People v. StrosniderPeople v. Strosnider
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Cooke
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error, John Henry Strosnider, was on July 3, 1913, by the verdict of a jury in the criminal court of Cook county, found guilty of obtaining money by means
The indictment under which Strosnider was1 tried was returned against him and John D. Snarley, Daniel F. Kinnally and Charles Kissell, jointly. It consisted of two counts. The first count charged that the defendants, on October 29, 1912, obtained from William T. Kirby $20,-000 by means of the confidence game, and the second count charged the defendants with the larceny of $20,000 from Kirby. Kissell was not apprehended. The other defendants, upon being arraigned, pleaded not guilty. At the close of the People’s case the court directed verdicts of riot guilty as to Snarley and Kinnally, and upon motion of the State’s attorney entered a nolle prosequi as to the second count of the indictment charging the defendants with larceny. Thereupon Strosnider moved the court to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that he had been extradited from the Dominion of Canada on a charge of larceny, and because the treaties between the United States and Great Britain do not provide for the extradition from territory under the jurisdiction of Great Britain of one charged with obtaining money by means of the confidence game. The court denied the motion and permitted the trial to proceed under the count charging Strosnider with obtaining money by means of the confidence game, and this action of the court is one of the grounds urged for reversal.
The only evidence offered in support of this motion was a certified copy of an application by the State’s attorney of Cook county to the Governor of this State, and a certified copy of a petition from the Governor to the Secretary of State at Washington, for the extradition of Strosnider. It was not shown that any action was taken by the Federal government upon the petition of the Governor, nor that any request was made to the Canadian government for the surrender of plaintiff in error to the United States government. So far as appears from any proof contained in the record in this
Prior to the trial, upon motion of the State’s attorney, the court appointed Edward S. Day as special counsel to assist the State’s attorney in the prosecution, and this action of the court is assigned as error. Assuming that Day was employed by private parties to assist in the prosecution, as contended by plaintiff in error, this fact, alone, is not sufficient to warrant us in holding that the court erred in appointing him as special counsel to assist the State’s attorney. The trial court is vested with a discretion in such matters, and a judgment of conviction will not be reversed on this ground unless’ it appears that the trial court has abused its discretion to the manifest prejudice of the defendant. (Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142; People v. Blevins, 251 id. 381; People v. Donaldson, 255 id. 19.) No such abuse of discretion or prejudice is here shown, but, on the contrary,
It is urged that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. The principal witness for the People was William T. Kirby, from whom plaintiff in error was charged with obtaining $20,000 by means of the confidence game. During the period covering the transactions hereinafter detailed, and for some time prior thereto, Kirby was conduct- ’ ing a private bank in the city of Chicago. He testified that during the month of July, 1912, a stranger, whom he after-wards knew as Charles Kissell, entered the bank and inquired about- a building which was being erected across the street -from the bank; that subsequently he met Kissell on the streets of Chicago and on one occasion at Manhattan Beach, where he had a conversation with him in the presence of his (Kirby’s) wife and children; that during the forenoon of October 28, 1912, Kissell came to the bank and represented to him that he had a brother-in-law who was connected with a large corporation, and that he desired Kirby to accompany him to the Western Union building to meet this brother-in-law and confer with him upon an important business proposition; that he accompanied Kissell to the Western Union building, and from there to the .telegraph office in the Board of Trade building and met plaintiff in error, whoin Kissell introduced as Mr. Shea, in the hallway just outside the telegraph office in the Board of Trade building; that plaintiff in error requested them to go to the Grand Pacific Hotel and wait for him there, which they did; that within ten minutes plaintiff in error came to the hotel, and, after obtaining Kirby’s promise of secrecy, told him that he was a confidential man in the employ of the Western Union Telegraph Company; that he had been working in Pittsburg but had been transferred to
Kirby testified that the following morning he directed Daniel Kirby to draw a check for $15,000 on the Stock-men’s Trust and Savings Bank and to go over to that bank and get $10,000 of the money in one-thousand-dollar bills; that Daniel Kirby went over to that bank as directed and returned with the $15,000, but that he only brought with him two one-thousand-dollar bills; that the balance was in bills of smaller denomination; that the witness took $10,000 of this money, including the two one-thousand-dollar bills, placed the money in a grip, ordered an autopnobileifrom the Emery Motor Company and went to the Blackstone Hotel, taking the grip with him; that he had previously arranged with the Slavic-American Bank to send over to his bánk an additional $10,000, but that this money had not reached the bank when he left; that he telephoned his wife and requested her to call at his bank and bring this $10,000 to him at the Blackstone Hotel, and also directed Daniel Kirby to deliver the $10,000 to his wife when she called for it; that Edward Townsend was the name of the chauffeur sent by the Emery Motor
Mrs. Kirby corroborated her husband’s testimony to the effect that on October 29, shortly before noon, she received $10,000 in one-thousand-dollar bills from Daniel Kirby at the bank, and, acting under the directions of her husband, she took this money to him at the Blackstqne Hotel, where Kirby and a man whom she had previously met at Manhattan Beach with her husband entered the automobile in which she and her children were riding and were taken to the corner of Eighteenth street and Wabash avenue, where the two men alighted. She further testified that when she handed this money to her husband he opened a grip and she noticed there was other money in the grip.
