*1 justify to timeline disruption enough by the prejudiced be would Defendant that motion. Plaintiff's the denial described As case. this in late endorsement newof aware made was above, Defendant as soon III. Conclusion treatment in Plaintiff's developments any viable occurred, eliminating they as to com- failure Plaintiffs that We conclude surprised be would Defendant that claim substan- discovery deadline ply with Moreover, disclosure. expert the additional thus hold We harmless. tially justified in set yet been not has trial because its discretion abused court the trial no states Plaintiff case, because this new endorsing the from Plaintiff precluding to time extra Defendant giving to objection make 'We at trial. for use witness expert refer- re-depose Dr. Lewis depose the case and remand absolute rule disclosure, Lewis ring physician opinion. with this ceedings consistent to opportunity ample have will Defendant testimony. See Lewis's Dr. against defend dissents. EID Justice "whether question that the (stating id. EID, dissenting. timely fash- a Justice evidence to disclose failure by de- party opposing prejudice will ion already desig- case, has plaintiff In this to opportunity adequate party nying Maj. op. at 248. experts. twenty-one nated evidence"). against defend of the one extension already received has She addition, trial Id. accept designation deadline. expert decline likewise We Dr. Lewis' failed to establish untimely has endorse- she conclusion court's case, Dr. as her testimony is essential her by exposing Defendant prejudices ment of the presence not- testify to the We interest. Dwyer can prejudgment to additional discovery Finally, Assembly insti- Id. at "the calcification. Todd that ined over six case for ongoing a interest has been statutory prejudgment tuted these cireum- 248-49. Under Id. at of mon- months. value time accounting for the way of district find that stances, not I would the case n. 8. As at 981 ey." 980 refusing to exposed be its discretion indeed abused Todd, court Defendant twenty-second interest as add a plaintiff prejudgment permit amount greater a reasons, respectfully I For these expert. this case. delayed resolution aof a result majority. opinion "merely dissent amount However, additional the fact plaintiff] compensates [the has months, plaintiff] [the extra
during those compen- the use had the benefit
not found might she damages
satory has en- defendant] entitled, [the while to be Thus, we Id. amount." of that the use
joyed based Defendant prejudice perceive inter- prejudgment exposure increased her the State The PEOPLE est. Colorado, Plaintiff trial court a finally that acknowledge We management closely control must SUMMERS, Defendant. Eugene "timely to ensure in order and cases dockets Windustrial Denver v. S. Burchett justice." No. 08SA169. However, Co., Colorado, Supreme Court set, yet been has not trial date because Banc. En importance potential because we fore- and because question, testimony in May26,2009. the endorse- delay associated see to be expert additional single ment untimely Plaintiffs minimal, hold significant present does
disclosure
(Colo.App.Feb.
07CR2186,
WL
2009).
History
and Procedural
Facts
I.
Summers, was
defendant, Eugene
*3
as
of sexual
thirty-two counts
charged with
by
child
child,
on a
assault
sexual
on a
sault
trust,
on
assault
sexual
of
position
in a
one
attempt
abuse,
criminal
of
child-pattern
The acts
a child.
on
assault
sexual
to commit
Attorney,
District
Morrissey,
R.
Mitchell
sepa
during two
allegedly
were
Whitley,
District, Robert J.
Judicial
Second
August
from
period
periods-one
time
rate
Attorney,
District
Deputy
Appellate
Chief
period
and one
August
Plaintiff.
Colorado, Attorneys for
Denver,
The
1996.
to June
August
Jordan, Mackey
Mueller,
Haddon, Morgan,
charging Summers
complaint
felony
Mueller, Ra-
P.C.,
R.
Foreman,
Norman
&
Sum
April
2007.
filed
crimes
these
Colorado, Attorneys
Denver,
Bellis,
A.
chel
charges against
the
moved to dismiss
mers
Defendant.
by
all barred
they were
him, contending that
of
The statute
limitations.
of
the statute
of the
Opinion
the
alleged
delivered
RICE
the
time of
Justice
at the
limitations
However, the General
Court.
was ten
crimes
of limitations
statute
the
Assembly amended
the
of
arises out
proceeding
original
This
of limita
ten-year statute
2002, tolling the
as
the sexual
to dismiss
motion
defendant's
until the
a child
on
assault
tions for sexual
because
him
against
charges
a child
sault
eighteen.
age of
the
reaches
child victim
con
The defendant
time barred.
they are
motion
Summers'
court denied
The trial
limitations
of
ten-year statute
the
tends
newly amended
dismiss,
holding that
allegedly
he
when
in effect
to Summers'
applied
limitations
statute
charges
dismissal
mandates
crimes
yet run.1
it had not
and that
case
last
after the
years
than ten
more
brought
People counter
alleged incident.
