delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Dimitrius Thomas and codefendants Tyrone Sanders 1 and Jeremiah Johnson were charged with multiple felonies including home invasion, armed robbery and aggravated kidnaping from the March 2005 robbery of Tammie Allen and her children David Allen, Jr., Tamera Allen and Tyla Allen. Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery, home invasion and aggravated kidnaping. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to 25 years for the home invasion and aggravated kidnaping of Tammie, 50 years for the home invasion, aggravated kidnaping and armed robbery of David, and 50 years for the aggravated kidnaping of Tamera and Tyla.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove defendant guilty of home invasion because no one was present in the house when it was entered; (2) one of his convictions for home invasion must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to an extended-term sentence of 50 years; and (4) the mittimus must be corrected to reflect a conviction for armed robbery instead of armed violence.
The following evidence was presented at defendant’s jury trial.
On March 10, 2005, Tammie Allen arrived at her home, located at 4515 South Leamington Avenue, with her children and parked in front of the house. David, age 11, and Tamera, age 7, walked to the side door while Tammie stayed in front of the house as Tyla, age 5, played in the snow. David had his own key and went to unlock the door. As he was going into the house, two men approached them, later identified as codefendants Johnson and Sanders. Sanders came up behind David and Tamera while Johnson grabbed Tammie and Tyla.
The men forced the family into their home and cornered thеm in the kitchen. Tammie stood in front with Tamera and Tyla in the middle and David in the back. The men were armed with firearms. One of the men grabbed Tammie by the collar and demanded to know where the money was and threatened to “deaden her ass” when she said she did not know. Sanders then fired his gun into the kitchen floor. The men emptied Tammie’s purse and took a cell phone and $6 from David.
Johnson forced Tammie to lead him around the house. They went into Tammie and her husband’s bedroom and Johnson began pulling clothes out of drawers. He asked what was under the mattress, and Tammie lifted it up. Defendant was called on his cell phone and asked to bring duct tape. When Johnson and Tammie returned to the kitchen, she saw a third man, wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt with the hood partially covering his head. The hooded man said, “Don’t let that bitch see my face.” Jоhnson then pushed Tammie into David’s bedroom. Johnson returned and put duct tape over her mouth and forehead, partially covering her eyes. Tammie’s hands were bound behind her back by the tape. Eventually the tape was removed from Tammie’s mouth and forehead.
Tammie was taken to the basement by Johnson and defendant. The men began “rambling” through the basement and kept asking for the money. They looked through storage bins and the washing machine and dryer. The wires were pulled out of the home’s security system. Soon, Sanders yelled from upstairs that “it’s a blue and white out here.” The men ran up the stairs and out of the house. Tammie was able to release herself from the duct tape and called for her children.
During the police investigation, Tammie initially identified a person who “resembled” defendant, but did not affirmatively identify him. In April 2005, Detective Thomas Kampenga, who was investigating the robbery, learned that a search warrant had been served at 1910 North Sawyer and three handguns were recovered from that address. He had the bullet recovered from the Allens’ kitchen floor compared with the recovered handguns. It was determined to be a match. Subsequently, Tammie met with Detective Kampenga, at which time she identified Johnson and defendant in a photogrаphic array. A lineup was conducted later and Tammie again identified Johnson and defendant. David viewed the lineup separately from his mother, and he also identified defendant and Johnson. In June 2005, Tammie identified Sanders in a photographic array and later in a lineup. David also identified Sanders separately at a lineup.
A fingerprint was taken from the dryer, but it did not match defendant. No other suitable fingerprints werе recovered from the house. Also, DNA analysis was performed on a cigarette butt smoked by one of the men and left at the crime scene. However, the DNA profile did not match any of the men.
Johnson testified for the State and said that he pled guilty to home invasion in exchange for an 11-year sentence. All other charges were dropped against him. According to Johnson, he was told by a person called “Ball” about a place they could rob. Ball picked up Johnson with other men. Johnson identified one of the men as defendant but did not identify the other as Sanders. The men parked away from the house and waited for the family to come home. His testimony mostly corroborated the testimony of Tammie and David. Johnson stated that defendant took all the guns after they left.
