Jerome Strickland challenges his jury trial convictions of first-degree home invasion,
Strickland was convicted of breaking into the home of a seniоr couple, Arlis and Vera Clarkson, during which 70-year-old Arlis armed himself with a gun after realizing the possibility of an intruder. The prosecution alleged that while Strickland was assaulting Arlis, he jointly possеssed Arlis’s firearm when he placed both hands on the gun as he attempted to take it from Arlis. The gun discharged three times during the struggle, and Arlis was shot in the hand. Strickland conceded at trial that hе invaded the Clarksons’ home, but argued that he never possessed Arlis’s gun.
I. APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL
Strickland first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for new counsel made on the first day of trial. We disаgree.
“A trial court’s decision regarding substitution of counsel will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”
“An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appоinted simply by requesting that the attorney originally appointed be replaced. Appointment of a substitute counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Good cause exists where a legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his аppointed counsel with regard to a fundamentaltrial tactic. ” [9]
Initially, we reject Strickland’s claim that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into the nature of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. “When a defendant asserts that the defendant’s assigned attorney is not adequate or diligent, or is disinterested, the trial court should hear the defendant’s сlaim and, if there is a factual dispute, take testimony and state its findings and conclusion on the record.”
Further, neither Strickland’s complaints nor his filing of a grievance established good cаuse for the appointment of new counsel. A mere allegation that a defendant lacks confidence in his or her attorney, unsupported by a substantial reason, doеs not amount to adequate cause.
In addition to the matters mentioned in the trial court, Strickland adds on appeal that counsel failed to file any pretrial motions to dispose of the assault and firearm charges. Strickland does not indicate what motions should have been filed or explain how they would have been successftd. Counsel was not required to file a futile motiоn.
Finally, Strickland waited until the day of trial to request new counsel. The jury and witnesses were present, and thе prosecutor and defense counsel were ready to proceed. A substitution of counsel at that point would have unreasonably delayed the judicial process. Although Strickland claimed to have made the request one month earlier, the record does not support that claim. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Strickland argues that he never possessed a weapon, so the evidence was insufficient to support the firearm and dangerous-weapon elements of the offenses оf assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, felonious assault, felon-in-possession, and felony-firearm. We disagree.
In ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presеnted at trial to support a conviction, this Court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact cоuld have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
We first note that, Strickland’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm lеss than murder is without merit. His conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder did not rely on the factual question of whether he possessed a firearm, and possession of a firearm or a dangerous weapon is not a necessary element of that offense.
With regard to the remaining convictions, possession is a question of fact for the trier of fact and сan be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence.
Strickland invaded the Clarksons’ home and discovered that Arlis had armed himself with a gun. Arlis testified that Strickland immediately attacked him and attempted to take the gun. During the struggle, Strickland had both of his hands on the gun, repeatedly tried to take it away, and directed Arlis to “give it up.” Strickland nearly managed to completеly wrest control of the gun away from Arlis a couple of times. As Strickland attempted to gain sole possession of the gun, it discharged and Arlis was shot.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to reasonably
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Strickland lastly argues that his dual convictions and sentences for both assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault viólate his double jeopardy right not to be subjected to more punishment than the Legislature intended. Because this issue was not raised below, our review is limited to plain error affecting substantial rights.
The validity of multiple punishments under the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Michigan Constitutions is generally determined under the “same-elements test,” which requires the reviewing court to determine “ ‘whether еach provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ”
Affirmed.
Notes
MCL 750.110a(2).
MCL 750.84.
MCL 750.224f.
MCL 750.82.
MCL 750.227b.
MCL 769.12.
People v Traylor,
People v Yost,
9 Traylor,
People v Bauder,
People v Otler,
See, e.g., Traylor,
People v Rockey,
Traylor,
See People v Snider,
Traylor,
People v Wolfe,
People v Nowack,
People v Parcha,
People v Hill,
Hill,
See Hill,
Wolfe,
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-753, 763-764;
People v Smith,
People v Strawther,
People v Hall,