delivered the opinion of the court:
Following jury trial in the circuit court of Vermilion County, defendant William F. Straub was found guilty of second degree murder. 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(a). Defendant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, with credit for eight days previously served. The issue on appeal is whether defendant was denied due process and the effective assistаnce of counsel because he was not provided a hearing to determine his fitness to stand trial and defense counsel never requested such a hearing. We affirm.
On September 28, 1992, defendant was charged by information with aggravated battery of Danny Meyers. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4(b)(1). Defendant posted bond the same day. On October 9, 1992, a first-amended information was filed alleging three counts of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 9 — 1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)) in addition to a renewed charge of aggravated battery. At the October 21, 1992, arraignment, the defendant’s attorney made the trial court aware of the mental health limitations defendant had as a result оf a work-related injury. At the pretrial conference on September 24, 1993, the trial court noted the defendant had filed a copy of a letter from Dr. David G. Jarmon, a clinical psychologist, in an attempt to raise a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness to stand trial. The letter indicated two separate examinations of defendant by Jarmon, on December 20, 1988, and April 30, 1993, at the request of the Disability Determination Office in Indianapolis, Indiana. The report indicated defendant suffered from significant dementia after being struck in the head by a concrete block in 1979. The trial court found no .bona fide doubt had been raised but allowed dеfendant to request to be examined prior to trial to determine his fitness to stand trial. An order for examination was entered on September 24, 1993. On October 20, 1993, defendant was examined by Dr. M.E. Stebbins. Defendant, in a motion to continue, also indicated he intended to submit for examination to Dr. Patrick D. Brophy. Although defense counsel indiсated he had seen a copy of Stebbins’ report, it is not in the record on appeal. In objecting to defendant’s motion for continuance, the assistant State’s Attorney indicated that the only information supplied to the trial court showed defendant fit to stand trial.
On December 11, 1995, at a motions hearing, the defendant indicated he was scheduled to undergo surgery. He had been getting epidural shots in the spine for his back pain. He was also taking Demerol, Vicodin, Motrin, Septra, water pills, and quinine for cramps in his lower legs. The trial judge inquired as to the effect of these medications on defendant and whether it made it difficult for defеndant to understand what he was saying. Defendant stated it did make it difficult to understand. He could read something four or five times before comprehending the first sentence. At that hearing, he understood the trial court wanted to know if he wanted Mike Mc-Fatridge to be his attorney. Defendant indicated he wanted Mc-Fatridge to be his attorney even though he understood McFatridge represented a possible witness for the State and would have to cross-examine that witness on defendant’s behalf. The trial court also indicated it had received a letter dated December 7, 1995, from defendant’s neurologist in reference to defendant’s back pain. In that letter, she stated her opinion that defendant was presently unable to assist in the defense of his trial, but if he was off his pain medication, then defendant’s normal impairments would also render him unable to assist at trial. The assistant State’s Attorney questioned the neurologist’s qualifications to make that determination. Defendаnt’s counsel stated defendant was "not raising the issue of fitness,” but was seeking a continuance because'defendant was in pain and taking pain medication that would prejudice him. Defendant’s attorney indicated he thought the surgery would alleviate the pain so defendant could drop the medication.
Brophy interviеwed defendant on February 3, 1993, February 10, 1993, and February 20, 1994. Finally, on February 5, 1996, defendant filed a copy of Brophy’s February 5, 1996, report. Brophy’s report makes no mention of any medication being taken by defendant. Brophy agreed with Jarmon’s diagnosis of significant dementia secondary to the 1979 head trauma. Brophy found defendant’s problem-solving skills were particularly inflexible and that he was often unable to evaluate novel tasks. Brophy indicated such persons typically do not function well under stress and are easily confused. However, in spite of the fact that one of the reasons for the referral was to assess defendant’s caрacity to stand trial, Brophy’s report made no conclusion on that subject.
On February 6, 1996, prior to the selection of the jury, the trial court inquired of defendant’s counsel if he wanted to make a statement for the record concerning medication and defendant’s fitness. Defendant’s attorney stated that, if he believеd there was a legitimate issue of fitness, he would be obligated to raise the issue, but he was not raising the issue at the present time. Defendant stated his medication had changed significantly in the previous three years and he was currently taking 100 milligrams of Demerol every V-h to 2 hours for pain in his low back and hips. He further indicated he took quinine for leg cramping, water pills, and medication for "dysentery.” He also received a spinal injection on the previous Friday. He took Motrin and seizure medication. The trial court then asked for a list of his medications. Defendant stated he cut down on his medication that day so he would be able to comprehend everything being said. He indicated he had a little trouble with his speech, but that he understood what was being said. The trial court then inquired as to what defendant understood had transpired in court that morning, and defendant said there was nothing he wanted the trial judge to go over. Defendant had conferred with his attorney that morning. Thе trial court found no bona fide doubt of fitness to stand trial based on its observations of defendant, a review of the doctor’s report, and the representation of defendant’s attorney.
