Opinion
Dеfendant Robert Clarence Taylor appeals from a judgment of the Orange County Superior Court imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),
I. Facts
Defendant Taylor, together with codefendants James Norman DeWitt and Nanette Scheid (see People v. Scheid (1997)
An hour later, Scheid returned, accompanied by defendant and DeWitt. After a test drive, defendant agreed to the sale and asked Kazumi to sign the
Defendant presented no defense. Codefendant Scheid claimed she was innocent and uninvolved in the robbery and murder. Codefendant DeWitt, without testifying, nonetheless relied on a similar defense derived from a statement defendant gave to police, claiming sole responsibility for the crimes.
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced defendant’s four prior felony convictions (two robberies, a burglary, and a conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor). The prоsecution also presented evidence of six prior unadjudicated incidents of criminal activity, including forcible rape, attempted murder, robberies, and assaults. Finally, the prosecution elicited victim impact evidence from Dean and Kazumi describing how their lives had been changed by Ryoko’s murder and Kazumi’s shooting and resultant paralysis.
Defendant elected to testify at the penalty phase regarding his physically abusive father, his biracial heritage, his cocaine use, his present love for a woman inmate, and the unintentional nature of the Hanano shootings (defendant claimed he panicked under the influence of cocaine). Defendant also attempted to minimize or mitigate his role in two of his prior crimes.
Other defense witnesses included defendant’s mother, sister, and friends, each of whom gave various mitigating background and character evidence. Defendant also introduced mitigating testimony from a counselor for biraciаl children, a former prison director, and a family counselor.
As previously noted, defendant was found guilty of murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death. Codefendant DeWitt was likewise
II. Contentions
A. Guilt Phase
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant first argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during the guilt phase. We find no prejudicial misconduct.
a. Rape victim hypothetical question
The prosecutor posed to Kazumi’s physician, Dr. Parsons, a hypothetical question asking whether a traumatized rape victim, feeling “dehumanized” and “defiled,” might “block” her memories of the incident. The doctor agreed this might occur as a'result of the trauma. Defendant, whose ensuing motion for mistrial was denied, claims the hypothetical question allowed the prosecutor to “preview” penalty phase evidence of defendant’s prior commission of forcible rape, a matter inadmissible at the guilt phase, thereby generating sympathy for the rape victim and causing the jury to speculate whether defendant or codefendant DeWitt might have raped someone.
As the Attorney General observes in response, the prosecutor posed the question on redirect examination after counsel for defendant and codefendant DeWitt had each asked Dr. Parsons hypothetically whether a traumatized person (presumably referring to victim Kazumi) might suffer impairment of his perceptive ability. Therefore, the prosecutor’s redirect examination of Dr. Parsons was closely related to the subject matter the defense" raised on cross-examination. It is true, as defendant observes, that the prosecution initially introduced the topic of suppressed memory during direct examinаtion of Dr. Parsons. But we see no reason why the prosecutor could not continue to explore the matter hypothetically in response to defense cross-examination of Parsons.
Defendant accuses the prosecutor of using the rape victim hypothetical question as a device for previewing penalty phase evidence regarding defendant’s forcible rape of Patti B., but we cannot assume this from the record before us. Even assuming arguendo the prosecutor had such a motive, it is not reasonably probable defendant was prejudiced by the tactic. The prosecutor made no effort during the guilt phase to link either defendant or
b. Attacking defense counsel
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor implied that defense lawyers generally use various “tricks” and “moves” to try to win their cases by confusing the witnesses. The matter arose after Kazumi testified that he remembered Deputy District Attorney Bryan Brown representing the prosecution at the preliminary examination. Counsel for codefendant Scheid, evidently hoping to cast some doubt on Kazumi’s ability to remember such details, called Chief Deputy District Attorney James Enright to testify that he, and not Brown, was the prosecutor at defendant’s preliminary examination.