Defendant rested without presenting any evidence. The State moved to dismiss all charges against Sanders. The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery, two counts of home invasion, and four counts of aggravated kidnaping. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years for the home invasion and aggravated kidnaping of Tammie, 50 years for the home invasion, aggravated kidnaping and armed robbery of David, and 50 years for the aggravated kidnaping of Tamera and Tyla, all sentences to run concurrently.
This appeal followed.
First, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of home invasion because the evidence presented did not establish that people were present in the home when it was entered. When this court considers a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not our function to retry the defendant. People v. Hall,
Section 12 — 11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
“(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters thе dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and
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(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs[.]” 720 ILCS 5/12— 11(a)(3) (West 2004).
Defendant contends the witnesses testified that they were seized by the offenders outside the house and forced into the home. According to defendant, these facts do not satisfy the home invasion statute because the home was empty prior to the entry of the victims with the offenders. Defendant relies on People v. Pettit,
Defendant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, defendant is in error when he states that all of the witnesses testified that they were outside of the house when they were seized. David testified at the time he was opening the door, he “saw a man behind [him] coming inside the gate.” When asked by the State what happened when he saw the man, David stated that, “[he] was in the housе and [he] turned the light on.” David’s testimony indicates that he was present in the house at the time of the entry. Any discrepancies in the testimony were a question for the jury. Further, defendant does not contest any of the testimony presented.
Second, even if David’s testimony were insufficient to show presence in the house at the time of the entry, defendant’s claim still fails. Although not cited by either party, the Fourth District in People v. Dall,
“Pettit’s conviction for home invasion was revеrsed on appeal. Pet-tit and two others had invaded the first floor of a house which had been divided into two apartments. The residents of the upstairs apartment were baby-sitting for the downstairs residents. All of the evidence indicated Pettit and the other defendants were unaware of the fact that the house had been divided into two apartments. After waiting for the first-floor apartment dwellers to return, Pettit took his hostagеs upstairs. He was charged with home invasion of the second-floor apartment. The supreme court affirmed reversal of the convictions, noting that no evidence indicated Pettit knew he was entering the ‘dwelling of another’ when he went upstairs.” Dall,207 Ill. App. 3d at 523 .
The court then found that “[fjorcing a person into her own home and following that person into the home without authority satisfies the portion of the home invasion statute, thаt defendant, without authority, enters the dwelling place of another knowing that one or more persons are present.” Dall,
We agree with the conclusion in Dali. Here, the defendants waited for Tammie and her children to come home. As David started to unlock the door, Johnson and Sanders approached the family and forced them into the kitchen, where they were held at gunpoint. Even if David did not enter the house before one of the offenders, the simultaneous forced entry alongside the victim is sufficient to satisfy the home invasion statute. Therefore, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant entered the home when people were present.
Next, defendant asks this court to vacate one of his convictions for home invasion because there was only one criminal entry into the dwelling. The State аgrees with defendant and concedes that we should vacate one conviction as in accordance with People v. Cole,
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of 50 years for an incident in which no one suffered any injuries and that lasted only a few minutes. The State responds that defendant was sentenced within the statutory range, he had numerous prior convictions with the opportunity for rehabilitation, and he discounts that the crime was committed against a woman and her three small children.
“It is well established that a trial court has broad discretionary authority in sentencing a criminal defendant.” People v. Evans,
“The Illinois Constitution mandates the balancing of both retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment.” Evans,
Here, defendant was convicted of home invasion, armed robbery and aggravating kidnaping against David, aggravated kidnaping of Tammie, and the aggravated kidnaping of Tamera and Tyla. All of these convictions are Class X felonies. See 720 ILCS 5/12 — 11(c), 18— 2(b), 10 — 2(b) (West 2004). Class X felonies are subject to a sentence of 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(3) (West 2004).