On February 8, 1996, a handwritten list of defendant’s medications was filed. That list indicated defendant was prescribed (1) one Vicodin Extra Strength four times a day; (2) l1/2 Demerol tablets every four to six hours, or as needed; (3) one Motrin with meals three times a day, alternating every other day with Ketoprofen; (4) one quinine tablet each evening; (5) one "Diphen/athrop” four times a day for loose bowel movements; (6) one Dilantin capsule three times a day for seizures; (7) оne capsule of "Triamt/HCTZ 50/25,” generic for Dyzide, each morning for fluid buildup; (8) one Valium tablet three times a day; and (9) periodic spinal injections for severe pain. At trial, defendant testified that, in September 1992, he had been taking Motrin and Vicodin for pain, water pills, quinine, and Valium. After being found guilty of second degree murder, defendant was sentenced on April 17, 1996. At that hearing, defense counsel stated he had a discussion with defendant concerning the list filed in February 1996. Defendant had a prescription for Demerol but was not then taking it. Nor was he taking Diphen. Defendant’s counsel further stated to the court "he also said he may not necessarily be taking Vаlium.” Defendant had taken Vicodin for his back pain V-h hours prior to the beginning of the hearing. Defendant, who was present in court when defense counsel made these statements, made no comment regarding the statements by defense counsel.
On appeal, defendant’s entire argument rests on the reference in thе list filed February 8, 1996, to Valium. The State’s argument appears to accept defendant’s characterization of Valium as a psychotropic medication.
Defendant did not request a fitness hearing or raise this contention in his posttrial motion. Ordinarily such a failure would result in waiver of the issue on appeal. People v. Brandon,
Defendant also attempts to avoid waiver by raising the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a hearing. To demonstrate ineffective аssistance of counsel, defendants must show (1) defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) had it not been for the unprofessional errors of defense cpunsel, the result of the proceedings would have been different. If it is easier to dispose of thе ineffectiveness claim on the grounds of lack of sufficient prejudice to defendant, it is not necessary to first address whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient. People v. Albanese,
A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, plead, and be sentenced, but he may be found unfit to stand trial "if, beсause of a mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” Brandon,
At the time of the commission of the offense in this case, section 104 — 21(a) of the Code provided in relevant рart: "A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under medication.” 725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1992). This statute has been interpreted as requiring a fitness hearing if the defendant was taking psychotropic medication in proximity to the trial or sentencing proceedings. People v. Nitz,
After an amendment to this section (Pub. Act 89 — 428, § 605, eff. December 13, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4453, 4578-79)) was declared unconstitutional (Johnson v. Edgar,
The State argues that this amendmеnt relates to a procedure and, therefore, may be given retrospective application. However, in People v. Birdsall,
"Incidentally, since our decisions in Brandon, Gevas and Kinkead, the legislature has amended section 104 — 21(a) to provide that no fitness hearing is required unless the court finds that there is a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness. Pub. Act 89 — 428, § 605, eff. December 13, 1995, amending 725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a). The State does not suggest that the statute, as аmended, has application in these proceedings.
Nevertheless, we find it appropriate to note the rule that amendatory acts which are procedural in nature have retrospective operation for matters which are pending on the effective date of the amendment or are subsequently filed. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 432 (1953); see also Hogan v. Bleeker,
Even though the supreme court declined to apply the amendment in a direct appeal in Birdsall, the State uses the language in Nitz to argue that, had Nitz not been a collateral postconviction proceeding, the supreme court would have applied the amendment there. However, thе statement in Nitz appears to be only a recognition of the applicable rules concerning the retroactive operation of procedural amendments while noting (1) the issue had not been raised and (2) even if it had been raised, it had no application to that case.
The critical stagе of when a defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing is at the time of trial and sentencing. People v. Johns,
Nevertheless, we find no reversible error in this case. In People v. Hanna,
In this case, the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion by not conducting a fitness hearing. Defendant never informed the trial court he was taking Valium at the time of the trial, even though he may have had a prescription for it. Even at sentencing, he did not say he was taking Valium. Two evaluations of defendant did not find him unfit to stand trial, including that of defendant’s own examining psychologist. Brophy’s report was dated shortly before trial begаn. The trial court was fully aware of defendant’s physical and mental problems and his medications. Nevertheless, the trial court took great pains to assure that defendant’s medication was not affecting his ability to understand the proceedings and cooperate in his defense. Defendant’s counsel understoоd his obligation to raise fitness as an issue if defendant had difficulty in these areas, but counsel did not do so. The trial court could rely on defense counsel’s representation that there had been no problem. In addition, defendant’s behavior was not so aberrant as to raise a doubt of his ability to function within the context оf the trial. See People v. George,
We also find no ineffective assistance of counsel. The issue of defendant’s fitness was clearly before the trial court. Since the trial court had a duty to order a fitness hearing sua sponte if there was a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness and since defendant has demonstrated no entitlement to a fitness hearing, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of defense counsel to request a fitness hearing.
The judgment of the circuit court of Vermilion County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
KNECHT and COOK, JJ„ concur.