*5 Opinion
Real party in interest, Dustin William Sparks (hereafter defendant or Sparks), was charged with two felony murders. Before his case came to trial, two other persons were tried for the same murders. One was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and the other was acquitted. Concerned about possible inconsistent verdicts, and applying the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel adopted in a criminal case in
People v. Taylor
(1974)
We conclude that decisions postdating
Taylor, supra,
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which set aside the superior court’s ruling, and overrule
People
v.
Taylor, supra,
I. Facts and Procedural History
Defendant was charged with two counts of felony murder based on a plan to steal marijuana plants that resulted in the killing of two people. Two other participants in the events leading to the deaths, Michael Huggins and Matthew Griffin, were tried separately for the murders before defendant’s case came to trial. Griffin was acquitted and Huggins convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
The Court of Appeal summarized the evidence presented at Huggins’s trial, which that court and this court have judicially noticed:
“In September 2005, Huggins lived in a house in Antelope with his girlfriend, Angelic Rampone, Matthew Griffin, and Griffin’s girlfriend, Amy Butler. Levill Hill would sometimes spend the night at the house.
*6 “In the house one day there was a discussion in which Butler told Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill that she knew of a house in Olivehurst where they could steal marijuana plants. The Olivehurst house belonged to Michael Hance. In back of the Olivehurst house was a trailer occupied by two men who had gone to school with Butler—Scott Davis and Michael Hance’s son, Christopher Hance. Davis lived rent free in the trailer in exchange for guarding marijuana plants that were on the property.
“One evening in the beginning of September 2005, Butler, Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill drove to the Olivehurst house but decided not to steal the marijuana plants at that time. Later, Huggins, Griffin, and Butler talked about returning to the Olivehurst house, tying ‘the boys up,’ and trying to steal the marijuana plants. Butler said she wanted nothing more to do with the plan.
“In the early morning of September 27, Huggins, Rampone, Hill, and Griffin drove back to the Olivehurst house. En route, they picked up Huggins’s cousin, Sparks. When they got to the Olivehurst house, they parked the car, and Huggins, Sparks, Griffin, and Hill got out. Huggins had a .45-caliber pistol and Sparks had a toy gun that looked real. Hill was handed duct tape and Griffin rope ‘just in case’ they needed to tie anybody up. Hill threw the duct tape back inside the car. They all then walked past the house and decided that none of them were going to go ahead with the plan to steal marijuana. They then split up in two groups—Huggins and Sparks ahead and Hill and Griffin behind—and all headed back toward the Olivehurst house.
“When they got to the house, however, Huggins kneeled down between the south and north gate to the house. Sparks stood right by Huggins. Hill and Griffin walked by them, and Hill asked what they were doing. Huggins replied, ‘ “We’re going to do it.” ’ Hill responded, ‘ “No, you’re not.” ’ Hill and Griffin then walked away. In Hill’s view, he and Griffin abandoned the plan, but Huggins and Sparks did not.
“Huggins walked through the gate to the side of the house. Sparks stayed at the gate. While Sparks was at the gate, someone hit him.
“After Sparks was hit, Hill heard a gunshot. Hill and Griffin ran back to the car. Sparks and Huggins followed. They drove back to the Antelope house.
“Michael Hance was home at the time of the shooting and described what he heard and saw. He was in the house talking with his son while Davis was sleeping in the trailer. Michael and Christopher Hance heard one of the gates open, so Christopher went out to investigate. Michael Hance then heard ‘scuffling’ ‘between the two gates’ and heard a shot.
*7 “Michael Hance ran outside and saw Huggins go into the trailer, heard ‘some yelling,’ and then ‘a shot or two’ inside the trailer. As Michael Hance started going toward the trailer, Christopher Hance, Huggins, and Davis ‘poured out’ of the trailer. Davis, who was holding his neck, fell to the ground.
“Michael Hance called 911. When police arrived, they found Davis dead. Christopher Hance was bleeding profusely from his lower abdomen and right leg and died from blood loss.
