People v. ThompsonPeople v. Thompson
Opinion
On appeal from a judgment of conviction for violation of section 12021 of the Penal Code (possession of a concealable firearm by a person who has been convicted of a felony), appellant contends that the conviction cannot stand because the People failed to prove that the gun was operable, and because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed it.
Subdivision (a) of section 12021 provides in relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony . .. who owns or has in his possession or under his custody or control any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person is guilty of a public offense,...”
In
People
v.
Jackson
(1968)
The uncontradicted evidence in the case at bench was that the gun in question was missing a clip and that as a safety measure the
At the time of the Jackson decision, section 12001 of the Penal Code read: “ ‘Pistol,’ ‘revolver,’ and ‘firearm capable of being concealed upon the person’ as used in this chapter [The Dangerous Weapons’ Control Law, §§ 12000-12094] shall apply to and include any device, designed to be used as a weapon, from which is expelled a projectile by the force of any explosion, or other form of combustion, and which has a barrel less than 12 inches in length.”
After Jackson, the Legislature added the following sentence to section 12001: “ ‘Pistol,’ ‘revolver,’ and ‘firearm capable of being concealed upon the person’ as used in Sections 12021, 12072, and 12073 include the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” (Stats. 1969, ch. 1002, § 1, p. 1973.) No reported decision contains a holding regarding the effect on the Jackson rule of the 1969 amendment to section 12001. This case therefore presents an issue of first impression.
Discussion in one case supports the inference that the
Jackson
rule still applies to violations of section 12021, despite the 1969 amendment to section 12001.
(People
v.
Hayden
(1973)
Appellant’s contention that there was not substantial evidence that he possessed the weapon is frivolous. Police responded to a report of a man firing a gun. Appellant fled up a stairway, but halted, putting up his hands, one of which contained a red scarf. Upon descending the stairs appellant bent down for a moment about halfway down. When the officers arrested him at the bottom of the stairway, appellant possessed no weapon but had five live rounds of .25 caliber ammunition of an unusual make in his pocket. The scarf was missing. The .25 automatic weapon was found wrapped in the red scarf on the stairs where appellant had bent over. There was sufficient evidence of possession. (See, e.g.,
People
v.
Evans
(1974)
In light of our holding, the trial court’s instructions to the jury that operability of the weapon was not an issue were correct. TTie court correctly refused to instruct in accordance with CALJIC No. 12.46, which states the Jackson rule.
Judgment affirmed.
Devine, * and Good, J., † concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 22, 1977.
Notes
We note that an opinion of the Attorney General which seems to support this conclusion is based, in relevant part, upon an erroneous view of legislative history. In an opinion issued on October 30, 1975, the Attorney General concluded that a dart-launcher weapon called the Taser TF-1 was a firearm capable of being concealed upon the person and was a deadly weapon within the meaning of sections 12001 and 3024 of the Penal Code. (
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
Retired judge of the superior court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.