*1 No. 20497. Feb. 1982.] [Crim. PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
THE TERESINSKI, Respondent. Defendant and ROBERT JOSEPH *4 Counsel
George Deukmejian and Evelle J. Younger, General, Attorneys Robert H. Philibosian and Jack Winkler, R. Chief Assistant Gener- Attorneys al, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant General, Attorney Willard F. Jones and William Prahl, G. Deputy General, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
D. Jensen, Lowell District (Alameda), Attorney Meehan, John J. Assis- tant District Attorney, Ralph Countryman, District Deputy Attorney,
David (Concord), J. Levy, City Attorney Kenneth C. As- Scheidig, sistant as Amici Curiae City Attorney, on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Denvir,
Paul Defenders, Halvonik and Quin State Public S. Gary Hendon, Goodpaster Defenders, Ezra Chief Assistant Public Zola, Richard E. Shapiro Michael S. State Public Deputy Defend- ers, and Lewis F. Shearer for Defendant and Respondent. Krause, Krause, Shell, Krause, Timan, Baskin,
Marshall W. Baskin & Grant, & Stathatos, Shell Ephriam C. Margolin, Margaret Steven Alan Crosby, L. Schlosser and Amitai Schwartz as Amici Curiae on be- half of Defendant and Respondent.
Opinion BROUSSARD, J.Our in this case prior opinion Teresinski (People 874]) Cal.3d 605 P.2d a rul- upheld of the Yolo ing Superior dismissing County charges against *5 defendant on the that both the evidence him to ground physical linking the and the identification of the victim were charged robbery testimony the direct of The States product illegal Supreme detention. United the to us further con- granted certiorari and remanded case for sideration in of United States Crews U.S. light L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct. v. Teresinski (California 1244].
U.S. 914 101 S.Ct. does affect our conclusion that the ar- prior Crews decision not reasonable basis for detaining officer lacked an resting objectively defendant; it our that the evidence seized prior physical confirms ruling as a result of.that detention and the identifica- subsequent photographic Crews, however, our holding tion are inadmissible. casts doubt the victim must also be ex- that the identification of testimony robbery be if cluded. we reasoned that such should excluded Although testimony act, flow, from the initial intervening derived in direct causative without detention, that should admissibility the Court in Crews stated Supreme the re- turn the victim’s identification was testimony instead on whether crime, the by any sult of an recollection of untainted independent the detention. confrontation or identification from arising mandate of issue, to the pursuant this of reconsideration Upon indistinguish virtually Crews is Court, first that we note the this of authority the Although recognizing the case. present able from be protection to provide Constitution the California construe court to document, we the federal of parallel provisions afforded that yond with consistent Crews persuasive the reasoning find nevertheless as defining decisions; adopt therefore Crews we California past California Constitution. under the of the parties rights Crews, testimony identification a victim’s reasoning Under il- untainted by recollection independent his if based upon admissible that determined the trial court case conduct. In the legal police victim’s product the independent was the identification determination Since that during robbery. observation of the trial we conclude with the requirements complies suppressing court erred
1. Statement facts. adding former opinion, recital from our the factual reproduce We concerning indepen- the trial judge brief discussion of the views of identification testimony. dent basis of the unfa- force saw an a.m., of the Dixon police
About 2 Officer Rocha business through city occupants proceeding car with three miliar defendant, could not see windshield he glare district. Because of and surmised that driver, were juveniles but he both thought passengers at a law- proceeding the car was Although the driver also was a minor. driver behavior, signaled the officer without any suspicious ful speed because “I he detained the car explained He stop. subsequently *6 curfew have a 10:00 o’clock in the car. We believed there were juveniles in Dixon.”1 and observed defendant Officer Rocha stop
As the car slowed to a reach down. Those gestures back and the front-seat passenger glance alcohol or reach- hiding be might led him to believe that the occupants car, the the walked toward from alighted for a Defendant ing weapon. juvenile companion, involving defendant’s proceeding a 1Citing testimony from incomplete inac presents an and the record in this case Attorney asserts that General detaining Rocha’s reasons for activities and Officer of defendant’s curate account constrained, however, the record before us. decide this case on to We are defendant. in a different action. presented of judicial notice of the truth take We cannot vehicle, driver’s presented his license. The license verified de- status, fendant’s adult and in fact one of the car a only occupant was juvenile. car,
Rocha told defendant at rear of walked to the stay window, driver’s and shined his He on floorboard. saw a light pool of liquid a beer can under the front seat. the two Ordering passen- out, holster; and, gers he then observed a after Rocha gun questioning, retrieved a loaded from the floorboard.2 weapon
A containers, search of the car several beer subsequent produced and a filled with baggie marijuana, paper bag bills and The change. was traced to a Seven-Eleven store that had been money robbed earlier night Woodland. Defendant and his two nearby were passengers arrested on suspicion robbery. Mr. the store clerk who wit- Cady, nessed the identified robbery, photographs and his Later at the companions. identified preliminary hearing Cady defen- dant in person.