Analysis
II. -
Assembly's amendment
determine
case to
asked
areWe
on a
assault
sexual
of limitations
statute
applies to
limitations
which statute
child, extending it
brought
charges
child
on a
sexual assault
in
eighteen,
age of
reaches
victim
plain lan-
Because
against Summers.
retroactively and therefore
tended
ambiguous and we
of the statute
guage
The trial
in this case.
charges
applies to
ex-
any
clear
to determine
unable
concluding that
People,
agreed with
court
we hold
legislature,
by the
pressed
applied
limitations
statute
the extended
statute
and the
lenity applies
to dis
defendant,
his motion
and denied
time of
at the
in effect
of limitations
cause and
show
rule to
We issued
miss.
against Sum-
charges
acts bars
absolute, holding that
that rule
make
now
mers.
legisla
to discern
unable
we are
because
amendments
intent behind
tive
Language
Ambiguity in Plain
A.
the rule
limitations,
we must
statute
amendments
the ten-
charges under
lenity to bar the
child were
on a
assault
for sexual
when
in effect
year 02-1396, which was
Bill
House
introduced
alsoWe
committed.
allegedly
were
18-8-411, C.R.S.
§as
enacted
later
decision
appeals' recent
the court
overrule
-
apply H.B.
determining how to
-,
Boston,
No.
People v.
charges until
not bar
does
of limitations
December
was born
in this case
victim
1. The
eighteen
December
December
and turned
case, apply in this
amendments
If
begin
plain
with the
language of the
sions. We must therefore determine which
People,
statute. Frazier v.
90 P.3d
one controls
inquiring
legislative
into the
(Colo.2004).
language
If the
is unambiguous,
intent behind
used.
we look no further
the words as
written.
Slack v. Farmers
Insurance Ex
Legislative
B.
Intent
change, 5
If,
how
ever,
ambiguity
there is
on the face of the
Because we are
unable to
statute, our task is to
discern the
plain language
statute,
we turn to an
Frazier,
intent behind the law.
90 P.3d at
analysis
legislature's
enacting
intent in
In construing statutory language, we
the statute. When an ambiguity appears on
whole,
read the statute as a
goal
with a
statute,
the face of a
may
"we
rely on other
"consistent,
giving
harmonious, and sensible
*4
factors such
legislative
as
history, the conse
parts."
effect to all
People
Court,
v. Dist.
quences
given
construction
goal
and the
(Colo.1986).
713P.2d
statutory
scheme to determine a stat
purposes
For
of determining the statute of
Frazier,
meaning."
ute's
257 leg- to discern application prospective Dep't intent, v. Ficarra convey that the statute. behind intent Ins., islative P.2d 849 Div. Agencies, Regulatory look place first (Colo.1993), the 14 of Intent Subsequent Indications intent legislature's determining Spahmer See recognized the General statute. in the used previously have We to make power 162 Gullette, Assembly's P.3d 113 v. subsequent ain clear a statute behind Tacorante, 624 appli See the statute. prospective version presumption The subsequent (recognizing insertion at 1329-30 strengthened P.2d cation part date explicitly effective amended clause bill date effective County Plan bill); well Pinellas It is also see application. prior prospective mandates Smith, n. 372 So.2d the Gener v. ning when Council in Colorado established Tacor (cited approval (Fla.1978) with date in an effective indicates Assembly al 1330) legislature (allowing ante, prospective P.2d at shall a statute clause date in effective error language. clerical by that correct are bound ly, courts (Colo. clause). 1171, 1174 P.2d McCoy, 764 People v. where prospectively 1988) (applying power exercised has legislature amendments stated clause date effective statutory very prior version after" or on committed acts "shall Before case. at issue scheme 1985); People date effective its on assault for sexual limitations the statute (Colo.1981) (apply Macias, 165-401, C.R.S. § years. three a child date effective where prospectively Assembly ing statute (1981). take effect shall read, "This Act clause statute of to extend amended commit apply to shall 16-5-401, to ten date"); Pat People v. said on or ted amended, originally As (ap (Colo.App.2005) node, it was to whether indicate did not where prospectively plying statute crimes prospectively take "shall amendment said intended whether its effective of and shall to cover possible far as back to reach date."). said on or fenses past for which yet not had previous statute directly anal- above cases cited mistake, However, realizing run. at statutes case, as none to this ogous *7 again Assembly amended lan- substantive involved cases in those issue legislature's the indicating add a section to prospective conflicted that guage of limita ten-year statute the new intent for Nonetheless, we while clause. date deter retroactively.5 