On cross-examining Enright, the prosecutor asked if he was familiar with some of the “tricks” used by criminal defense lawyers. The court sustained a codefendant’s objection to the word “tricks,” but allowed the prosecutor to inquire whether Enright had ever seen similar defense “moves” used on a “hypothetical” witness who testified for hours from a wheelchair and suffered from pain, and who was then asked to remember who had prosecuted the preliminary examination. After the court overruled a codefendant’s objection, Enright replied, “That’s a new one,” and the matter was dropped. During closing arguments, however, the prosecutor continued with this theme, observing that codefendants’ counsel had used all their “tricks” to confuse Kazumi in his vulnerable state.
Defendant now argues the prosecutor’s remarks constituted an attack on the credibility and integrity of defense lawyers generally (see People v. Welch (1999)
Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct argument is similar to one we rejected in People v. Medina (1995)
We think the prosecutor’s comments in the present case, referring to defense “tricks” or “moves” used to demonstrate a witness’s confusion оr uncertainty, fall within the same category as that in Medina, involving no improper personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity. We observe that, with the exception of People v. Hill (1998)
As for the prosecutor’s references to Kazumi’s suffering, we find no improper attempt to place “victim impact” evidence before the jury. In context, we think the prosecutor was merely calling the jury’s attention to the fact that Kazumi’s physical state naturally made him susceptible to minor mistakes in his testimony, such as failing to recall which person conducted a particular preliminary examination. Moreover, the jury was well aware, from the other testimony in the case, that Kazumi suffered from severe paralysis and pain. Any prosecutorial disclosure of the impact of defendant’s assault on Kazumi was entirely cumulative to other evidence in the case.
2. Crime Scene Photographs and Videotape
The prosecutor introduced eight crime scene photographs, several depicting the handcuffed victims. The prosecutor also introduced a videotape of the crime scene, showing the physical scene at the time the investigators first arrived. Defendant contends that these photographs and videotape were irrelevant to the guilt phase, that the court abused its discretion in admitting them, and that their admission prejudiced him at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. We disagree.
We recently reviewed the applicable principles in a case involving a similar photograph, depicting the same handcuffed victims, introduced at the retrial of codefendant Nanette Scheid. (See Scheid, supra,
Contrary to defendant’s present argument, we stressed in Scheid that the cumulative nature of the photograph, and the availability of other evidence to establish the prosecution’s case, would not lessen the photograph’s relevance or require its exclusion. (Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 15-16.) For the same reasons, we find relevant the various photographs and videotape admitted in this case. (See also People v. Box (2000)
As for the trial court’s discretionary decision to admit the photographs and videotape despite their possible prejudicial effect, we find no abuse. Defendant argues the various photographs were so gruesome as to likely inflame the jury’s passions. Again, Scheid is instructive. There, in resolving a similar claim, we observed that the decision to admit victim photographs is a discretionary matter we will not disturb on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of the photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. (Scheid, supra,
In the present case, we have examined the photographs and videotape in question, and although some of the photographs are unpleasant to view, showing the bloodied bodies of defendant’s victims, they are not unduly gruesome or inflammatory and, as previously noted, each bears some relevance to issues in the case. All photographs of murder victims are disturbing (Scheid, supra,
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to state for the record that it had weighed potential prejudice against probative value under Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Farmer (1989)
As for defendant’s argument that admission of the photographs prejudiced the jury’s penalty decision, our conclusion that the court properly exercised its discretion in admitting them at the guilt phase applies as well to defendant’s penalty phase contention. (See People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1200-1201.)