Defendant moved to Penal Code pursuant section 1538.5 to suppress both the evidence physical seized and the identification his Cady, basing motion on the primarily testimony of and Offi- Cady cer Rocha at the preliminary hearing. Following argument, court requested on the whether briefing question “under circumstances where the victim is able to but is unable to name the identify defendant as the crime, perpetrator of the if the defendant’s name becomes known to the victim as a result of an arrest are mug pictures taken and victim, shown to the then must the victim’s identification of the defen- dant ... be suppressed?” its Clarifying request, court further stated that “Here the Court is satisfied that Mr. was able to Cady identify defendants. He knew their But he did physical appearance. not know name, their and their names became known to him through mug- ” shots which were taken as a result of . .. an . .. . illegal stop briefs, After the trial receiving court the motion granted to suppress. ruled, first, It that because defendant and his companions were not loi- them; Officer Rocha tering, had no basis for the detention detaining was therefore illegal. of the detention illegality compels suppression *7 2The issues in this case legality concern the of the initial scope detention. The of the (Cf. search has questioned. Superior not been (Kiefer) (1970) v. Court 729, Cal.Rptr. 478 P.2d 45 A.L.R.3d The court also directed suppres- found in the car. trial of the evidence direct, was a on the ground sion of Cady’s testimony, “[t]here and illegal stop and causal connection between immediate necessary no evidence linking the identifications.” Since there remained with the the court ordered the dismissed. robbery, charges "earlier, a hear- this court granted we
The As noted People appealed. (26 457.) Cal.3d respects. in all ruling and affirmed the trial court’s ing to us for the case and remanded certiorari granted Supreme Crews, 445 U.S. supra, of United States reconsideration light decision to our subsequent court filed high decision Teresinski.
2. the detention. Invalidity of United Court’s mandate referred to
Although only States a decision which does relate to our earlier holding not that defendant’s detention was we have to illegal, permitted parties present additional authorities and on that issue. argument bearing Upon matter, however, review of the we adhere to our prior holding, adopt the of the former as take language opinion modified to account of additional contentions advanced and authorities cited. In re
As we C. noted in our former Tony opinion, Cal. 3d 582 P.2d defined the constitutional 957] standard for of a measuring validity detention. That decision explained that: “to or detention the circum justify investigative stop stances known or to the officer apparent must include specific articulable facts him to causing suspect that some activity relating to crime occur, has taken or is place or about to occurring he person intends to stop detain involved in that activity. only Not must he entertain such a but it must subjectively suspicion, be objec tively reasonable for him to do so: facts must be such as would cause any reasonable officer in a like when position, drawing ap propriate on his training and experience omitted], suspect [citation the same criminal and the same involvement activity person question.”
We need that standard to the facts of only apply the present case. The detention here rested upon Officer Rocha’s suspicion that de-
830
fendant and his comrades were a curfew ordinance.3 violating city statement, to Officer Rocha’s the ordinance does not declare Contrary it a crime for minors to be found in after 10 It public p.m. provides loiter, idle, wander, stroll, it is a “to unlawful for minor or in or play streets” and other between 10 and 5 public public places p.m. upon a.m.4 These terms cannot be construed reasonably to defen- encompass dant’s conduct.