When apply to tions legislative determi- the clear "ignore cannot of statute mining appropriate intend- were ... amendments that nation in allegedly to crimes apply to only," as effect prospective have ... to ed subsequent decla that used court this clause, Riley, date the effective expressed that to hold intent legislative ration simply to not free are we at ap ten-year amended in section conflicting language disregard Holland, 120- People v. plied. that see- language the statute. ("We specific (Colo.1985) conclude to rebut an intent to indicate appears intent legislative indication explicit using application, prospective presumption overcome 16-5-401.1, to is sufficient section However, language. retroactive explicitly ap prospective [of presumptions general effec- prospective use simultaneous ..."). statutes]. plication consid- rebuttal weakens tive since seven conflictingprovi- now been It has of these a result erably. As issue at amendments adoption of presumption to use sions, unable arewe offenses as to ten-year of limitations ate the statute: added to following 5. The on or subsections in said enacting assembly general ''The (1985). § 16-5-401.1, 1979." 16-5-401(6) to cre- in 1982 July legislature case. The has made no at- interpreted must be in favor of the defen tempt clarify its intent regarding the ret- dant." Id. Due to our conclusion that the roactive prospective or applicability of this amended statute of limitation's coverage is fact, statute. In legislature again ambiguous, lenity rule of requires amended the law in completely 2006 to elimi- apply the flat statute of limita nate the statute of limitations for sexual as- tions in effect when the allegedly acts took sault on a 16-5-401, § child. See ("Based place. CRS. See Id. at 1199 on the rule of (2006). so, In doing clearly it indicated lenity, we accordingly construe this ambigui intent for change retroactively. ty in favor of the [defendants] and hold that The substantive amendments to the bill indi- prosecution their by barred the statute of cate that is to "to limitations."). sex offenses We do not resort to the rule against children committed on or July lenity lightly, but we are mindful that a 1, 1996, and to sex against children court should "not attributle] legisla [the 1, 1996, before ture], for which the in the enactment statutes, of criminal applicable statute of limitations in pri- effect punish intention to more severely than the yet has not run language of its clearly laws imports in the § 16-5-401, see. 2006 light pertinent legislative history." Prince Colo. Sess. Laws States, v. United 322, 329, 352 U.S. The effective 77 S.Ct. date clause for the 2006 simply amendments Where, L.Ed.2d 370 here, states, "This act shall take both statutory legisla and the 2006," ch. 16-5-401, 2006 Colo. history tive leave us with way no to defini 410, 414, Sess. Laws with no indication any tively determine the statute's intended cover legislative intent for the amendments ap- age, it place is not our to choose between two ply only prospectively. competing and viable alternatives in order to usurp the General Assembly's role in making sum, we have attempt no legisla- - the law. See Santos, United States v. ture to clarify its intent behind H.B. 02-1396. -, -, U.S. 128 S.Ct. We are left with written, the statute as L .Ed.2d 912 (2008)(plurality opinion)(noting is contradictory face; on its lenity rule of "keeps away courts history statute, compel does not from making criminal law in legisla [the particular result; and the presumption of stead"). Rather, ture's] we have no choice prospective application, which the language but lenity in favor of the of the statute simultaneously enforces and result, defendant. As a charges against rebuts. Confronted with conflicting lan- Summers are time barred and must be dis guage and finding guidance through the missed. of statutory use aids, construction we unable to definitively determine whether the People III. v. Boston General Assembly intended eighteen- plus-ten statute of limitations retro- The court appeals recently addressed actively or prospectively. the issue we resolve here in an opinion an- *8 nounced after certiorari granted was