Further, the trial court was entitled to sentence defendant to an extended tеrm of 30 to 60 years if any of the aggravating factors in section 5 — 5—3.2(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections were present. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—2(a)(2) (West 2004). Two aggravating factors were present in defendant’s case: he had prior felony convictions and he committed felonies against children under 12 years of age. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—3.2(b)(1), (b)(4)(i) (West 2004). According to defendant’s presentence investigation (PSI) report, defendant had previously been convicted оf six felonies from 2000 to 2004. These prior convictions included three convictions for possession of a controlled substance, one for delivery of cannabis on school grounds, and two convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Defendant fails to acknowledge his prior felony convictions in his brief as an aggravating factor to warrant an extended-term sentence.
Instead, defendant focuses on the brevity of the crime and the fact that none of the victims were physically harmed. We find defendant’s attempts to minimize the nature of these crimes to be without merit. Defendant cites to the decision in People v. Juarez,
At sentencing, the trial court thoroughly discussed the serious nature of defendant’s crimes.
“This cаse is again a very serious case. For the children of David — for the children of David Allen and Tamera Allen, this is nothing less than a nightmare. This is nothing less than a mother and her offspring returning home to what is supposed to be a place of safety, a place of security, and a place of happiness. You know, metaphorically speaking, it should be an oasis away from all that’s bad. However, the defendant, Mr. Dimitrius Thomas, and a number of cohorts decided to upset that particular place of safety and decided to inject a nightmare into the lives of Miss Allen and her [three] children in this case. Not for a quick crime of stealth or quick crime of violence or something is taken, someone is knocked down and the individuals or perpetrators run away, but to sit in someone’s home, in the sanctity of that home, and over a periоd of time literally, mentally torture the occupants of that home who did nothing more than come from wherever they were lawfully before that.
The sentence the Court going to impose in this case is given to Mr. Dimitrius Thomas, and it’s needed to deter others from engaging in this type of conduct.
The violence, not physical violence or manifestation of that is so much apparent in this case, but the mental anguish and the sheеr torture, the psychological torture of having your home invaded and your children put in harm’s way is, in this Court’s eyes, some of the most unacceptable behavior under the statutory scheme in the state of Illinois.”
The trial court stated that its sentencing decision was based on the evidence at trial, defendant’s PSI report, the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the victim impact statement, and the arguments of counsel. The court specifically noted defendant’s six prior convictions and noted that, “Lessons learned in the penitentiary have not been learned well by Mr. Dimitrius Thomas in this case.” The court went on to impose concurrent sentences for all the convictions with 50-year extended sentences for the crimes against the Allen children and a 25-year sentence for the aggravated kidnaping of Tammie Allen. All of the sentences are within the statutory range. We find that the trial court considered all relevant factors including defendant’s rehabilitative potential along with the need for punishment. Given defendant’s criminal history and severity of the crimes committed against a mother and her three children under the age of 12, we hold that the trial court’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, defendant asks this court to amend the mittimus to reflect a conviction for armed robbery instead of armed violence. The State concedes that the mittimus should be corrected, but points out that, in addition to defendant’s claim of error, the mittimus lists the counts incorrectly. The mittimus reflects that count XVII is a conviction for aggravated kidnaping and count XXIV is a conviction for armed violence. This is incorrect. According to the indictment, count XVII was for the chаrge of armed robbery and count XXIV was for aggravated kidnaping. Count XXXI was armed violence, and the State nol-prossed that charge at the start of the trial. Under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(1), this court has the authority to order a correction of the mittimus. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(1). Therefore, we order the mittimus to reflect a conviction for count XVII for armed robbery and a conviction for count XXIV for aggravated kidnaping.
For the foregoing rеasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction for home invasion of a person under 12 years of age (count III) and sentence. We vacate defendant’s conviction of home invasion (count I) and order the mittimus corrected to reflect a conviction for armed robbery.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
O’MALLEY, EJ„ and JOSEFH GORDON, J., concur.
Notes
Sanders was tried in a simultaneous bench trial with defendant but is not a party to this appeal.