The word “loiter” in particular bears a sinister connotation:
it
(In
generally connotes
for the
lingering
purpose
a crime.
committing
(1961)
re Cregler
Cal.Rptr.
to suspect defendant or his were passengers violating prohibi- 3The ordinance reads: P.M.; be in public exceptions. “Sec. 16.2 not to after 10:00 Curfew—Minors loiter, idle, age eighteen any person years “It shall be unlawful for under the to wander, stroll, streets, roads, play public highways, alleys, parks, or in or playgrounds, public grounds, public places public buildings, places other or lots, eating places, unsupervised places, amusement and vacant or other between the day immediately following; provided, hours of 10:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. of the howev- er, apply person accompanied by provisions that the of this section do not when the is guardian, person having custody person, the care and parent, his or when the tional from work. or other adult entertainment, returning directly meeting, recrea- person home from a is dance, returning person going directly directly activity or when the or meeting, person eighteen years may “A under obtain food in a cafe after a entertain P.M., ment, activity, dance or work after the hour of 10:00 but must recreational consuming directly immediately proceed after the food served and premises vacate the ) 6, 1950, (Ord. home.” No. § 1. eighteen violating regulations. under curfew “Sec. 16.4 Curfew—Minors eighteen violating “Any age years provisions of section 16.2 person under juvenile guilty and shall be dealt with in accordance with shall be court law and of a misdemeanor 6, 1950, (Ord. 3.)” No. procedure. § unlawful, the detention was we need not consider de 4In view of our conclusion that constitutionality arguments attacking the of the ordinance. fendant’s
831
his detention of
Accordingly,
of the ordinance.5
lory language
C.,
in In re Tony
supra,
was unlawful under the standards established
888,
893.
did
it is clear that defendant’s conduct
not violate
Although
ordinance,
curfew
nevertheless
that
the detention
People
argue
action was based on a
upheld
should be
on the
that
officer’s
ground
(Cf.
(1971) 401 U.S.
“reasonable mistake of law.”
Hill v. California
484,
(mistake
fact);
797
Elder v. Bd.
L.Ed.2d
91 S.Ct.
[28
1106]
(1966)
Cal.Rptr. 304].)
Medical Examiners
241
246
Cal.App.2d
[50
to excuse a po
Courts on
have
refused
strong
grounds
generally
policy
(See,
(1972) 23
lice officer’s mistake of law.
e.g., People McKelvy
1027,
We need not de
].)6
1036-1037
661
Cal.App.3d
Cal.Rptr.
[100
cide, however, whether under.
circumstances an officer’s
exceptional
“pres
groups:
prohibit
5Curfew ordinances can be classified into two
those which
(see, e.g.,
in
re
proscribed
place
ence” at the
Francis W.
time and
the ordinance described
277])
(1974)
and those such as the
Cal.App.3d
42
892 [117
(See
present
“loitering”
generally
prohibit
ordinance which
or similar conduct.
Curfew
66,
(1958) 107
Ordinances and the Control Nocturnal Juvenile Crime
U.Pa.L.Rev.
C,
73;
747,
Nancy
755.)
Officer Rocha mistak
supra,
Cal.App.3d
Apparently
In re
thought
presence upon
mere
enly
the
type
prohibited
ordinance was of the
which
Dixon
city
p.m.
streets after
argue
reality,
People
that
Seeking
misconception into
to transform the officer’s
juveniles
being
on the
prohibit
present
we
from
should construe the Dixon ordinance to
clear,
argument,
entirely
appears to be that the
streets after curfew. Their
which is not
“loiter, idle, wander,
ordinance,
stroll
language
it
of the
which declares
whatsoever,
activity
even
city’s
to ban all
play,” is so broad as to indicate the
intention
if such was the intention
activity
specific
those
terms. Even
which does not fall within
language of
present
support
no
for that claim—the
city
council—and the
that does not fall within
reasonably be construed to ban conduct
the ordinance cannot
specific
its
terms.
Circuit
decision of the Fifth
to the en banc
Attorney
calls our attention
6The
General
830,
judges announced
which 13 of 24
(1980) 622 F.2d
in
in United States Williams
in dictum their view that
tained
evidence ob
admission of
exclusionary rule should not bar
a technical
seizure involved
acting
good faith” even if its
“in
by police
officers
Court, however, has
The United States
of the Fourth Amendment.
violation
view,
of evidence
suppression
frequently required
and has
endorsed
never
cases in which the
e.g.,
v.
v.
good
(See,
Robbins
acting
faith.
arguably were
police
744,
2841];
United States
101 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
3. Suppression evidence. it fol illegal, necessarily defendant’s detention found
Having
as a result of
found in the automobile
evidence
lows that
physical
Crews,
(See,
States v.
supra,
United
e.g.,
this detention is inadmissible.
C.,
537,
In
463,
Tony
re
546];
supra,
L.Ed.2d
445 U.S.
[63
(1970)
899;
Court
3 Cal.3d
888,
Lockridge
Superior
Cal.3d
[89
731,
photo
defendant was booked
474 P.2d
Since
Cal.Rptr.
investigation
as
part
that detention
following
graphed
defendant’s
victim’s identification of
the robbery
Seven-Eleven robbery,
immediate re
taken as a direct and
photograph
booking photograph—a
Crews,
(See
States v.
inadmissible.