C. Lenity Rule of case. The court appeals reached a differ- ent conclusion than we today, reach essen- Because we are unable to tially writing the effective date clause out of plain language of the statute and we are the statute to find that there was no conflict unable to discern legislature's intent be on the face of the statute and that eigh- hind the statutory language, reluctantly we teen-plus-ten statute of applied turn to the lenity-a rule of last retroactively. To the extent that the court of resort only invoked "if after utilizing the appeals' opinion is ours, inconsistent with it various aids of statutory construction, is overruled. General Assembly's remains ob- seured." People Co., v. Thoro Prods. 70 P.3d provided The court two lines of reasoning (Colo.2003). 1198 rule, Under the "am support to its conclusion eighteen- that biguity in the meaning of a criminal plus-ten statute of limitations should interpreting Laws when Session Colorado ef First, it reasoned retroactively. People, 202 See, v. eg., statutes. 02- into H.B. inserted Kufman clause date fective Indus., (Colo.2009); Avalanche 542, 548 P.3d two safety clause awith together (Colo.2008); Clark, 198 P.3d v. Inc. ef became the act when purposes-showing Revenue, 171 P.3d Dep't v. Colo. refer Gallion from the bill protecting fective addition, the Colora ig 217, 221 could be therefore process-and endum that a provides constitution do Boston, the bill. interpreting when nored act, in the - stated *2. the date at on -, WL "take[s] at P.3d act, its on in the then or, is stated if no date the effec because Second, that it determined V, 19. We art. Const. passage." Colo. only in the Colorado appears clause tive date language which ignore simply not free are Re Colorado Laws, in the and not Session The constitution. meaning by our given is to be Statutes, "not considered it is vised that, reasoning erred appeals court of Id. state." statutes the official part appeared clause date the effective because of reason line --, neither find at *3. We at Laws, not Session in the Colorado only ing persuasive. Statutes, it need not Revised in the Colorado contention appeals' reject the court We enforced. alleged intention Assembly's the General reasoning provided line of neither Because renders clause date the effective behind cor- in Boston was appeals court of by the There meaningless. in that clause analysis conduct we rect, and because purpose to show evidence is no result, is that case a different today compels towas clause date effective behind overruled. process, referendum the bill tect analysis explaining provided the court Conclusion As- IV. to be why it believed date if the effective Even sembly's intent. lenity the rule on conclude based We the refer- to avoid only inserted were clause limita- statute of eighteen-plus-ten disregard simply cannot process, endum or after on applies to crimes tions indication legislature's in the as stated effective the statute's prospectively. intended result, As a clause. date appeals' court of at 257. Riley, barred are time charges against Summers the effective essentially ignore decision in ef- ten-year statute flat al- legislature's upon based We alleged acts. time of at the fect error. intent was leged cause abso- rule to show make the therefore consist proceedings remand line of reason lute and appeals' second The court opinion. in the Colo appearing anything not ing, that officially part of not is Statutes rado Revised judgment. concurs COATS Justice state, erroneous. is likewise of this laws 2-5-118(1)(a) cited section court EID dissents. Justice Ener and Suncor Statutes Revised Colorado Inc., Prods., (USA) Aspen Petroleum gy COATS, concurring in the Justice support (Colo.App.2007), to judgment. misguided. reliance This conclusion. - limita- the extended believe Although I too con Statutes Revised the Colorado While can 02-1396 HB period of tions of statutes publication the official sidered passage on (2008), 2-5-118(1)(a), Colorado, § rely necessary act, consider I do include references required reviser *9 fact, In that result. lenity to reach a rule of permit Laws Session the Colorado lan- by the dictated result is I believe legisla original source to locate reader concur I therefore act itself. guage of Revised Stat in the Colorado published court. judgment only in the (2008); 25-102(a), see C.R.S. § utes. See gen- certain upon contingent being Despite 788, 789 Washington, 969 People v. also legisla- by other savings generated fund eral consistently reference (Colo.App.1998). We tion, the effective date of way the act ly clear, is but inadequately expressed, legisla- ambiguous. The effective date clause ex- tive intent. pressly limits the applicability of the entire Because I believe the applicability of HB act to offenses committed on or after the 02-1396 is by controlled the language of the date of passage. its While the substantive itself, act I find it unnecessary to resort by statutes amended HB 02-1396 would ex- the rule lenity. I therefore concur equal tend clarity period judgment of the court. prosecution specified offenses, sexual not for new offenses but for all such EID, Justice dissenting. offenses for which the existing statute of H.B. 02-1396 provisions