delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant Thomson entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to several charges arising from a shooting incident. The issue of his sanity was tried to a jury. Over the district attorney’s objection, the trial judge gave the jury the following informational instruction, which had been *233 requested by the defendant:
“If a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, it is the duty of the Court to commit the Defendant to the Department of Institutions until such time as the Defendant is determined to no longer require hospitalization because he no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect which is likely to cause him to be dangerous to himself, to others, or to the community in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The People argue that the giving of this instruction was error because it improperly prejudiced the jury towards a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In support of the People’s position, there was cited
Ingles v. People,
Ingles
was decided in 1931 and reflects the rationale of that era. Recent studies and cases have recognized that today’s juries are distracted from their fact finding function by their concern that a defendant will be returned to the community at large if found not guilty by reason of insanity.
See H. Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant’s Mental Condition Under the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code,
29 Temp. L.Q. 235, 247 (1956);
Roberts v. State,
In a landmark federal case,
Lyles
v.
United States,
We find the Lyles reasoning persuasive and, to the extent that Ingles is inconsistent, it is overruled. We realize that the challenged instruction in this case might possibly influence the jury toward a result-oriented verdict. This must be balanced by the possible miscarriage of justice if, in the mistaken belief that as a result of an insanity verdict the accused will be returned to the community, the jury rejects such a verdict on that account and later finds the accused guilty. This possibility should be negated by a jury instruction which clearly and simply explains the consequences to the defendant of an insanity verdict. Such an instruction should clearly indicate that it is only informational and is to have no persuasive *234 bearing on the jury’s determination of a proper verdict under the evidence. 1
Premised on the foregoing discussion, we now adopt the rule that a defendant who is relying on an insanity defense is entitled,
upon request,
to an instruction on commitment procedures.
See Commonwealth v. Mutina,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
The instruction should be prefaced by the following wording: “This is an informational instruction and must have no persuasive bearing on the verdict you arrive at under the evidence.”