United
also
illegality—is
sult of
537, 547,
463, 473,
18,
3 La
549];
L.Ed.2d
fn.
U.S.
supra,
cited; cf. Davis
Pave,
(1978)
and cases there
and Seizure
11.4
Search
§
89 S.Ct.
Washington restrooms, that he matched observed near the Monument loitering him. women, attempted photograph description given by suitable he took picture, the officer could not get When station, defendant at the police for custody photographed into truancy, *11 victims identified the photo- and released After two of the robbery him. with charged robbery. defendant was arrested graph, il- The trial court ruled that the detention for constituted an truancy arrest, the identification and a both legal suppressed photographic tes- identification. The court victims to subsequent lineup permitted trial, however, at arid on the basis of that defendant was tify testimony found of the first victim. guilty robbery
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned conviction, holding that the in-court was identification the inadmissible (Crews product (D.C. of the illegal 1978) detention. v. United States 277.) 389 A.2d The United States Supreme Court re- unanimously Brennan, versed. Justice all other joined by held participating justices, that the pretrial inadmissible, identifications were but that the robbery victim’s noted, first, identification at trial was admissible. He that the victim’s was known to the before the de- identity police illegal tention, and thus her presence at trial was not traceable any Fourth (445 Amendment violation p. U.S. 472 L.Ed.2d Further- p. 546]). [63 more, the trial court in Crews found that specifically victim’s courtroom identification “rested on an of her independent recollection assailant, initial encounter with the uninfluenced identi- by pretrial (P. fications.” 473 L.Ed.2d p. 547].) Justice Brennan therefore [63 concluded that the in-court identification was not tainted by the prior detention. illegal Crews,
The defendant that an de- although acknowledging illegal (see tention in itself is not a bar to a Frisbie v. subsequent prosecution that 509]), argued L.Ed. 72 S.Ct. Collins U.S. [96 he be identified the victim was the by his in court where could presence D of his Justice Brennan part opinion, fruit of an detention. illegal issue since “in this case the record found it to reach unnecessary arrest, to his both knew discloses that plainly prior illegal basis to his involvement in the suspect and had some identity [Crews’] (445 L.Ed.2d p. crimes with which he was U.S. very charged.” however, Justice Five refused to this join portion p. justices, that the in-court identification might Brennan’s since it opinion implied if had detained Crews without basis any be inadmissible the police whatever, crime other than those with or had arrested him for some Blackmun, Powell, Justice joined by which he was later Justice charged. that a defen- that he would . .. claim “reject explicitly announced (P. fruit arrest.” dant’s face can be a suppressible White, the Chief Justice and Justice Justice p. 549].) joined by defendant’s appearance contention that a Rhenquist, any asserted precedent. was foreclosed suppressible court for identification (P. 550-551].) L.Ed.2d pp. case from United States v. distinguish
We find no basis to case, reported like the victim in The victim in this Crews. *12 of the robber description them with a crime to the police provided here the trial court detention occurred. Although before the illegal hear- victim’s at preliminary that the finding made no formal untainted recollection of his upon independent, was based ing such a crime,7 of the hearing imply statements at the close the court’s is satisfied that “the court expressly Patton stated determination. Judge knew their phys- defendants. He was able to identify that Mr. Cady name, and their names know their ical But he did not appearance. which were taken as a re- to him through mugshots became known ” . . ... illegal stop sult of .. witness, if the relying that v. Crews It is clear from States United based crime, the defendant identify is able to of the memory his upon witness rests upon of the his upon appearance, physical the de basis; the witness learned the fact that adequate independent Judge is irrelevant. action a result of illegal fendant’s name as defendant’s appearance identify could Cady determination Patton’s deten of the illegal as a result he acquired from information apart any 1538.5. hearing suppress evidence under section to required in a 7Findings are not tion is therefore sufficient to establish that the identification testimony e.8 rested upon an independent and untainted sourc case,
Defendant
in the
argues
unlike
the police
had no
to
grounds
him of the
to the
suspect
prior
deten-
robbery
illegal
distinction,
however,
tion. This
rests on that
portion
Justice
Brennan’s opinion which was not
joined
of the
by majority
justices.