contains two run, limitations had yet not these conflicting are in square conflict regarding the date of provisions do not render the effective date applicability for the tolling provision. Sec- clause ambiguous. tion which 18-3-411(2)(b), amends tolls the legislature has anticipated that it statute of limitations until the al- might pass irreconcilable statutes at either leged victim eighteen, turns and states that the same sessions, or different and in that tolling new "shall to all felony event it makes clear its intention that (1) in subsection of this prevailing statute be the one with the later section which to have occurred on effective or in the case of identical Ch. § see. 18- dates, the statute enacted more re- 3-411(2)(b), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws cently. 2-4-206, Al- added). (emphasis 5(1) states, Section on the though legislature has expressly hand, other the act "shall to of- provided for a conflict between an act's sub- committed on or [the date fenses provisions stantive clause, and effective date 3, 2008]." passage, June 5(1), preference for recency clear, aas 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws (emphasis simple matter logic, particular provision parties agree, as does the ma- enactment cannot more jority, 18-3-411(2)(b) 5(1) and section broadly than the enactment of which it ais cannot reconciled, in that they both define part. Especially where, here, as partic- the coverage of the tolling provision using ular provision substantive does not directly different Therefore, dates. either the 1992 countermand the applicability act's clause so date or the 2002 date is a mistake. One as to render it completely nugatory, but go. must merely purports itself to an even When faced with such a conflict cases, broader class of I believe the subse- statutory language, "we seek interpreta quent decision to limit the applicability of tion that will make the most consistent whole the entire enactment necessarily fixes an A.N.J., statute." State v. 98 N.J. outer limit on the applicability any of its (1985); A.2d O'Donnell v. cf. parts. State Co., Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 186 P.3d From legislature's concern for (Colo.2008) ("To the act's effectuate the General immediate fiscal impact, evident in the con- Assembly's intent, we will read and consider tingent construction of the effective date whole, giving consistent, itself, it seems clear that the harmonious, inclusion and sensible effect to all of standard applicability language, typical of parts."); Texas, People v. 85 Colo. most statutes, criminal was a mistake. Nev- (1929) (we 275 P. must strive to ertheless, I do not believe the language cho- "give word, every clause, and see sen legislature to limit applicabili- tion, done"). if it can be majority, Unlike the ty of the act as a whole susceptible any I give effect to the 1992 date contained other reasonable interpretation. 18-8-411(2)(b). the ab- interpretation While this sence of an actual violation, constitutional I give does not meaning to the 2002 date con do not consider it to be within province 5(1), tained in section preserves the lan the courts to excise clear statutory language, guage tolling provision itself, as well as even in the service of implementing equal- the overall structure of H.B.
261 2 amend- adopted, section ultimately (2) as date; then the 1992 the keyed off is which 18-8-411(2)(b) stated: ing charging pro and appropriations legislation's tried, or prosecuted, be 1992 shall person if the No make sense only visions, which offense sexual an unlawful for punished statuto (8) subsequent used; the and is date indictment, felony unless the assump a charged as the on amendments, rest which ry for the action information, or complaint, to applies tolling provision the that within instituted or found By con same after on or crimes age of the reaches the victim years after preserves interpretation majority's trast, the ten-year statute eighteen itself, renders but 5(1)'s date 2002 section felony offenses to all shall limitations and senseless rest of the much (1) section of this in subsection to seek should result superfluous-a or on occurred alleged to have v. United Nation Chickasaw See avoid. 1998." 528, 151 84-85, 122 S.Ct. States, U.S. after 534 18-3-411(2)(b), "rea (2001) 2002 Colo. (adopting sec. L.Ed.2d though even In the statute" reading of (emphasis Laws sonable Sess. would tolling provision inconsistent words, rendered the new interpretation other that ten-year describing inconsistent for which all "surplusage"; apply to phrase mistake"; already run- and had not drafting limitations "simply a statute phrase after on or is, erimes to inconsistent meaning to give declining to require "seri would doing so because phrase rest of language of rewriting introduced, ously was first 02-1896 H.B. When statute"). bill's outlining section then applicability, date of and its date lenity, rule of I resort Nor would lan- tolling provision with consistent was maj. op. at depends, majority