“Based on this and other evidence introduced at trial, the jury in Huggins’s case was instructed on felony murder with the underlying felony being robbery or burglary or attempted robbery or burglary and on voluntary manslaughter based on intent to kill or conscious disregard for life. The jury found Huggins guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter while personally using a firearm.”
As a result of the verdicts as to Huggins and Griffin, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution from trying him for any crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. He argued that collateral estoppel prevented the prosecution from relitigating issues decided in the previous trials.
In opposing the motion, the district attorney argued that evidence not admitted at the earlier trials could be used in defendant’s trial. As the Court of Appeal summarized: “This evidence included statements made by Sparks during a police interview. In that interview, Sparks initially explained that he, Huggins, Griffin, and Hill all planned to participate in stealing the marijuana with his role being to ‘grab the plants.’ When they got to the street, Griffin got scared, ‘punk[ed] out,’ and went back to the car. Sparks and Huggins stood by the gate. Huggins went onto the property. As Sparks was standing outside the gate, he was confronted by someone wanting to know who he was, leading to a short physical altercation. Sparks then heard gunshots and ran back to the car. When Huggins returned to the car, he said to Sparks, ‘[Wjhere the Fuck were you a[t] Dustin?’ Not wanting Huggins to think he ‘just punked out,’ Sparks said that he got into a fight.” (Fn. omitted.)
The trial court, which had presided over Huggins’s trial, granted defendant’s motion. Relying largely on
Taylor, supra,
*8 The People filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal challenging the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and ultimately a peremptory writ directing the superior court to vacate its order and to issue a new order denying defendant’s motion to preclude the People from trying him for any crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.
We granted defendant’s petition for review. We also directed the parties to brief the question of whether Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.Sd 686, should be overruled.
II. Discussion
In
Taylor, supra,
In overturning the trial court’s ruling in this case, the Court of Appeal distinguished
Taylor,
partly on the basis that evidence admissible against defendant in his trial was not available in the prior trials of Huggins and Griffin. Defendant argues that
Taylor
is indistinguishable, and that the Court of Appeal erred in not applying it. Whether
Taylor
would apply to the facts of this case is a complex and difficult question. But we need not decide that question. As we discuss, intervening judicial decisions have deprived
Taylor
of any continuing validity. In
Palmer, supra,
Taylor began its analysis by explaining that “[collateral estoppel has been held to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous trial if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior trial.” (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at *9 p. 691.) “As to the third requirement of identity of parties,” Taylor continued, “it is the rule in civil cases that the party benefitting from collateral estoppel need not have been a party in the prior trial so long as the party bound by the doctrine was such a party. Mutuality is thus not required.” (Id. at p. 692, italics added.) Taylor observed, however, that “courts have sometimes declined to apply the doctrine in behalf of a criminal defendant who was not involved in the prior trial.” (Ibid.) This observation gave rise to the question of whether what is sometimes called “nonmutual collateral estoppel” applies in a criminal case, that is, whether a defendant can obtain the benefit of a favorable verdict involving a different person even though that defendant would not have been bound by an unfavorable verdict regarding that other person.
In support of applying collateral estoppel even when there is no identity of defendants,
Taylor
cited some out-of-state and federal cases applying the defense of collateral estoppel.
(Taylor, supra,
In addition to citing supporting cases,
Taylor
identified three “strong policy considerations” behind the collateral estoppel doctrine: “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.”
(Taylor, supra,
Regarding the first of these considerations, the court explained that “[t]he need for judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation is even more important in criminal than in civil trials. Crowded court dockets inevitably will impose a heavy burden on criminal defendants as substantial periods of incarceration may result while they await trial, and long delays between arrest and sentencing will decrease the effectiveness of the punishment which is ultimately meted out. [Citation.] Although the saving of the resources of the court system may be somewhat reduced when, in addition to the crime against which a plea of collateral estoppel is urged, other crimes must also be litigated, the other goals of an application of the doctrine can nevertheless be achieved.”