Justices
concurring opinions of
Powell and White make it clear
that a
majority
high
identification,
court believe that an in-court
based upon the independent
recollection of a witness known to the po-
detention,
lice before an
is
admissible whether or not the police
suspected
(See
the defendant before the detention.
Thorne v. State of
Arkansas
We conclude that Crews with
controlling
respect
any contentions
based
Constitution,
on the federal
us to
compels
reject defendant’s
premise that
the admission of
courtroom
Cady’s
identification violated
the Fourth Amendment. We therefore turn to defendant’s alternative
I,
claim based on article
section 13 of the California Constitution.9
issue,
this
addressing
we begin by
reaffirming
now settled
principle that
courts,
the California
in interpreting the Constitution of
state,
this
are not bound
federal
precedent construing the parallel
text;
federal
as we
stated
in Committee to
recently
Reproduc
Defend
tive Rights
v. Myers
Third, parallel influenced not to we have on occasion been the incisive dissenting opinions eral decisions by vigor Re- (See to Committee of those decisions. academic criticism Defend 17; 252, 267, fn. 29 Cal.3d v. Myers, supra, productive Rights Bustamante, 88, 100-101.) court decision high 30 Cal.3d supra, unanimous, criti- has not extensive Crews, however, inspired was 252, 261, Myers, Rights supra, Reproductive *14 10In Committee Defend cases, (1955) beginning People v. Martin 45 with we listed numerous footnote Constitu 855], in which this court has construed the California P.2d Cal.2d 755 [290 by parallel provisions that afforded of the greater protection than providing tion as federal Constitution. detention does on which it an illegal cism. The principles rests—that an indepen- rests on testimony not bar and that that prosecution, proof despite police illegality—are dent its admission prior source will justify move the earlier beyond theory well established. Indeed once courts an search to testimo- proof illegal of a direct line causation from of the the crime ny automatically compelled suppression a witness to Lockridge in v. witness’ which this court reached testimony—a point Court, in Crews follows 3d Superior supra, holding Cal. 166—the from those logically principles. Court if followed
Finally, by decision state, courts of this would not overturn established California doctrine to the affording greater rights defendant. To the as we will contrary, explain, California past precedent is consistent with the set principles out in Crews.
Prior to our first Teresinski opinion, California decision leading Court, on the Crews issue was Lockridge Superior v. supra, Cal. 3d 166.11 In Lockridge, investigating jewelry store ob- burglary tained a warrant and searched an apartment. search uncovered a gun earlier, stolen two years tracing the serial number of gun police located the victims of earlier The victims robbery. identified photographs defendants and identified defen- subsequently dants at preliminary hearing. case, however, the burglary an appellate court had held the already search warrant invalid (Lockridge Superior Cal.App.2d de- Cal.Rptr. 223]); fendants therefore moved to suppress victims’ as testimony the fruit of an illegal search.
We denied the request for mandate to suppress the identification tes-
timony. Our
states
opinion
that “The Pesces
were
[the witnesses]
11We note
one earlier case. In
Stoner
already the course during a search conducted . .. as the result of was found gun ... was pure unrelated crimes. of investigation totally of a police [I]t crimes, the police an of other investigation that happenstance during the ex- The purpose in the Pesce robbery. came across the taken gun In the conduct. unlawful police rule is to deter clusionary [Citations.] the case, served suppressing gun was adequately by present purpose were That seeking. other crimes that the police and the evidence of the by suppressing would not be further advanced purpose unquestionably the Pesce robbery; the known victims of crime, of that establish petitioners’ guilt would have been admissible to therewith a during their connection the chance disclosure of but for (3 170-171.)12 at pp. Cal.3d investigation” unrelated wholly cases, case. In both present a close to Lockridge provides parallel matter an of an unrelated police investigation unlawful search a during (the in the present a curfew violation Lockridge, jewelry burglary defen- case) linking evidence physical led chance to the discovery not were robbery a In both the victims of prior dants to robbery. search,13 but were known to a result of the unlawful discovered as occurred. police before that search a settled line
Thus the decision does not threaten to overturn Crews but, leads to results consistent contrary, of California to precedent Thus, with cases. those decisions which rely California leading in California state in order to independent preserve consistency grounds (see doctrine v. su- Pettingill, law and established state protect People 231; 943) are v. Cal.3d Longwill, supra, People pra, case. in the inapposite present People reasoning Lockridge. In 12Subsequent cases have followed the California McInnis, identify robbery we held that victims could supra, 6 Cal.3d taken photograph on the basis of a though victims first identified him in court even 648], Cal.App.3d after an arrest. Griffin facts,
