*1 ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, THE OF THE PEOPLE STATE OF SUMMERS, Defendant-Appellant. STEVEN D.
Fifth District No. 5—95—0720 Opinion September filed HOPKINS, J., dissenting. Peterson, Appellate
Daniel M. Kirwan and Rita K. both of State Office, Vernon, appellant. Defender’s of Mt. (Norbert Henry Bergmann, Attorney, Carlyle Goetten, State’s J. Ste- Norris, Sanders,
phen Attorneys Appellate E. and Rebecca all of State’s Office, counsel), People. Prosecutor’s for the PRESIDING opinion JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the court: adage
This case features that old that cautions restraint what challenges disposition making. one seeks. Defendant own De- his negotiated guilty fendant pleas precisely wants us to undo his because they what bestow defendant asked for and wanted. in return for prison terms insisted concurrent
Defendant his demand. Defendant The State embraced guilty pleas. two his negotiated pleas and received the concurrent entered bargain, obtained two his defendant Pursuant he desired. 60-year prison bargained for sentences that he complains appeal, On con- design the law’s that assures He raises that he did not deserve. commit crimes like his. for those who secutive sentences noth- insists that his crimes deserve inveighs position and prior *2 punishment. ing less than consecutive paradox that resolves is
This call for consecutive sentences not want by understanding purpose. its true Defendant does itself he Defendant sentences that he now claims deserves. the consecutive design negotiated dodge law’s to shed the sentences exposes his purpose slip is his sought and obtained. Defendant’s he earlier agreed- negotiated pleas, and the plea bargain’s promise. Defendant’s confer, inseparable are elements material pleas sentences those Evans, bargain. 673 N.E.2d plea People to the See v. (1996). required, are defendant’s concur If consecutive sentences Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 658 N.E.2d People rent sentences are void. v. (1995). void, clearly If sentences are defendant entered goal pleas consequence. unaware of their true Defendant’s is to his jettison guilty pleas process and start the criminal anew. bargained-for concurrent sentences
We must decide whether the bargaining empowers are void. Our decision turns on whether imposi- the State to concede the existence of criteria that force the mandatory tion of consecutive sentences. multiple
In this defendant’s crimes allowed for several mandatory ques- interpretations placed consecutive sentences circumstances, legitimately could concede tion. Under the necessary for consecutive-sentence that version of defendant’s crimes product are valid imposition. Defendant’s concurrent sentences mandatory plea bargain pursued and obtained. Since clearly required, consecutive sentences are not guilty are affirm. pleas are not void and his sound. We first-degree attempts at murder. pied to two gunfire face each point-blank involved into the Miraculously, elderly man and wife intended murder victim. close-range and sustained head shots survived. of Cor of the Unified Code
Defendant raises section 1994)) (Code) (730 5/5—8—4(a) (West argues that rections ILCS mandatory consecutive sentences. the crimes meet its criteria for 5—8—4(a)reads, pertinent part: Section impose "The court shall not consecutive sentences for offenses part which during were committed as of a course of conduct change which there was no substantial in the nature of crimi- unless, objective, nal one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a X felony Class or Class 1 and the defendant bodily ***, injury inflicted severe in which event the court shall 5/5—8—4(a) enter consecutively.” sentences to run 730 ILCS (West 1994). disputes No one the fact that defendant bodily inflicted severe injury. Nor quarrel is there over classification of the two at tempted first-degree murders. Both are X Class felonies that qualify Perkins, sentences. See (1995). 655 N.E.2d The decisive factor is objective nature of the crimes’ changed and whether signifi it cantly during the crimes’ course.
Defendant boasts a objective criminal that remains constant dur- multiple his efforts at murder. He objec- claims the constant hijack tive was to the victims’ argues car. Defendant the at- merely part murders were hijacking the overall scheme. Thus, defendant offers two part murders committed as of a single course of conduct absent substantial objec- in criminal tive.
For the first time on defendant reveals the true deadly behind his simply deeds. He elderly couple’s wanted to use the car. Unfortunately, they were in merely it. Murder was the means he *3 chose to object remove them from the of his desire. events,
With this construct of defendant asserts that his at- mandatory murders fit the third criterion for offering sentences. Defendant’s provides a version of conduct that Nevertheless, nullifies the pursued. concurrent sentences he once de- any fendant is not free to ascribe reason for his conduct that suits his purpose. Although enlightens immediate obscurity the that advantage plea proceedings, served to his present earlier account suddenly plea-bargained does not the undo determination of events.