(Taylor, supra,
Regarding the second of these considerations, the court explained that “[p]erhaps the most compelling reason for an application of collateral estoppel where vicarious liability is at issue is to prevent the compromising of the *10 integrity of the judicial system caused by the rendering of inconsistent verdicts. Criminal trials generally receive more publicity than civil ones, and the public’s view of the judicial system in general is often shaped by the impression of the fairness of the criminal justice system in particular. [Citation.] Few things undermine the layman’s faith in the integrity of our legal institutions more than the specter of a system whióh results in a person being punished for the acts of another, when the actor himself under identical charges had been previously exonerated from responsibility for those very acts. This is particularly so under the facts of the instant case when the People seek to punish defendant, who was not even present on the immediate scene, for the death of an accomplice caused by the acts of another confederate who himself has been exonerated.” (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.Sd at pp. 695-696.)
The court acknowledged that “the third purpose of collateral estoppel, preventing harassment through vexatious litigation, does not appear to be fulfilled if the doctrine is applied when different defendants are tried but once in separate trials . . . .” (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.Sd at p. 696.) But it believed the “other general purposes” of the doctrine supported applying it under the circumstances of the case. (Ibid.) The court stressed that the defendant tried first “did not offer a defense such as insanity, intoxication, or duress based on his personal lack of culpability irrespective of the criminality of his acts” (id. at p. 697, fn. 13), and that the inconsistency in the verdicts “cannot be explained by differences in evidence or jury instructions” (id. at p. 698, fns. omitted). It noted that the “case therefore does not present the issue of whether and under what circumstances the prosecution’s discovery of new evidence after the first trial will preclude a plea of collateral estoppel which otherwise may have been valid” (id. at p. 698, fn. 16), and it did “not reach the question of whether the bar of collateral estoppel is applicable when the People allege that the prior verdict of acquittal was based on erroneous rulings which they were unable to correct through appellate review” (id. at p. 698, fn. 17).
Under these circumstances—where the prior trial involved no defense personal to the defendant, there was no difference in evidence between the trials, and there was no claim the prior acquittal was based on erroneous rulings—Taylor “conclude[d] that the lack of identity of parties defendant does not preclude the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel; we limit today’s holding to the particular circumstances of the instant case where an accused’s guilt must be predicated on his vicarious liability for the acts of a previously acquitted confederate.” (Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.Sd at p. 698.)
Six years after
Taylor,
the United States Supreme Court refused to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel to a criminal case.
(Standefer, supra,
447 U.S.
*11
10.) The
Standefer
court described the issue as being “whether a defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the commission of a federal offense may be convicted after the named principal has been acquitted of that offense.”
(Id.
at p. 11.) As we explained in
Palmer,
in
Standefer,
“the petitioner was convicted of aiding and abetting a crime despite the fact that the alleged actual perpetrator, Niederberger, had previously been acquitted of that crime in a different prosecution. Relying on the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel, the petitioner argued that the prior acquittal precluded the government from relitigating the question of the actual perpetrator’s guilt.”
(Palmer, supra,
The
Standefer
court noted (as had
Taylor, supra,
The court also noted that sometimes evidence is available in one case against one defendant that is not available in another case against another defendant. The unavailability of evidence in the one case may result in an acquittal that might not occur in a trial where the evidence was available. In these circumstances, the court explained, “application of nonmutual estoppel would be plainly unwarranted, [f] It is argued that this concern could be met on a case-by-case basis by conducting a pretrial hearing to determine whether any such evidentiary ruling had deprived the Government of an opportunity to present its case fully the first time around. That process, however, could
*12
prove protracted and burdensome. Under such a scheme, the Government presumably would be entitled to seek review of any adverse evidentiary ruling rendered in the first proceeding and of any aspect of the jury charge in that case that worked to its detriment. Nothing short of that would insure that its opportunity to litigate had been ‘full and fair.’ If so, the ‘pretrial hearing’ would fast become a substitute for appellate review, and the very purpose of litigation economy that estoppel is designed to promote would be frustrated.”
