People v. SweeneyPeople v. Sweeney
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The defendant‘s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury verdict is not preserved for appellate review, as defense counsel only made a general motion for a trial order of dismissal based upon the People‘s alleged failure to make out a prima facie case (see
The defendant‘s contention regarding the County Court‘s instruction to the jury on the element of intent is unpreserved for appellate review (see
To the extent that the defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves matter dehors the record, it may not be reviewed on direct appeal (see People v Bartlett, 215 AD2d 489 [1995]; People v Otero, 201 AD2d 675, 675-676 [1994]). To the extent that the claim may be reviewed, defense counsel provided effective assistance (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-715 [1998]). The defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel‘s failure to request particular pretrial hearings (see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; People v Noll, 24 AD3d 688, 688-689 [2005]). Furthermore, trial counsel‘s solitary misstatement as to the charges in the indictment during his opening statement did not deprive the defendant of meaningful representation (see People v Fludd, 173 AD2d 840 [1991]). Additionally, the manner in which defense counsel chose to attack the credibility of the complainant was “a reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances and evidence presented” (People v Benevento, 91 NY2d at 713; see People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 798 [1985]; People v Jackson, 52 NY2d 1027 [1981]; People v Miller, 81 AD3d 854 [2011]). As “[t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of trial counsel arising from counsel‘s failure to make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]), the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by trial counsel‘s failure to object to the jury charge as given, or to move for a trial order of dismissal on the count of attempted assault in the first degree on the ground that serious physical injury had not been established.
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant‘s remaining contention in his pro se supplemental brief is without merit. Angiolillo, J.P., Dickerson, Belen and Sgroi, JJ., concur.