upon which 18-3-411(2)(b). it stat- Specifically, guage (the statutory interpretation one because take effect shall act "[this ed date) far more to the 1992 giving effect one commit- all offenses apply to and shall than whole as a statute with consistent HB. on or ted the 2002 (the effect giving one other Reg. Sess. 2d Assem. 63rd Gen. "tie" that words, there is date). other In introduced, and order was After the bill United lenity must break. the rule re- appropriations compliance facilitate - -, -, Santos, U.S. States Legis- Colorado the Office quirements, (2008) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. analy- impact a fiscal prepared lative Council (noting opinion) (Sealia, J., plurality the bill analysis concluded This sis. tie) Be a to break lenity applies incarceration additional in one result lan effect give I would cause impact, the fiscal a result As by 2008. against charges because and guage, contingent passed could 02-1896 H.B. under time-barred are not defendant funds, availability upon the majori dissent respectfully I sepa- passage upon the depended opinion. ty's words, funding bill In other bill. rate H.B. 02-1896 in order pass had to amendments, the relevant Before effective. become 18- 16-5-401 of section portions in order amended thus was 02-1396 flat established 3-411 contingent now the bill reflect The stat- felony offenses. sex limitations 3 be- Section appropriations. sufficient upon from the running began limitations ute date bill's effective and the came committed. offense date changed to were applicability and date Assembly revisited 5(1), as Section passage. bill's 02- adopting H.B. provisions limitations "Except as otherwise adopted, provides, provide continued HB. 02-1896 section, act of this in subsection vided tolled but ten-year statute shall passage, upon victim take shall until the period said initially introduced As eighteen. turned *11 262 288, date." 5(1), Ch. see. 2002 Colo. Sess. scribing phrase inconsistent as "simply a 1127, Laws (emphasis 1130 sum, In drafting mistake"; and declining give 18-3-411(2)(b) although applies tolling the meaning to phrase inconsistent because do-
provision to crimes committed on or after
ing so would require "seriously rewriting the
1,
July
1992,
5(1)
section
states that
the act
statute").
of the rest of the
applies only to crimes committed on or after
First, the overall structure of H.B. 02-1896
the
passage,
date of
June 2002.
depends on the 1992 date.
In two different
parties
The
majority
and the
agree that
places,
legislation
the
specifies that the new
5(1)
the language in section
and
18-3-
tolling provision applies only to crimes for
411(2)(b) cannot be reconciled
they
because
which
ten-year
statute of limitations had
both define the coverage
tolling
provi-
above,
run. As noted
tolling provi-
sion using different dates. Either the 1992
sion itself states that
applies
it
to crimes that
date or the 2002 date is a mistake. We must
occurred on or
July
1992. Ch.
give
date;
effect to one
the other
go.
must
2, §
see.
18-8-411(2)(b), 2002 Colo. Sess.
When faced with such a conflict
Laws
addition,
In
statutory language, "we seek
interpreta
1992 coverage date
repeated
provi-
tion that will make the most consistent whole
sion of the amendments
subjecting various
A.N.J.,
the statute."
325;
487 A.2d at
felonies
cf.
prior
committed
1992 to a
O'Donnell,
(when
increase
hand,
ap-
If,
legislation
on the other
capital
immediate
for the
provide
must
ed
July
or after
committed on
plies to crimes
five
the first
cost for
operating
cost
had
of limitations
the statute
1992 for which
In order to
impact.
bill has an
years the
18-3-411(2)(b)
there
run,
suggests,
as
requirements,
these
comply with
legislation
impact from
be a fiscal
would
the Colorado
Assembly used the Office
example,
By way of
in the first five
analysis to
impact
fiscal
Council's
Legislative
H.B.
prior to
legislative scheme
under
money
was needed
much
how
determine
July
02-1396, a crime committed
02-1396.
years of H.B.
five
for the first
pay
ten
prosecuted within
have to be
would
adopted, the General
as
specifically,
More
18-3-
by July 2002. Under
years,
or
funding
H.B. 02-
Assembly
specified
however,
411(2)(b)'s
tolling provision,
fiscal
separate provisions-for
in five
alleged victim
it involved an
crime-if
same
Seq,
2004, 2005,
2002, 2003,
2006.
years
prose-
be
eighteen-could
age
under
17-1-139(1)(a),
§
see.
e.g., ch.