(Standefer, supra,
The high court also noted “the important federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law.”
(Standefer, supra,
The Standefer court explained that in denying preclusive effect to the actual perpetrator’s acquittal, it did “not deviate from the sound teaching that ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ [Citation.] This case does no more than manifest the simple, if discomforting, reality that ‘different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.’ [Citation.] While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required. [Citation.] [f] Here, petitioner received a fair trial at which the Government bore the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that Niederberger violated [the statute] and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture. He was entitled to no less—and to no more.” (Standefer, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 25-26.)
Standefer, supra,
Indeed, we have already found
Standefer
persuasive. In
Palmer, supra,
Relying on a number of California and federal cases holding that inconsistent verdicts may stand—some involving multiple defendants and some involving multiple verdicts as to a single defendant—we explained that “[t]he law generally accepts inconsistent verdicts as an occasionally inevitable, if not entirely satisfying, consequence of a criminal justice system that gives defendants the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to guilt, and juries the power to acquit whatever the evidence.”
(Palmer, supra,
We relied heavily on the reasoning of
Standefer, supra,
Palmer
further explained that “[o]ur criminal justice system, which permits a conviction only if the jury unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt
*14
that a defendant is guilty of the particular charge, gives the defendant the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, a jury clearly has the unreviewable
power,
if not the right, to acquit whatever the evidence. An inevitable result of this system, and one that society accepts in its quest to avoid convicting the innocent, is that some criminal defendants who are guilty will be found not guilty. This circumstance does not, however, mean that if one person receives lenient treatment from the system, all must.”
(Palmer, supra,
Palmer
rejected Price’s reliance on
Taylor, supra,
Palmer
specifically disapproved Court of Appeal decisions that had applied the rule of consistency, including the two cases
Taylor
had cited in this regard to support its own conclusion.
(Palmer, supra,
24 Cal.4th at pp. 861, 867; see
Taylor, supra,
It is readily apparent that little remains of the foundation on which
Taylor
based its conclusion. Most of the authority
Taylor
cited has now been disapproved, either implicitly by the high court in
Standefer, supra,
Palmer
is distinguishable from this case and from
Taylor.
In
Palmer,
the inconsistent verdicts occurred simultaneously, so
Taylor’s
judicial economy rationale was not implicated. As we noted in
Palmer,
no rule can prevent an inconsistent verdict that has already occurred.
(Palmer, supra,
Taylor’s
judicial economy rationale, however, does not warrant a departure from the general rule enunciated in
Palmer
and other cases that an acquittal of one defendant has no preclusive effect on another defendant. We do not know how many, if any, trials never occurred due to
Taylor,
but over the years the decision itself has
generated
much litigation, generally resulting, at least at the appellate level, in
Taylor
being distinguished rather than followed. Moreover, if, as
Taylor
itself suggested, its rule would require examination of the prior trial’s record to determine whether the acquitted defendant had proffered a defense personal to that defendant, or whether judicial error had occurred, or whether the evidence at the new trial might be different than at the prior trial (as the Court of Appeal found in this case), that examination would itself create substantial additional litigation which, as the high court pointed out, would frustrate “the very purpose of litigation economy that estoppel is designed to promote . . . .”
(Standefer, supra,
This case presents a good example of Taylor’s inefficiencies. In deciding whether Taylor applies here, the Court of Appeal judicially noticed, and extensively reviewed, the appellate record in Huggins’s case. At defendant’s request, we have judicially noticed that same record. The parties’ briefs discuss and analyze that record in detail. Defendant also asked us to judicially notice the record of Griffin’s trial. But because Griffin was acquitted, no appellate record currently exists. No one appeals an acquittal. Thus, for us to analyze Griffin’s trial, a record of that case would have to have been created. Because no appellate record of Griffin’s trial currently exists, and the Court of Appeal had not noticed the record of that case, we denied defendant’s request to notice that record, but without prejudice to a party’s citing the trial court’s discussion of Griffin’s trial or arguing that the Court of Appeal should have noticed that record. In his brief on the merits in this court, defendant no longer relies on Griffin’s trial or acquittal. But in many cases involving *16 collateral estoppel, a record of a trial resulting in an acquittal might have to be prepared. Doing so solely to decide whether the acquittal should have preclusive effect on another case would hardly further judicial economy.
