THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY R. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 3-16-0503
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
September 6, 2017
2017 IL App (3d) 160503
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices O‘Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Illinois Official Reports. Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, No. 15-CF-414; the Hon. H. Chris Ryan, Jr., Judge, presiding. Judgment: Reversed and remanded. Eric L. Miskell, of Miskell Law Center, of Ottawa, for appellant. Karen K. Donnelly, State‘s Attorney, of Ottawa (Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, and Thomas D. Arado, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Jeremy R. Thompson, challenges his convictions, arguing that the circuit court erred in allowing an officer to testify as to ballistics results without sufficient foundation. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
¶ 2 Defendant was charged with (1) possession of a firearm by a felon (
¶ 3 A jury trial was held at which the evidence established that just after 10 p.m. on September 13, 2015, Hollenbeck and Deputy Matt Moore were dispatched to an apartment building based on a theft complaint. They were advised by dispatch that there was a warrant out for one of the tenants of the apartment building. They arrested the tenant. As they were walking to the squad car, Hollenbeck and Moore noticed a green light bouncing off the building and hitting the squad car. They looked up to see where the light was coming from and saw defendant holding a rifle about 40 to 50 feet away on the other side of a fence. A woman was tugging on defendant‘s arm, causing the laser from the rifle‘s scope to move around. Hollenbeck yelled at everyone outside of the apartment building to get down. He then yelled multiple times at the man to drop the gun. Hollenbeck thought he was going to get shot. The man and woman both took off running in the opposite direction. Hollenbeck and Moore ran after defendant and the woman with their guns drawn. They then saw defendant and the woman come back into view without the gun. Hollenbeck told them to freeze and put up their hands. He then patted down defendant. He did not find any weapons on him. Hollenbeck asked defendant where he placed the rifle, and defendant responded, “I stuck it up my ass, why don‘t you try looking there.” Defendant was placed in handcuffs. Hollenbeck searched the area and found the rifle underneath a camper trailer about 40 feet away. The gun turned out to be a .22-caliber pneumatic rifle that was not loaded.
¶ 4 The State called Detective Sergeant Adam Diss to testify regarding the muzzle velocity of the pneumatic rifle in order to establish that it was considered a firearm. See
¶ 5 Defense counsel objected to the foundation for Diss‘s testimony regarding the tests Diss performed with the chronograph. Outside the presence of the jury, the State and defense counsel questioned Diss regarding his education and training in firearms and the use of the chronograph. Diss stated that he did not have any formal degrees, formal training in forensic science, or any formal training “with regard to ballistic measuring of speed of firearms.” When asked when he last calibrated his chronograph, Diss stated, “You don‘t calibrate personal chronographs.” He did not consult any documentation to ascertain whether his chronograph was properly calibrated. He knew there were standards for calibrating chronographs, but he did not know what they were. Diss was unaware of national standards for using a chronograph to test the speed of bullets. He was further unaware of the National Institute of Standards in Technology. Diss again stated that he checked his chronograph against his friends’ chronographs, but he said he did not know when or if their chronographs were calibrated.
¶ 6 Diss stated that when he used his chronograph in this case, the gun was not fixed, but he remained in the same position. He did not know the wind speed, the humidity, or where the wind was coming from during the time he tested the firearm. He did not know the standard for recording wind resistance as he “didn‘t think it was an issue.” Diss stated he did not base his examination on any generally accepted scientific methodology, but only on his knowledge of his chronograph. When using the chronograph, Diss placed it 10 feet away from the firearm and fired 10 shots. He said he uses the same methodology each time based on his experience. He always fired the slowest possible pellets. Diss said he was unaware of any other methodology that would be relevant to its accuracy. Diss said he did not call the Illinois State Police for guidance as to the methodology to conduct a ballistics test or send the gun for velocity testing at the Illinois State Police crime lab because “[t]hey do not offer velocity testing because they say they cannot calibrate a chronograph.” He further did not consult the National Rifle Association or any other industry standard organization for the methodology. He based his method solely on his experience, uninformed by technical standards.
¶ 7 The court allowed Diss‘s testimony, stating, “I‘ll let him give his opinion on it. Whether or not you‘re going to get past a directed verdict is a whole other question.” The jury was brought back in, and Diss testified that he fired 10 rounds of the .22-caliber air rifle over the chronograph, using the “slowest possible pellets.” The velocity of the 10 rounds ranged from 714 to 741 feet per second, which was sufficient to designate the pneumatic rifle as a firearm. See
ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Diss to testify as to the chronograph results without sufficient foundation. Because Diss did not establish the accuracy of the ballistic testing, we find that the foundation was insufficient for Diss‘s testimony regarding the ballistics results.