3. Denial of Motion for New Penalty Phase Jury
Defendant next argues the court improperly denied his motion to impanel a new jury to decide the penalty issue, under section 190.4, subdivision (c). He speculates that the prosecutorial misconduct and inflammatory photographs previously discussed may have caused the guilt phase jury to
Section 190.4, subdivision (c), provides the same jury shall try both the guilt and penalty phases “unless for good cause shown” the court discharges the jury and impanels a new one. In light of this “legislative preference” for a single jury, we have indicated that good cause to imрanel a new jury must appear on the record as a demonstrable reality and show the jury’s inability to perform its function. (People v. Bradford (1997)
We find no abuse of discretion. As we have seen (pts. 1 and 2, ante), contrary to defendant’s assumption, the guilt phase jury was neither tainted nor prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, improper victim impact evidence, or inadmissible crime scene photographs. Moreover, trial counsel’s desire to participate in jury voir dire was an insufficient ground for impaneling a new jury. (See People v. Rowland (1992)
4. Victim Impact Evidence
Defendant next argues that the court’s admission of improper and “fundamentally unfair” victim impact evidence at both the guilt and penalty phases denied him a fair trial. (See Payne v. Tennessee (1991)
Nevertheless, defendant’s guilt phase contention lacks merit. Kazumi himself repeated much of the subject matter of the challenged testimony during his own guilt phase testimony, and defendant concedes that Kazumi’s testimony was properly admitted. All of this evidence was relevant to show the extent of Kazumi’s injuries and to confirm that, despite his injuries, he could accurately recall the incident. The court did not err in permitting Dr. Parsons to review, and elaborate on, some of the same ground covered in Kazumi’s unobjectionable testimony. Additionally, any error in this regard clearly would be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.
We conclude that each of defendant’s various guilt phase contentions lacks merit. We observe that, asserting a denial of his due process, fair trial, and impartial jury rights, defendant has supported each of his guilt phase contentions with references to various provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, but the assertion of these provisions adds nothing of substance to his otherwise meritless claims.
B. Penalty Phase
1. Victim Impact Evidence
As noted, defendant contends the court erred in admitting “fundamentally unfair” victim impact evidence during the penalty phasе. This evidence, which defendant claims was unduly voluminous and inflammatory, fell into two categories: (1) the impact of Ryoko’s death on Kazumi and Dean, and (2) the extent of the injuries, physical and psychological, that Kazumi alone suffered.
a. Impact on Ryoko’s family
Kazumi and Dean each explained the various ways they were adversely affected by their loss of Ryoko’s care and companionship. Victim impact evidence of this kind, directed toward showing the impact of the defendant’s acts on the family of his victims, is admissible at the penalty phase of capital trials. (See Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 826-827 [111 S.Ct. at
b. Kazumi’s own injuries
Defendant argues that evidence regarding Kazumi’s injuries, including his paralysis, pain, and inability to care for himself, wаs not true “victim impact” evidence, as it failed to show the impact of Ryoko’s death on Kazumi. This evidence did show, however, that because he suffered severe injuries at defendant’s hand, Kazumi will require extensive care that Ryoko might have provided but for her murder, an aggravating circumstance of which the jury was entitled to learn.
Moreover, evidence of Kazumi’s injuries was relevant at the penalty phase to show the circumstances of defendant’s crimes and the nature and extent of his violent acts other than Ryoko’s murder (see § 190.3, factors (a), (b)). As we have stated, “Evidence of the impact of the defendant’s conduct on victims other than the murder victim is relevant if related directly to the circumstances of the capital offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Mitcham (1992)
2. Ken Christian’s Testimony
Defendant next argues that the court erred in admitting penalty phase tеstimony from Ken Christian to the effect that in 1985, three years before the Hanano crimes, defendant initiated a plan to commit another robbery and murder in order to obtain a black Corvette from its owner. The court allowed the evidence to rebut defendant’s own penalty phase testimony that (1) the Hanano robbery murder was not part of any preexisting plan to steal a black Corvette, and (2) in 1985 Christian approached him with the plan to steal such a car and kill the owner.