Mrs. Pearl DeCoverly, a witness called by the People, testified that from August 30, 1912, until some time in January, 1913, she conducted a rooming house at 1710 Michigan avenue; that in October, 1912, she rented to a man named Kane two large front rooms on the main floor of the house, Kane representing that a friend of his who was working on
Edith Pope and Clara Monroe, who were rooming with Mrs. DeCoverly at 1710 Michigan avenue during the month of October, 1912, testified that during that period they met Kane there; that he used the parlors on the main floor, and that on one occasion while they were in those rooms Kane introduced them to a man by the name of Shea, and that plaintiff in error looked like that man.
Louis Borman, who worked for Mrs. DeCoverly during the same period, testified that during the latter part of October he on several occasions assisted in taking the pictures and ornaments from the walls in the front rooms of the house. He also testified that on one occasion at Kane’s request he took a telegraph instrument to a repair shop, and after it was repaired returned it to Kane at 1710 Michigan avenue. Other witnesses who saw Borman at the repair shop with the telegraph instrument testified that it was not the ordinary instrument used by telegraph operators but was of low voltage, and had an attachment which could be put on the floor or under a table or carpet and operated with the foot, and that by means of this foot attachment messages could be transmitted to the instrument. In other words, that while messages were apparently received from an outside source by this instrument they were in fact transmitted to the instrument, by means of the foot attachment, by the same person
James A. Patterson, who conducted a drug store at the corner of Eighteenth street and Wabash avenue, corroborated Kirby in his testimony that he and Kissell telephoned from that drug store during the latter part of October, 1912, and that on that occasion they were in the drug store for more than an hour waiting for a return- call.
Edward Townsend, corroborated Kirby’s testimony to the effect that during the latter part of October, 1912, while Townsend was in the employ of Emery & Co. as a chauffeur, he conveyed Kirby in an automobile from his bank to the Blackstone Hotel and from there to the sub-treasury, and that on the return trip from the sub-treasury to the Blackstone Hotel Kirby took a thousand-dollar bill from a grip, showed it to him and remarked that he had nearly a quarter of a million dollars in the grip.
Daniel Kirby corroborated Kirby’s testimony with reference to telephone calls at the bank and with reference to obtaining $15,000 from the Stockmen’s Trust and Savings Bank on October 29, of which amount Kirby took $10,000 and placed in a grip. He also testified that on October 29 John Shea called up the bank by telephone and inquired where Kirby could be reached, and that he told him to call “Calumet 1818,” Kirby having previously informed him that he could be reached at that number.
Alice E. Seegmuller testified that she was a telephone operator at the Drexel Arms Hotel during the month of October, 1912, and that she kept a record of all telephone calls sent out from the hotel; that during that period plaintiff in error, under the name of‘John Shea, was rooming at the hotel, and that he occupied room No. 523; that there was a telephone in that room; that on October 29 Shea asked, for a connection with “Yards 186,” and when he got the connection asked if that was the Kirby Bank, and that she did not listen to any more of the conversation.
The hotel register of the Drexel Arms Hotel was offered in evidence, and it shows that John Shea registered at the hotel on September 9, 1912, and was assigned to room No. 523 and remained there until the first of November. The clerk of the hotel testified he was acquainted with the person who registered under the name of John Shea at this hotel, and that plaintiff in error was that person.