Additionally, here the trial court did not preclude a trial but merely reduced the seriousness of the charge. Another full trial would be needed even under the trial court’s ruling. Thus, in this case, applying Taylor has caused much litigation and much expenditure of judicial resources. Because a trial would be required in any event, whether the trial court’s ruling would have saved any resources is questionable. On balance, we can confidently say that it would have been much more sparing of judicial resources simply to have tried defendant long ago.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the
Taylor
rule might occasionally save some judicial resources, as the high court also pointed out, it is not in the best interests of the courts or public to use judicial economy as a reason not to try criminal defendants.
(Standefer, supra,
Distinguishing
Palmer
on the basis that here no inconsistent verdict has yet occurred would also have the unfortunate effect of making collateral estoppel’s application turn on the happenstance of which trial goes first. If this defendant had been tried first and convicted of murder, and the other two participants tried later, then
Palmer
would compel acceptance of defendant’s conviction even if it were inconsistent with the later verdicts. As we have explained, occasional inconsistent verdicts do not undermine the integrity of the justice system. But a rule that defendants can assert the preclusive effect of other trials if, and only if, their trial was scheduled to go later than the other trials would, we believe, itself cast discredit on that system. It would mean that, of two participants in an alleged criminal enterprise, the one tried first would have only one trial in which to prevail—that participant’s own trial; but the participant scheduled to be tried second might have
two
trials in which to prevail—either the first or the second trial. If, instead, both participants were tried together,
neither
could benefit from an inconsistent verdict.
(Palmer, supra,
Applying the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel would have another unfortunate effect on the criminal justice system. Because no criminal defendant can be bound by an
adverse
factual finding in a trial in which that defendant did not participate, retention of nonmutual collateral estoppel in criminal cases creates what we might call a one-way ratchet. That is, if the
*17
first coconspirator to be tried receives a favorable verdict, that verdict, if given collateral estoppel effect, ratchets down the potential punishment for other defendants whose trials might follow; in contrast, because nonmutual collateral estoppel would apply against the prosecution but not against any defendant, if the first coconspirator received an unfavorable verdict, additional defendants would still be fully eligible to argue for acquittal or a lesser punishment. All defendants may thus receive the benefit of the most favorable verdict any jury might render (provided they time their trials correctly). Nothing in our jury system suggests such a scale tipping is either compelled or beneficial. A rule that can extend the effect of an erroneous acquittal to all persons who participated in the criminal enterprise might undermine the system more than accepting the potential for inconsistent verdicts.
(Palmer, supra,
Stressing the narrowness of
Taylor’s
holding, defendant seeks to distinguish its facts from both
Standefer, supra,
There are, certainly, factual differences among the cases. But, crucially, in both
Standefer, supra,
Defendant also cites
People
v.
Caesar
(2008)
Courts from other states that have considered
Taylor, supra,
One of the most recent of these cases, the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in
State v. Mullin-Coston, supra,
We are aware of only two cases, both predating
Standefer, supra,
The second of these cases,
People
v.
Felton
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1978)
Defendant argues that the doctrine of stare decisis militates against overruling
Taylor, supra,
Defendant notes that the Legislature has never acted to overturn
Taylor, supra,
Finally, citing
People v. Morante
(1999)
These concerns are not implicated here. Overruling
Taylor
will not criminalize conduct that had been innocent. Murder has always been a crime. At the time of the alleged crime, defendant could not have relied on the fact that Huggins would be tried before him or on the verdict as to Huggins, for that trial and that verdict had not yet occurred. Reliance is of less concern in cases “involving procedural and evidentiary rules.”
(Payne v. Tennessee, supra,
*22
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and overrule
People v. Taylor, supra,
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
The petition of real party in interest for a rehearing was denied March 30, 2010.