Defendant contends that Christian’s testimony was inadmissible because it described proposed criminal activity rather than “a completed crime” that
We think the foregoing evidence was admissible to show that, contrary to defendant’s own testimony on cross-examination, he originated an earlier plan to steal a black Corvette and murder its owner. The testimony was proper to rebut defendant’s attempt to disclaim any preexisting intent to accomplish such crimes. In light of its relevance for this purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Because the evidence retained some probative value, any remoteness of Christian’s testimony would affect its weight, not its admissibility. (See People v. Thomas (1978)
3. Denial of Severance or Separate Jury
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to hold separate penalty trials, or convene separate juries, to decide the appropriate penalty for him and codefendant DeWitt. Defendant suggests that he was necessarily disadvantaged by the jury’s probable comparison of the two codefendants. Defendant notes that he is “a bi-racial Caucasian and African-American male” from the Bronx, and DeWitt is entirely Caucasian from Southern California, where trial was held. According to defendant, his prior criminal record was more “significant,” and his mitigating evidence less impressive, than DeWitt’s. Indeed, the jury rendered a verdict of life imprisonment without parole for DeWitt, while selecting death for defendant.
Defendant relies on cases strongly suggesting the need for individualized sentencing in capital cases. (See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio (1978)
We recently considered the very issue defendant raises regarding the need for severance or separate juries for multiple defendants. In People v. Ervin (2000)
In the present case, we find nothing in the record indicating defendant’s jurors failed to assess independently the appropriateness of the death penalty for defendant or DeWitt, or engaged in improper comparative evaluations of these men. The penalty phase jury was instructed to consider the evidence separately as to each defendant, and not consider as evidence against one defendant any evidence admitted only against another. Moreover, the jury was told to “decide separately the questiоn of the penalty as to each of the defendants,” the same instruction given in the Ervin case. (People v. Ervin, supra,
4. Ruling on Motion to Modify Verdict
Defendant next claims the trial court denied his motion to modify the verdict (see § 190.4, subd. (e)) after hearing and considering some victim
At defendant’s own sentencing hearing, and before receiving testimony from the Hanano family, the court announced that it had denied the automatic motion to modify the sentence. This procedure was proper under our case law. (People v, Kirkpatrick (1994)
A trial judge is inevitably exposed to a plethora of inadmissible, even highly inflammatory, evidence during the course of trial. Yet, in the absence of contrary evidence, we may presume that such exposure played no role in the court’s ultimate decisions. (E.g., People v. Champion (1995)
We presume the trial court’s training and experience enabled it to confine its consideration of such evidence to the case in which it was properly admitted. Defendant cites nothing in the record indicating the court actually relied on any inadmissible evidence in making its decision to deny modification. (See People v. Memro (1995)
5. Antisympathy Instructions
Defendant’s jury, during its penalty deliberations, had asked to see the court’s guilt phase instructions on aiding and аbetting. Recognizing that
Defendant now contends the court erred in providing the penalty phase jury with a copy of the guilt phase instructions, which included an instruction (see CALJIC No. 1.00) cautioning the jury not to be influenced by such emotions as passion, sympathy, and “pity for or prejudice against a defendant.” Defendant also suggests the jury’s request indicated its confusion regarding its responsibilities (see McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997)
As for the “antisympathy” instruction in the guilt phase instructions, the penalty phasе instructions specifically told jurors, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, that they could consider “any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death . . . . You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle.” (Italics added.) As noted, the court’s subsequent response to the jury’s request repeated the admonition that the guilt phase instructions should not be used in determining the appropriate penalty. We have consistently rejected similar claims of error. (See People v. Frye (1998)
6. Delay in Executing Sentence
Defendant next contends that his nine-year confinement on death row pending resolution of this appeal, and the probable additional delay in executing him, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions. We have rejected similar claims in recent cases, and defendant offers no compelling reasons for reconsidering them. A relatively lengthy period of incarceration pending appeal and execution is necessary to provide careful appellate review. (See People v. Massie (1998)
7. Method of Execution
Defendant asserts the method of executing the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment under both the state and federal Constitutions. We have rejected similar claims in recent cases, and defendant offers no compelling reasons for reconsidering them. As previously noted, asserted imperfection in the method of execution is no basis for reversal of the judgment. (See, e.g., People v. Samayoa, supra,
8. Disproportionate Penalty
Defendant next asserts that death is a disproportionate penalty for him in light of his crime and his background. (See People v. Dillon (1983)
The majority in Hines observed that we will set aside a death judgment if the penalty seems “ ‘grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability.’ ” (People v. Hines, supra,
9. Sentencing Instructions
Defendant next asserts that the standard penalty phase sentencing instructions are inadequate in three respects. They fail to explain “which party bore the burden of proof on mitigation and aggravation, and what the burden was.” They fail to require jury unanimity in determining which factors аre aggravating. And they fail to instruct on “the presumption of life,” to assure the jury will vote for life imprisonment without parole unless it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating ones. None of these arguments has merit.