¶ 10 At the outset, we note that the State argues that defendant has waived the above argument as he failed to cite authority. The State acknowledges that defendant cited Illinois Rule of Evidence 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) and a case included in the comment to the rule, but notes that defendant does not explain how the rules apply in this case. We agree with the State‘s assessment of defendant‘s argument; however, we note that waiver is a limitation on the parties, not the court. People v. Collins, 301 Ill. App. 3d 529, 531 (1998) (citing Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 300 (1995)). Here we believe the interest of justice requires that we consider the merits of defendant‘s appeal.
¶ 11 “[W]hen expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device *** the expert must offer some foundation proof as to the method of recording the information and proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used.” People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502, 514 (1994). Such proof is necessary to ensure that the admission of expert scientific testimony based upon a testing device is both relevant and reliable. Id. The expert must show that the electronic or mechanical device was in good working order when it was used by explaining how the machine is maintained and calibrated and why the expert knows the results are accurate. Compare People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703, 708-10 (2001) (expert failed to testify that gas chromatography mass spectrometer (GCMS) was working properly, that any testing was done to assess the condition of the machine, or that the accuracy of the machine was tested), Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 514 (expert failed to testify that GCMS machine was calibrated and that the results were accurate), and People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306, ¶ 43 (expert did not testify that breathalyzer performed accurately or was certified as accurate), with People v. Berrier, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1160-61 (2006) (expert testified that GCMS was calibrated before testing and was functioning properly), People v. DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1, 21 (2002) (expert testified that GCMS was calibrated daily), and Washington v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 257 Ill. App. 3d 936, 939 (1994) (expert testified how GCMS machines were calibrated).
¶ 12 If an expert (1) fails to testify that the machine used was working properly, (2) does not indicate whether any testing was done to assess the operating condition of the machine, or (3) fails to explain how the machine was calibrated, a proper foundation for the admission of the results obtained from the machine is not established. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 708-10. Where the required foundation is not established, the expert testimony is inadmissible. Id. at 710.
¶ 13 Here, Diss testified that he had been using a chronograph personally for 20 years. He stated that the chronograph was the industry standard for testing the velocity of ballistics. He had no formal training in measuring ballistic speed. To check the accuracy of his chronograph, he tested it against his friends’ chronographs and checked it against factory ammunition, which he
¶ 14 Further, Diss‘s use of the chronograph to test the pneumatic rifle was solely based on his experience and not on any generally-accepted methodology. He did not place the gun in a fixed position. He did not know the wind speed, wind direction, or the level of humidity on the day he shot the gun, nor did he know the standards for recording wind resistance. Because the expert failed to demonstrate the accuracy of the chronograph and its test results, the State did not “establish the necessary foundation proof for admitting the expert opinion” (id.), and the court abused its discretion in admitting Diss‘s testimony regarding the ballistics results. See People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010) (applying an abuse of discretion standard for a foundational challenge to the admission of expert testimony).
¶ 15 Having determined that the court erred in admitting Diss‘s expert testimony regarding the ballistics results, we must now determine the appropriate remedy. See Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306, ¶ 45. “The prospect of retrial raises double jeopardy concerns and requires us to assess the sufficiency of the evidence against defendant.” Id. ¶ 46. “Although the double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant after a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict, the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction.” People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995). Stated another way, if the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant, then we must reverse his conviction outright. However, ” ‘[i]f the evidence presented at the first trial, including the improperly admitted evidence, would have been sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, retrial is the proper remedy.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278, 311 (2010)).
¶ 16 In order to be convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, the State had to prove that defendant (1) had been convicted of a felony and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm “about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business.”
¶ 17 To convict the defendant of the first count of aggravated assault, the State had to prove that he committed an assault and “[k]nowingly and without lawful justification shine[d] or flashe[d] a laser gun sight or other laser device attached to a firearm, or used in concert with a firearm, so that the laser beam [struck] near or in the immediate vicinity of any person.”
CONCLUSION
¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed and remanded.
¶ 19 Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE McDADE
JUSTICE O‘BRIEN and JUSTICE WRIGHT concurred in the judgment and opinion.
