the applicable statute required additional tolling of the forfeiture period while prosecutors decided whether to extradite a fugitive who had been located in a foreign country. We disagree and affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 30, 2012, Allegheny Casualty Company, through its agent, posted $50,000 bail for Ericson Tingcungco, who had been charged with burglary. When Tingcungco did not appear as ordered on September 5, 2012, the trial court forfeited bail. The appearance period—the period during which the bond might be exonerated if Tingcungco appeared—was later extended to October 4, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, Allegheny notified the Los Angeles County District Attorney‘s Office that Tingcungco had been located in Mexico, and asked it to decide whether to begin extradition proceedings. If the district attorney elected not to do so within the appearance period, then the bail bond would be exonerated. (
The district attorney opposed the motion, contending that
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because we interpret a statute based on undisputed facts, we are not bound by the trial court‘s interpretation of the statute, and instead decide the correct interpretation as a matter of law. (Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction Authority v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 658, 663-664.) The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. In doing so, we first look to the words of the statute and try to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of the language, at the same time not rendering any language mere surplusage. (Id. at p. 664.) The words must be construed in context and in light of the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. The statute must be given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature, practical rather than technical in nature, and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. (Ibid.) If the language of a statute is clear, we should not add to or alter it to accomplish a purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. Statutes must be harmonized both internally and with each other. (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
1. The Statutory Framework and the Seneca Decision
If a criminal defendant out on bail fails to appear when lawfully required to do so, the trial court must declare bail forfeited. (
At issue here is
“In all cases of forfeiture where a defendant is not in custody and is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, is temporarily detained, by the bail agent, in the presence of a local law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in which the defendant is located, and is positively identified by that law enforcement officer as the wanted defendant in an affidavit signed under penalty of perjury, and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the location of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release.” (
§ 1305, subd. (g) .)3
The Seneca court considered the effect of that provision where the surety notified the prosecutor that its fugitive on bail had been located in a foreign country eight months before the bond exoneration period was set to end. Although the prosecutor said she would seek extradition, she had not initiated the process by the time the exoneration period ended. The surety moved to either (1) vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bail because the prosecutor‘s failure to initiate extradition proceedings was effectively a decision not to extradite or (2) toll the statutory appearance deadline so the prosecutor could pursue extradition. The trial court denied that motion.
The Seneca court affirmed. Applying the rules of statutory construction, it concluded: “A bail bond is not exonerated simply because the People have not completed (or even initiated) extradition of the defendant before the end of the bond exoneration period.” (Seneca, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082, italics added.) Instead, judgment must be entered in the amount of the bond unless the fugitive defendant is brought into court or the prosecutor forgoes extradition within the bond appearance period. “The statutory scheme does not authorize additional extensions or tolling of the bond exoneration period in the circumstances presented.” (Ibid.)
The Seneca court acknowledged that the bail statutes must be strictly construed to prevent forfeiture and also recognized the potential for unfairness if prosecutors either falsely elected to extradite and then abandoned their efforts, or did nothing. (Seneca, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082–1083.) Even so, the language of the statutory scheme did not support the surety‘s position because exoneration of the bond was contingent on the return of the defendant, not the initiation of extradition proceedings. “We are loath to impose nonstatutory deadlines on prosecutors to initiate the process of extradition or to otherwise require prosecutors to pursue extraditions on a particular timetable.” (Id. at p. 1083.)
In February 2012, a bill was introduced in the California Senate to amend
A bill analysis discussed Seneca in detail and cited the author as stating that the bill was needed “‘where the prosecutor declines to make a decision about extradition in a timely fashion.‘” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 989 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 24, 2012, p. 5.) It therefore appears that the bill as introduced was in reaction to Seneca.
However, the bill was amended one week later to eliminate the provision in
An analysis of the amended version of the bill quotes the author as stating that the new version “would allow a court to toll the 180-day period within which to vacate bail forfeiture, if it is agreed by both the bail agent and prosecuting attorney that additional time to return a fugitive defendant to the jurisdiction of the court is necessary. The bill simply allows both parties to
The version of the bill that was eventually enacted made minor changes to the amended version and relocated it as a separate subdivision (h) in
3. The Legislative History Precludes the Tolling Period Extension Advocated by Allegheny
Allegheny contends that bail should have been exonerated because it fully complied with its obligations under
The evolution of a proposed statute after its original introduction is helpful when determining legislative intent. (People v. Hunt (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 939, 947.) The Legislature‘s rejection of a specific provision which appeared in the original version of an act supports the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision. (Ibid.) While unadopted proposals may sometimes have little value when determining legislative intent (California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 32), the amendments made to Senate Bill No. 989 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.)
As introduced, Senate Bill No. 989 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) would have directly addressed and remedied the problem at issue here: the need to further toll the exoneration period while the prosecutor decides whether to extradite a fugitive on bail located in a foreign country. While that version of the bill was still in play, a bill analysis discussed Seneca in detail in a manner that suggested the bill was addressing that decision. The bill was then amended to strip out that provision in its entirety and replace it with a far different tolling mechanism. Under the bill as amended and eventually enacted, the trial court could only extend the exoneration period based on an agreement by the prosecutor to do so if more time were needed to extradite the defendant. This language therefore presumes that a decision to extradite was made.
We recognize that the facts at issue in Seneca were different from those here. In Seneca, the district attorney had decided to extradite but did not move the process along; whereas here, no decision to extradite had been made. Even so, Seneca employed broad language concerning the limited availability of tolling under
The Senate bill analysis that discussed Seneca picked up on this language, characterizing the holding to mean that “where the prosecution has not made a decision whether or not to seek extradition and the 180-day period before forfeiture runs, the bond must be forfeited.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 989 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 24, 2012, p. 6.) Thus, it appears the Legislature was initially motivated to address that aspect
To recap, Allegheny contends that (1)
Allegheny also contends that its inability to produce Tingcungco before the exoneration deadline should be excused under the contract doctrine of impossibility (
The Meyers court held that a bond should be exonerated because the bondsman would have to violate a court order in another county and thus be liable for contempt in order to do so. (Meyers, supra, 215 Cal. at p. 119.) The fugitive defendant in American Surety, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 1063 was deported to Mexico and barred from reentering the United States for a drug offense conviction. The American Surety court held that bail was exonerated under
Meyers long predates
Finally, Allegheny contends that People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1485 (Lexington), supports its contention that the exoneration period should have been tolled while the district attorney made an extradition decision. Lexington is inapplicable. The fugitive defendant in Lexington was in custody in Virginia. The surety moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. When the trial court denied that motion, the surety asked the trial court to toll the exoneration period. The trial court refused. On appeal the Lexington court held the trial court erred because the fugitive was under a temporary disability pursuant to
Allegheny‘s reliance on Lexington‘s statement concerning the prosecutor‘s ability to make an extradition decision during the tolling period reads more into the tolling discussion than is there. The Lexington court did not approve of tolling under
We acknowledge that our holding may strike some as unfair and could discourage some sureties from pressing their search for a fugitive as the exoneration period deadline approaches.4 However, as respondent pointed out during oral argument,
The order denying vacation of forfeiture and exoneration of the bond is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its appellate costs.
Bigelow, P. J., and Flier, J., concurred.
The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 9, 2015, S227683. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.