on similar reached the same result. ground distinguish Lockridge on the that defendant attempted 13The trial court to booked, arrested, the investi photographed in connection with present case was arrested, robbery, Lockridge while defendants were gation of the Seven-Eleven booked, burglary. Although we endorsed that distinc photographed jewelry for the illegal police conduct in validity open question. prior opinion, tion in our its case, motion, deten gave suppression the initial which rise to the concerns the tion, detention occurred booking photographing. That subsequent not the arrest or detaining officer was investigation suspected violation before the during of a curfew robbery. even of the Seven-Eleven aware *16 We this court should the of United adopt reasoning conclude I, v. a under rights States Crews to define the article sec- tion 13 of the As said in Lockridge California Constitution. we Court, 166, 171, 3d the purpose Cal. of the exclusion- Superior supra, is rule served the evidence ary adequately by suppressing physical seized the officer as a result of the That by detention. purpose be would not furthered the tes- significantly by additionally suppressing of a witness was not a who discovered as result of unlawful timony conduct, his and whose rests mem- independent ory of robbery.14 conclusion,
In accord with that we hold superior that the court cor- rectly suppressed both the physical evidence seized at time of the and illegal detention the testimonial evidence that Cady, robbery victim, identified defendant’s after the photograph morning robbery. erred, however, The court in suppressing Cady’s testimony identifying defendant at the preliminary Since hearing. was suffi- cient to probable establish cause to believe that defendant committed the charged the court robbery, erred also the action dismissing against defendant. (order reversed, dismissal) judgment the matter re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. *
Bird, J., Mosk, J., Newman, J., Kaus, J., Tobriner, J., C. concurred. J.,
RICHARDSON,
Concurring
in the
Dissenting.
I concur
judg-
ment
reversing
order of
pursuant
dismissal
to United
States
Crews
sibility of evidence under pretext, that decision. If an sham employed arrest were a or merely identification, aas device to secure a person photograph defendant’s for purpose exclusionary might deterrant of the rule require suppression of in-court testimony. identification assignment by the sitting *Retired Associate Justice under of the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. however, opinion dissent, from that portion I respectfully reason officer lacked an arresting objectively which that the concludes well expressed by For the reasons able basis for defendant. detaining *17 (26 Cal. 3d at this case dissenting opinion Justice Manuel his concurred, As Jus 465-466), the detention was proper. in which I pp. cause to make probable short of tice Manuel “Circumstances explained: or motorists for pedestrians an officer may stopping an arrest justify 888, (In (1978) 21 Cal.3d 892 Cal.Rptr. re C. questioning. Tony [148 384, (1975) 15 388-389 366, Cal.3d 582 P.2d v. Harris 957]; People 536, (1970) 2 Court 632]; Superior 540 P.2d Cunha Cal.Rptr. [124 352, 160, Irwin v. Superior P.2d Cal.Rptr. 704]; Cal.3d 355 466 [85 423, 484, 12]; 462 P.2d Cal.Rptr. 426-427 [82 18, 380 Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d 450 v. Mickelson 59 [30 (1964) 62 Cal.2d Coupe P.2d One 1960 Cadillac 658]; People C, the Tony P.2d As stated 95-96 of ‘“the based on a determination application of the rules particular governmental all the reasonableness in the circumstances invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” (Terry v. Ohio [1968] (21 892; p. Cal.3d at italics p. 904]).’ U.S. at L.Ed.2d at p. added.) facts that
“In there an abundance of objective case was occupants Rocha’s honest and belief that justified strong Officer (See re be in of the curfew and ordinance. In vehicle violation might He Cal.Rptr. 113].) observed Nancy Cal.App.3d C. occupied juveniles, a car did be recognize, driving he not apparently relatively tween district of a small town. 3 a.m. in business he law contained provision exempting knew that curfew Although dance,’ business or place or from ‘some lawful juveniles traveling the exception applied he had no whether without determining way In of the vehicle. occupants light detaining questioning that the did not such detention strong exception apply, possibility be question there can no my opinion, was questioning fully justified. govern ‘the in all circumstances of the particular reasonableness mental invasion.’” denied
Appellant’s April for a was 1982. petition rehearing J., Richardson, J., not was of Reynoso, participate opin- did therein. petition ion that the should be granted.