As the Attorney General observes, the jury was instructed that the prosecution must prove defendant’s other crimes or prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, and that to return a death verdict, each juror must be persuaded “that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.” We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the federal or state Constitution, or Evidence Code sections 115 and 500, require further instructions on the subject of the burden of proof at the penalty phase. (See People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 682-684.)
b. Unanimity
The jury was instructed that unanimity regarding aggravating circumstances, including victim impact evidenсe, was not required. These instructions comport with our cases, which uniformly refuse to require jury unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances. (E.g., People v. Hines, supra,
c. Presumption of life
As the Attorney General observes, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that the penalty jury must be instructed that a presumption exists favoring life imprisonment. (E.g., People v. Carpenter, supra,
10. Other Penalty Phase Errors
Defendant cites several supposed errors committed during the penalty phase. We find no error.
a. Factor (a)
Defendant complains that permitting his jury to consider “the circumstances of the crime” he committed, as well as “any special circumstances found to be true,” without further limiting instructions (see § 190.3, factor (a)), was improper and failed to provide “an objective standard to channel
b. Factor (b)
The jury was told to weigh the presence or absence of defendant’s criminal activity involving the use or attempted use or threat to use force or violence. Defendant claims that the trial court failed to guide the jury properly concerning its consideration of evidence of his prior unadjudicated criminal activity. (See § 190.3, factor (b).) We have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (E.g., People v. Welch, supra,
c. Factors (d), (g), and (h)
Defendant asserts that section 190.3, factors (d) (defendant’s “extreme” mental or emotional disturbance) and (g) (defendant acting under “extreme” duress or “substantial” domination of another), are unduly vague and over-broad. We have repeatedly upheld these provisions and the instructions based on them. (E.g., People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 768-769; People v. Ochoa, supra,
Defendant also challenges the instruction based on section 190.3, factor (h), which requires the jury to consider whether at the time of the offense the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts or conform to law was impaired by mental disease or intoxication. In defendant’s view, the jury could have read the instruction as excluding consideration of such evidence as mitigating if it did not influence the commission of the crime. We recently rejected a similar argument regarding section 190.3, factor (d). (People v. Riel, supra,
d. Failure to delete inapplicable factors
Defendant next contends the court erred in failing to delete from the • penalty instructions any inapplicable sentencing factors. We have rejected
e. Failure to designate aggravating and mitigating factors
Defendant contends the court improperly failed to designate which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. We have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (E.g., People v. Carpenter, supra,
f. Failure to limit aggravating evidence
Defendant complains the trial court failed to give an instruction limiting the use of “nonstatutory” aggravating evidence. (See People v. Boyd (1985)
g. Mitigating factors instruction
The court gave an instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88) defining a mitigating circumstance as one that may not constitute a justification for the crime, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriate penalty. Defendant, armed with “empirical evidence” gleaned from studies not presented to the trial court, contends this instruction was insufficient and likely was understood as limiting the kinds of mitigating evidence the jury could consider. We have rejected similar arguments in recent cases. (Sеe People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 772-773; People v. Marshall (1990)
In a related argument, defendant contends the court failed affirmatively to instruct the jury to consider “all sympathetic mitigating factors, mercy and non-statutory mitigation,” failed to instruct on the role sympathy for defendant and his family should play, and failed to instruct that the guilt phase anti-sympathy instruction was inapplicable during the penalty phase. These arguments lack merit. The jury was told it could consider “any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record” and was also told to disregard guilt phase instructions in conflict with that principle. Under our case law, these instructions were sufficient. (See People v. Champion, supra,
h. Failure to instruct on returning life imprisonment verdict