Ewen Pinkhard, called as a witness by the People, was, over the objection of plaintiff in error, permitted to testify that during the month of March, 1912, while riding on a train in the State of Alabama, he met a man who gave his name as Charles Howard; that Howard induced him to accompany him to Nashville, Tennessee, where he introduced him to plaintiff in error, who was then going under the name of Daggert, and represented that plaintiff in error was his uncle; that plaintiff in error was in the office of the Western Union Telegraph Company at Nashville when he met him and made an appointment to meet the witness at a hotel in Nashville shortly afterwards; that as a result of the conversation which he had with plaintiff in error at the hotel he accompanied him to Chicago upon the representation that he was in the employ of the Western Union Telegraph Company as a special operator and had been transferred to Chicago; that he received the results of. horse races and transmitted them to the various pool rooms, and that he would, furnish the witness with the results of horse races before
The record discloses other evidence strongly corroborating Kirby’s testimony, but we deem it unnecessary to make any specific reference to the same. ,
Neither plaintiff in error nor any of the persons charged to have been connected with him in the alleged scheme testified in this case. The defense consisted of ah attempt to show that the defendant Snarley, whom Kirby testified he saw in the room at 1710 Michigan avenue on both occasions when he was there ánd whom he says he heard addressed as Judge Mahoney, at that time had a beard and was in Springfield on October 29, and certain documentary evidence showing that November 2, 1912, a petition in bankruptcy against Kirby was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; that in the bankruptcy proceedings both Kirby and his wife were adjudged guilty of contempt of court for failure to turn over assets of the bankrupt’s estate to the trustee in compliance with an order of court and were committed to the county jail, and were on April 29, 1913, indicted for concealing assets from the trustee in bankruptcy. No attempt was made to directly contradict any of the testimony given by the witnesses’ for the People, except the testimony of Kirby that he saw the defendant Snarley in the room at 1710 Michigan avenue on October 28 and 29.,
The contention that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence is based upon the assumption that there is no proof that any of the representations made by plaintiff in error to Kirby’ which induced him to bet $20,000 on “Lucky George” were false, and that consequently the corpus delicti of the crime with which plaintiff in error was charged was
It is urged that the court erred in permitting the witness Ewen Pinkhard to testify to an offense committed by plaintiff in error other and distinct from the offense charged in the indictment. The testimony of Pinkhard, the substance of which has been set out above, shows that plaintiff in error had previously used the same confidence scheme to obtain money from Pinkhard that he used to obtain the money from Kirby. Such
Plaintiff in error also complains that the court, over his objection, permitted four witnesses whose names were not indorsed on the indictment to testify on behalf of the People. In People v. Weil, supra, we said: “And it is within the sound legal discretion of the court to allow a witness to be called whose name is not indorsed on the back of the indictment, (Logg v. People, 92 Ill. 598,) and the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed by this court unless it appears that the defendant has been taken by surprise, (Gifford v. People, 148 Ill. 173,) and.the burden is upon’ the defendant to show that he was surprised.” It appears from a colloquy between the State’s attorney and the attorney for plaintiff in error that the former had, two days before the trial, furnished the latter with a list of witnesses to be called by the People upon the trial of this case and that the names of these witnesses were upon that list. No attempt was made by plaintiff in error to show that he was surprised by the action of the State’s attorney in calling these witnesses, the only objection interposed being that the names of these witnesses were not indorsed upon the indictment. Under such circumstances there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in permitting these witnesses to testify.
The court admitted in evidence, over the objection of plaintiff in error, an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois made June 4, 1913, finding Patrick O’Donnell, James Rosenthal • and Francis Ploulihan not guilty of obstructing justice. None of these parties were witnesses in this case, but it had developed during the trial that they were attorneys and represented Kirby and his wife in various proceedings taken against them in the bankruptcy matter on the charge of concealing assets
As hereinbefore stated, Kirby positively identified the defendant Snarley as one of the persons present in the rooms at 1710 Michigan avenue on October 28 and 29, and testified that Snarley at that time did not have a beard. Plaintiff in error offered to prove by several witnesses that Snarley during the latter part of October had a-beard, and further, that on October 29 he was in Springfield. The court refused to permit this proof to be made, and in this particular erred. The evidence offered was competent for the purpose of discrediting the testimony of Kirby, if the jury should have seen fit to give to it that effect. The admission of this testimony, however, could not have affected the verdict. The story detailed by Kirby was in so many particulars confirmed by the testimony of various other witnesses, that in the absence of any evidence offered by plaintiff in error to deny or explain the material parts of Kirby’s testimony connecting plaintiff in error with the crime the jury must necessarily have found him guilty, notwithstanding they may have disbelieved Kirby’s testimony regarding the presence of Snarley at the alleged pool room on the occasion when Kirby was there.
There are no such errors in the record as require a reversal of the judgment. The judgment of the criminal court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.