People v. TaylorPeople v. Taylor
■ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v PAUL J. TAYLOR, Appellant. [20 NYS3d 708]—
Lahtinen, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Essex County (Meyer, J.), rendered December 23, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree, gang assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
In
Defendant initially argues that his murder conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. When considering the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether “there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged” (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987] [citation omitted]; see People v Ramos, 19 NY3d 133, 136 [2012]). In a weight of the evidence review, where, as here, a different conclusion would not have been unreasonable, we “must, like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony” (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The focus of defendant‘s argument is that the evidence did not demonstrate that he intended to kill the victim. “Because intent is an invisible operation of the mind, direct evidence is rarely available” (People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]) and, thus, “it may be inferred from a defendant‘s conduct and the surrounding circumstances” (People v Callicut, 101 AD3d 1256, 1258 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1096 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Proof at trial included that defendant, Denno and Rivers
The forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy on the victim described the victim‘s body as having what appeared to be a series of footwear impressions. He stated that the victim had a large quantity of blood—about a quarter of all his blood—in his abdominal cavity. The victim‘s many injuries included, among others, collapsed lungs, over 20 fractures of his ribs and a fractured thyroid cartilage in his neck. The various lacerations suffered by the victim included a five-inch tear of his liver. The pathologist opined that the victim‘s cause of death was internal hemorrhage and the collapse of both lungs due to multiple traumatic blunt force injuries. He stated that, without medical attention, both injuries could have independently caused the victim‘s death and that, while the victim could have walked a short distance after sustaining the injuries, he would not have survived for more than 15 minutes. Viewed most favorably to the People, the evidence regarding the circumstances of the attack, the nature of defendant‘s repeated kicking of the incapacitated victim with steel-toed
Next, defendant asserts that Angela Rivers was permitted to improperly bolster her testimony. “The term ‘bolstering’ is used to describe the presentation in evidence of a prior consistent statement—that is, a statement that a testifying witness has previously made out of court that is in substance the same as his or her in-court testimony” and “such statements are generally excluded by the hearsay rule, unless a hearsay exception is applicable” (People v Smith, 22 NY3d 462, 465 [2013]; see People v Ludwig, 24 NY3d 221, 230 [2014]; People v Buie, 86 NY2d 501, 509-510 [1995]). Here, Angela Rivers gave three statements to police, two shortly after the incident in which she did not mention what happened to the victim and a third about a month later that included information about the victim. At trial, she acknowledged, without objection from defendant, that she had given the first two statements and that she had omitted in those statements information about the victim. The People then elicited that she had given a third statement, and she was asked whether she “put in there what happened to [the victim] on Mill Hill Road?” Over defendant‘s objection on the ground of bolstering, she answered simply, “Yes, I did.” She did not testify about the content of her prior third statement. This limited response was not hearsay and did not constitute bolstering (see People v Hampton, 121 AD3d 1538, 1539 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1084 [2014]). Nor was it bolstering to acknowledge—without providing information about what was said—that she had testified in the earlier trials of Denno and Rivers.
County Court did not err in permitting the People to cross-examine a State Police investigator, who was called by defendant as a witness, regarding certain statements made to the investigator by Denno. Although testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness are inadmissible as violative of the Confrontation Clause, “a defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause” (People v Reid, 19 NY3d 382, 387-388 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Denno, a witness to and participant in the crimes, gave three statements to the investigator, and Denno invoked his Fifth Amendment right
We are unpersuaded by defendant‘s argument that it was reversible error for County Court to deny his challenge for cause to a prospective juror. “When a prospective juror indicates that he or she may not be able to remain impartial in the event the defendant decides not to testify, the potential juror may be selected to serve only if the court elicits an unequivocal guarantee that he or she will follow the court‘s instructions regarding the law and render an impartial verdict” (People v Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1131 [2015] [citations omitted]). Defense counsel asked a prospective juror whether she “might take a negative inference” if defendant did not testify, and the juror responded: “I can‘t say that for sure, but I think I would question to myself why he wouldn‘t testify [on] his own behalf.” County Court then stated to the prospective juror: “If you were instructed on what the law is, that the law is that you cannot make any unfavorable inference against him if he fails to testify or even if he does not put on any evidence at all, would you follow that law?” The prospective juror stated: “I would have to.” This constituted an “unequivocal assurance” from the prospective juror that she would be “able to reach a verdict based entirely upon the court‘s instructions on the law” (People v Bludson, 97 NY2d 644, 646 [2001]; see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]).
Defendant contends that his arrest was unlawful in that the arresting officer lacked probable cause for the arrest and, thus, County Court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the arrest. “[E]ven if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest” (People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Stroman, 106 AD3d 1268, 1269 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1046 [2013]). As relevant here, the arresting officer, John Donohue, testified at the suppression hearing that, at the same time that he was interviewing defendant, other officers involved in the investiga-tion
Finally, with regard to defendant‘s sentence, the People concede—and we agree—that defendant‘s sentence for criminal possession of a weapon was statutorily required to run concurrently with the other sentences under the circumstances (see
Egan Jr., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by directing that defendant‘s sentence for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree shall run concurrently with the other sentences, and, as so modified, affirmed.