Defendant faults the sentencing instructions (CALJIC No. 8.88) for failing to direct the jury to impose a life imprisonment without parole sentence if it concluded the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating ones. We have repeatedly rejected the claim in light of other language in this instruction, allowing a death verdict only if aggrаvating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. (See People v. Jackson (1996)
Defendant also faults CALJIC No. 8.88 for calling on the jury to impose death if they find “substantial” aggravating factors, implicitly compelling a death verdict if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. Defendant observes that under our case law, the jury may reject a death sentence even if mitigating circumstances do not outweigh aggravating ones. (People v. Brown (1988)
Defendant also argues CALJIC No. 8.88 was deficient for failing expressly to inform the jurors they could vote against the death penalty even if they believed the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones. We have rejected the argument in past cases. (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171; People v. Medina, supra,
i. Inadequate notice of penalty phase evidence
Defendant next contends the prosecution gave him inadequate notice it intended to rely on victim impact evidence at the penalty phase. (See § 190.3.) According to defendant, the prosecutor announced his intent to submit such evidence only one day before the penalty phase commenced.
The record shows that, in December 1989, the prosecutor timely notified defendant that he intended to introduce penalty phase evidence of the facts
The People observe that general notice of the intended evidence will suffice, and that the failure to specify the precise evidence to be presented does not render the notice constitutionally insufficient. (See People v. Hart (1999)
Nonetheless, we find any error in the timing of the prosecutor’s notice to be harmless to the defense. The purpose of the notice provision is to afford defendant an opportunity to meet the prosecutor’s aggravating evidence. (People v. Carrera (1989)
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to require the jury to give a written statement and findings justifying its death verdict. In defendant’s view, such findings are needed to assure effective appellate review, to guarantee defendant is treated equally with noncapital felony defendants, and to assure the jury appreciates the gravity of its sentencing task. Our cases disagree. (See People v. Welch, supra,
k. Failure to instruct on life imprisonment without parole
Defendant next complains of the court’s failure to instruct on the “true meaning” of a life imprisonment without parole sentence. Once again, as defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected similar arguments, and we see no compelling reason to reconsider them here. (See People v. Musselwhite (1998)
l. Multiple use and counting of aggravating circumstances
Defendant claims that multiple use and counting of various facts as aggravating circumstances “artificially inflated the statutory factors favoring death.” We find no improper multiple use or counting. Defendant points to the dual felony counts оf robbery and burglary, observing that they served as two theories for felony murder and the felony-murder special circumstances, rendering him “doubly eligible for the death penalty.” These felonies were also used as “circumstances of the crime” charged under section 190.3, factor (a).
Our cases allow use of a felony to qualify a defendant both for first degree murder and for a special circumstance justifying the death penalty. (See People v. Ochoa, supra,
Defendant argues that the enactment of the three strikes law (see § 667, subds. (c), (f)(1)) precludes imposition of the death penalty. Our recent case law rejects the argument. (People v. Carpenter, supra,
11. Intercase Proportionality Review
Defendant asserts the trial court improperly failed to provide for intercase proportionality review. The argument lacks merit. (People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1223-1224; People v. Carpenter, supra,
12. Cumulative Errors
Defendant asserts the combined effect of the various “serious constitutional errors” in this case requires reversal. As we have seen, we conclude no such errors were committed here. Accordingly, we need not address defendant’s contention that the supposed errors combined to prejudice his case.
We conclude that each of defendant’s various penalty phase contentions lacks merit. We observe that, as with his guilt phase arguments, defendant has supported each of his contentions with references to various provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, but the assertion of these constitutional provisions adds nothing of substance to his otherwise meritless claims.
III. Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Brown, J., and Mallano, J.,
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 29, 2002.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.