People v. Taylor CA2/3
B333535
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check TreatmentFiled 11/17/25 P. v. Taylor CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333535
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA026288)
v.
WILLIE DAMONE TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted appellant Willie Damone Taylor of 14
crimes related to burglarizing the homes of four victims and
sexually assaulting them. Pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.75,1 the superior court recalled Taylor’s 69-year prison
sentence and resentenced him to 68 years by striking the now-
invalid prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). On appeal, Taylor argues that the superior court
abused its discretion by declining to further reduce his sentence.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
On October 14, 1989, Taylor burglarized the home of
Carol C. When Carol C. found Taylor in her home, he threatened
to kill her if she did not approach him. He forced her into a
bedroom, demanded money, took her personal property, and
ransacked the room. Taylor ordered her to lie on the floor on her
stomach. After Carol C. complied, Taylor tied her hands behind
her back and covered her eyes with a bathrobe sash. Taylor
rubbed his penis against her buttocks and told her that he
wanted to have sex with her. Carol C. resisted and Taylor kicked
her twice in the face and struck her in the head. She bit Taylor’s
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We refer to the factual background from the opinion in
People v. Taylor (Dec. 9, 1993, B070742) [nonpub. opn.], which
affirmed the judgment of conviction.
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finger when he tried to gag her mouth. Taylor fell against a table
and fled.
On September 16, 1990, Taylor burglarized the home of
Dina D. In two separate incidents, he forcibly raped her. On
September 26, 1990, Taylor burglarized the home of Tiffany T.
and Ellen D. He forcibly raped Tiffany T. four times and
sodomized her once. Taylor forcibly raped Ellen D. once. He
robbed both.
II. Procedure
On December 3, 1990, Taylor was arraigned on a multiple
count information filed by the District Attorney, stemming from
the three separate incidents involving the four victims between
October 1989 and September 1990.
On August 24, 1992, a jury convicted Taylor of three counts
of residential burglary (§ 459; counts 13, 20, 23), five counts of
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 15, 16, 17, 19, 22), one
count of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c); count 18), three counts
of first degree robbery (§ 211; counts 14, 21, 24), one count of
assault to commit rape (§ 220; count 25), and one count of
attempted forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 664, subd. (a); count
26).
On September 25, 1992, the trial court sentenced Taylor to
77 years and eight months in state prison. Included in the
sentence were two prior serious felony conviction enhancements
under section 667, subdivision (a), and one prior prison term
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On December 8, 1992, Taylor pleaded no contest to one
additional count of residential burglary (§ 459; count 1) and two
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additional counts of forcible rape (§ 261(a)(2); counts 3, 4).3 The
court sentenced him to an aggregate term of eight years in state
prison to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on
September 25, 1992.
On December 9, 1993, the Court of Appeal vacated the
original sentence and reduced the prison term to 69 years based
on a sentencing error but otherwise affirmed the conviction and
sentence. (People v. Taylor, supra, B070742.)
III. Postconviction hearing on Taylor’s petition for
resentencing
On May 31, 2023, counsel for Taylor filed a petition to
recall his sentence and resentence him under section 1172.75.
The District Attorney filed a reply.
On August 25, 2023, the superior court held a resentencing
hearing. Taylor’s counsel argued that he would not reoffend by
committing sex crimes because he was 61 years old and had
sciatica and back and knee problems.
The superior court rejected the argument that Taylor’s age
or infirmity would prevent him from reoffending. The court
stated that the convictions were not based on an isolated
incident. At the time he was arrested for the current case, Taylor
had been released on parole for 21 days for a prior conviction for
forcible rape. Taylor had a total of 19 felony convictions. He also
had five parole violations.
3 The record is not clear as to the reason for not including
these counts with the other counts prosecuted at the trial. The
Abstract of Judgment filed on January 26, 1993, reflects that
sentencing on these counts occurred on January 22, 1993.
4
The superior court described the facts of the current case,
which involved 26 felony offenses involving the aggravated sexual
assault of four separate victims in their homes. Taylor had
broken into the victims’ homes while they were sleeping, tied
some of them up, and sexually assaulted them. He threatened to
kill the victims and was violent. He kicked one victim in the
mouth and dragged her by the hair. He repeatedly raped and
sodomized other victims while they were bound.
While incarcerated in state prison, Taylor committed
multiple rule violations as recently as 2021 for possession of
contraband substances. The prosecutor noted that Taylor also
possessed weapons and controlled substances in prison.
The court concluded that Taylor’s pattern of violent
behavior, history of noncompliance while supervised, and recent
institutional misconduct supported a finding that he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court found by
clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. The court
dismissed the sole prior prison term enhancement, reducing the
sentence to 68 years in state prison. The court declined to
otherwise reduce Taylor’s sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. Resentencing under section 1172.75
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison
term enhancement to only terms for sexually violent offenses.
(Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It invalidated prior prison term
enhancements for other offenses. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 375, 379–380 (Burgess).)
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Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) made the changes by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive
and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, which
provided a mechanism for resentencing defendants sentenced on
the legally invalid enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Under the resentencing procedure, the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would initially
identify those people currently serving a term for a judgment that
included the invalid enhancement and forward their information
to the superior courts. Upon verification of eligibility of relief for
those defendants, the superior court recalls their sentences and
resentences them. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
II. Standard of review
We review the superior court’s sentencing decisions for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848,
856 (Garcia).) We will not set aside the superior court’s decision
unless it was arbitrary and capricious or falls outside the bounds
of reason. (Id. at p. 857.)
III. No abuse of discretion
Taylor argues that the superior court abused its discretion
by finding he would endanger public safety and by declining to
reduce his sentence by more than dismissing the prior prison
term enhancement.4 Specifically, he faults the court for “denying
4 Taylor asserts that substantial evidence did not support the
superior court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that he
would endanger public safety. Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1)
provides: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
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relief based mainly on the judgment of conviction and a prior
forcible rape incident while [he] was on parole without full
consideration of his rehabilitation efforts while in prison.” We
disagree.
At the resentencing, the court is required to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The
court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety.” A court satisfies this requirement
that the resentencing “ ‘results in a lesser sentence’ ” by
eliminating the repealed enhancement. (People v. Bravo (2025)
107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1156.) Nothing in the statute requires the
superior court to further reduce the sentence in addition to
striking the invalid enhancement, even if the court has not found
that the defendant posed a risk to public safety.
Here, the superior court resentenced Taylor to a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed by striking the prior
prison term enhancement. Because the trial court imposed a
lesser sentence—one year less than the sentence originally
imposed—it complied with the mandate of subdivision (d)(1).
Even though not required, the superior court also found by clear
and convincing evidence that further reducing the sentence
would endanger public safety. As we discuss, substantial
evidence supported the superior court’s sentencing decisions.
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reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interests of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (d) “vests the superior court with broad discretion
based on an inherently factual inquiry” in resentencing a
defendant. (Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 856–857.)
We are satisfied that the superior court fulfilled its
statutory obligations under section 1172.75 and that substantial
evidence supported its conclusions. The court struck the prior
prison term enhancement and reduced the sentence. Beyond
that, it meaningfully considered the postconviction factors of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3). The court reviewed evidence
of Taylor’s rehabilitation consisting of his programming efforts in
prison5 and progress toward attaining his GED. But these
5 From 2017 through 2021, Taylor completed the following
programs: Making Strides Against Breast Cancer (a five-
kilometer walk raising awareness of disease, honoring those who
passed, and celebrating survivors), Human Development
Seminar, Criminal & Gang members Anonymous, Offender
Responsibility Course, Substance Abuse Course, Employment
Course, Theft & Shoplifting Course, and Victim Impact
Certificate Completion. Taylor also planned to work as a
technician at an internet service firm. In 2023, Taylor
apparently also addressed personal issues related to
impulsiveness, substance abuse, associate selection, anger
management, and domestic relationship.
Taylor faults the superior court for not specifically naming
the programs he completed. But it was not necessary for the
court to specifically name each program to show that it was
considered. The programs were contained in Taylor’s petition.
The court preserved its consideration of each program on the
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positive efforts were undercut by the rule violations in prison
including violations in 2021 and 2022 for illegal drug use, which
provided a recent demonstration of reoffending even while in a
structured environment. The court also noted but was not
convinced that Taylor’s age, mobility limitations, and chronic
pain6 would render him incapable of reoffending by committing
sexually assaultive offenses as he had in the past.
Taylor is a serial sex offender. Understandably, this was
the court’s “main concern.” In the underlying case, Taylor
invaded the homes of the four victims and sexually assaulted
them. At the time, he had been released from prison for only 21
days and on parole supervision for a separate prior forcible rape
conviction. His criminal history amounted to 19 felony
convictions including other violent offenses. He also violated
parole five times. The remoteness of these offenses and
violations was attributable solely to his continuous incarceration.
The entirety of the evidence, especially the facts of the underlying
offenses and Taylor’s prior criminal history, led the superior court
to conclude that he continued to pose an unreasonable risk to
public safety. None of Taylor’s postconviction history sufficiently
record when it stated that “all the briefs should be incorporated
herein to this argument as well.” Further demonstrating its
comprehensive approach, the court stated, “I want to look at
everything so that I’m thorough in my assessment.”
6 The record did not clarify the inconsistency in Taylor’s
ability to recently complete a five-kilometer walk for Making
Strides Against Breast Cancer with his argument that he is not
dangerous because he is immobile.
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reduced his risk for future violence. We conclude that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce
Taylor’s sentence beyond striking the prior prison term
enhancement.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the August 25, 2023 judgment resentencing
Taylor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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