Nothing compels accept us to present version of his objective. criminal attempts bring Defendant’s elderly to death to two people may part plan well have been a constant to obtain their Cadillac. But there plausible suggest are other views that the murder attempts developed independently apart of and from the hijacking objective. ambiguity
The crimes’ course imparts creates doubt as to plan. gunpoint the overall The defendant first demands that the complies. At passenger exit the car. Neither driver nor occupants crime, slows, moment, pulls off the passerby a notices the slowing highway. flees for the vehicle. Defendant chases The driver which, turn, He at the vehicle flees the scene. her. He fires shots elderly plants woman and a bullet into her face. approaches then mounts, shooting question A based on how this occurs. Was marked death from the start or did her intended murder victim for The State spur unplanned reaction an otherwise bullet to the head? objective changed deadly suggests that defendant’s to the use force stopped help. when to someone changed. are not that defendant’s Never-
We convinced theless, hijacking obviously strays from its initial course. It develops anticipated. into a series of events that could not have been entirely possible only hijack- It is that defendant intended to commit and, course, unanticipated developed an unplanned its murder- may departed anger, ous bent. He have to murder in frustration or capture, simply satisfy spontaneous urge or in fear of or to a to avenge power. possible his victims’ disdain for his It is also that he simply enjoyed firing frightened gaze a bullet a into the senior cit- may enjoyed repeat izen. He have it so much that he decided to experience pure pleasure. for its merely part
Whether defendant’s a a were constant hijacking objective or departure objec- substantial from that tive is not for us to decide. The point critical for us is that the issue equivocal enough negotiated was determination. There are potential constructs that do not fit consecutive sentences. State, machinery prevent given
The law’s
does not
the facts
case,
negotiating
of this
a plea
from
that surrenders a construct nec-
essary
produce mandatory
to
consecutive sentences. Prosecutors
routinely negotiate disputed
They
facts.
abide crime
mark-
versions
edly
plea-
different from their true view of events in order to achieve
circumstances,
bargained dispositions.
proper
law
Under
toler-
legitimate negotiation
ates fact-based concessions as a
tool.
decided,
behest,
In this
the State
at defendant’s
to abide a
version of defendant’s crimes that allowed for concurrent sentences.
accept
developed
The State
the fact that defendant
a new
chose
objective,
hijacking,
apart from the
when he turned to his murderous
ways.
constancy
objective was un-
Since the
of defendant’s criminal
certain,
legitimately relinquished
plausible
one
alternative.
The State conceded that the two
murders were committed
during
in crim-
course of conduct without substantial
*4
inal objective.
support
separate
The concession finds
in two
and
necessarily
hijack-
attempts
distinct
at murder that do not
share car
underlying objective.
as their mutual
660
trial,
relies
Arna. After
bench
Arna was found
Arna,
109-10,
of two
murders.
N.E.2d at 447. The
evidence
trial established that Arna’s sole
purpose
Arna,
was to shoot and kill his two victims.
In
appellate
imposition
court’s
of consecutive sen-
5—8—4(a),
supreme
tences under section
court noted:
"[T]here was no substantial
in
objec
defendant’s criminal
shooting
tive from one
to the next. His clear intent from the start
***
was to shoot and kill both victims.
This was not a case where
defendant intended to commit one
] and in the course of
crimef
developed
objective
crime
a new
and committed another.”
Arna,
In our constancy of the criminal objective is not as beyond clear. It is not pale of reason to conclude that defendant intended to commit one crime in and the course of that crime developed a new and committed others.
The
present
open
facts of our case
question
applicabil-
on the
ity mandatory
consecutive sentences. There is sound reason to
hijacking plan,
finish,
conclude that the
start to
did not call for mur-
event,
der
people.
any
question
on two
In
was resolved
request.
defendant’s favor at defendant’s
open question
The
was
through negotiation.
plea bargain
determined
adopts a version of
multiple
crimes
facilitates concurrent sentences.
compatible
Wilson,
We note that our decision is
with
(1997),
286 App.
allowed,
Ill.
The Wilson Therefore, mandatory consecutive could not surrender under sentencing’s key to consecutive sentences applicability. 5—8—4(h) the State obtained open dispute. is never to When section offense, required law a con- guilty pretrial release the a on only way negotiate concurrent sentences sentence. The to secutive a 5—8— sentences is section when the sole criterion for consecutive 4(h) pretrial committed on violation is to dismiss those offenses charges. original pleas release in return for on the 5—8—4(h), manda Unlike section section turns on subject interpreta to tory consecutive-sentencing criteria that can be power negotiate. fall When tion. The criteria within the State’s unclear, adopt multiple- the criminal the State can is In crime version that allows for concurrent sentences. our negotiate sen State could a factor needed for disputed key expressly It concede the to consecutive tences. could precisely what it sentencing pleas. to facilitate That is order > did. legitimate power to view his crimes Defendant evoked the State’s he It not until way perfected in a his desire. is escape betrays He the concession as complains of a harsher truth. Indeed, product just punishment is punishment. from 60-year sought prison making. own uncertainty to the resolution of factual pursued He and obtained return, In his two victims favor his desire for concurrent time. spared trial’s ordeal. successfully any injustice fail in this case. Defendant
We to see may regret purpose. He pursued punishment that once suited his reality escape he cannot the fulfill- punishment, the harsh of that but justice always simple marks a not pursuits. ment of his This case Here, truly got what he asked for. found. foregoing reasons, judgment
For the of the circuit court of County hereby Clinton is affirmed.
Affirmed.
RARICK, J., concurs. HOPKINS,
JUSTICE dissenting: logic As much as I analysis find in the majority, of the I must respectfully examining Arna, dissent. In it is clear that the dissent of Justice logical Nickels makes the same anal ysis as does the majority However, herein. Ama clearly holds that imposition of concurrent sentences is a void sentence when the offenses are in a committed course of conduct. The two at by murders the defendant Summers clearly part are aof single course of conduct his effort position to steal a car. The *6 majority attempting to define the facts imaginative otherwise is more real, than and the should be vacated.
THE ILLINOIS, PEOPLE OF THE STATE Plaintiff-Appellee, OF v. JOHN LILLY,
W. Defendant-Appellant. Fifth District No. 5—95—0758 Opinion September filed