July 2002 because the
cuted after
("For
the fiscal
1128.
Laws
Colo. Sess.
vice-
until the
tolled
period would be
in addition
July
beginning
year
above, it was
eighteen. As noted
tim turned
hereby ap-
there
any
appropriation,
other
tolling provision could
estimated
fund
capital construction
from the
propriated
by raising
Depart-
impact
to a fiscal
lead
($69,467).");
at 1129
...
id.
...
the sum
giving rise to
costs thus
ment of Corrections
).
17-1-139(1)(b)-(e)
§
(specifically
sum,
In
inter-
provisions.
appropriations
to crimes
applying
as
preting H.B. 02-1896
five
in the first
only be costs
would
There
1992 avoids
committed on
however,
com-
affects erimes
if the bill
years,
provisions a
appropriations
rendering
Specifically,
on or after
mitted
nullity.
impact in
have a fiscal
the bill to
in order for
prosecution of
permit
have to
it would
H.B. 02-1896
Similarly,
provisions
would,
in the absence
an offense that
crimes
to the substantive
pertaining
In
in 2002.
bill,
prosecution
be barred from
charged make
be
could
which defendants
words,
permit prosecu-
have to
it would
other
interpreted to
legislation is
only if the
sense
that would lead
of additional
ex-
already
crimes. For
apply to
Depart-
impact
fiscal
an additional
amend-
H.B. 02-1896's
ample,
language in
of Corrections.
ment
16-5-401(8)(a.8)
states,
ment
5(1)
"[T)he
during
an adult
legislation
If,
suggests,
period of time
as section
shall
may
prosecuted
juvenile
be
person or
after the
only to crimes
applied
victim reaches
years after such
no fiscal
be
passage,
there would
date of
any
as to
offense
age
eighteen
reason to
years and no
in the first five
impact
(I)
felony un-
Charged as a
delinquent act:
in H.B.
provisions
include
words,
18-83-4083,
prior to
legislation
if the
existed
as it
In other
der ...
02-1396.
16-5-401(8)(a.3),
2000." Ch.
after the
applies to crimes
(emphasis
Laws
2002 Colo. Sess.
(June 3, 2002),
passage
of sexual assault
the crime
could run-at
erimes
for those
18-
contained
degree
in the second
irra-
have been
It would
earliest-in
individuals
But because
repealed.
Assembly
3-403 was
then,
tional,
for the General
statutory provi-
under the
charged
must be
years fol-
money for the five
have allocated
year
as
existed
defining the crime
sion
no fiscal
bill,
would have
if the bill
lowing committed, the new
allegedly
the crime was
differ-
somewhat
Stated
until 2012.
impact
16-5-401(8)(a.3)
specified
401(1.5),
tolling
amended
is not rendered
provision
charged
to crimes
un-
nullity
would be if
tolling provision
der the 2000 version of the sexual assault
applies
H.B. 02-1396
to crimes committed
statute.
It would make no sense for the
prior
words,
to 1996-in
other
giving ef-
Assembly
to have
feet
in H.B. 02-1896 that
tolling provision applied
already
commit- applies
provision
the tolling
to erimes com-
(Le.,
2000)
ted crimes
those committed
if
mitted on or after
02-1396
applied to crimes commit-
*13
What makes this such a difficult case is the
(June 3, 2002),
ted after
passage
the date of
that,
way
fact
go,
either
we must render
5(1)
as section
suggests. Again,
reading
statutory
some
language without effect. See
H.B. 02-1896 as applying to crimes commit-
Texas,
People
v.
Colo. at
preserves all applies to provision is, tolling that were the statute for which is no that there already run. Given
had not lenity broken, rule of resort to be "tie" maj. op. at in this case. inappropriate (Sca Santos, at 2025 258; 128 S.Ct. but cf. (holding appli
lia, J., opinion) plurality lenity appropriate
cation interpreta [proposed either "[uJnder
where ques
tion], [statute provisions all coherent; redun are provisions
tion} utterly
dant; is not rendered the statute
absurd"). H.B. 02- conclusion, I would hold of limitations tolled may prosecution case, therefore and that dissent from respectfully I thus
proceed.
majority's opinion. I see no tolling provision, and over the applicabili- control limit on the necessarily an outer fixes reasoning doing so. parts."). justification But ty any provision must
presumes that the