People v. StingleyPeople v. Stingley
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Crampton
delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff in error, Elijah Stingley, brings a writ of error to the criminal court of Cook County, where a bench trial was had without the intervention of a jury, a jury having been waived, to review the legality of two consecutive sentences for terms of ten to fourteen years each in the Illinois State Penitentiary entered upon two separate counts of the same indictment, which charged in one count an assault with intent to rape, and, in another, an assault with intent to murder, both of which arose out of a single series of acts committed upon the same victim at the same time and place.
The single indictment bore general number 47-1740 and was returned August 26, 1947. A first count thereof charged an unlawful and felonious assault upon the victim with
The plaintiff in error contends the trial court was without authority to impose two consecutive sentences under a single indictment consisting of two counts naming offenses in the same transaction and that the same constitutes double jeopardy within the meaning of the constitution of the State of Illinois and the constitution of the United States and that the same violates the due-process clauses thereof.
The State admits the issue here is one of first impression in this State, insofar as it appertains to consecutive sentences upon separate convictions for independent felonies arising out of the same transgression and charged in the same indictment. It is true this court has affirmed the consecutive or successive sentences imposed in cases involving misdemeanor convictions arising upon charges in separate counts of an indictment or information. (People v. Player, 377 Ill. 417; People v. Rettich, 332 Ill. 49; People v.
The trial of criminal cases in this State proceeds according to the common law except where the mode and method are changed by statute. It is a cardinal principle of our criminal jurisprudence that a defendant cannot be tried for two separate and distinct felonies, which are wholly and totally unrelated, at the same time, and where an indictment
The general rule in regard to the defense of former jeopardy as applied to separate offenses committed, at the same time, or closely connected in point of time, is succinctly stated in 8 R.C.L. 151, in the following language, “A putting in jeopardy for one act is no bar to a prosecution for a separate and distinct act, merely because they are so closely connected in point of time that it is impossible to separate the evidence relating to them on the trial for the one of them first had. Consequently a plea of former jeopardy will not be sustained where it appears that in one transaction two distinct crimes were committed.” (8 R.C.L. 151; 81 A.L.R. 701; 1.5 Am. Jur. sec. 390; Dodge v. State, 124 Ohio St. 580, 180 N.E. 45.) In the Dodge case last cited the crime of shooting with intent to kill and the crime of assault with intent to rob were held to be separate and distinct offenses and conviction or acquittal as to one of them or as to an offense included in either charge, does not bar an indictment and trial as to the other. We conclude the counts in the indictment in the case at bar were properly joined and the joinder thereof did not constitute double jeopardy.
The right to assess cumulative sentences under two or more separate indictments is too well settled to require citation of authority. However, the charge of plaintiff in error that there is no authority in law to impose two consecutive sentences under two counts of a single indictment raises a far more important and troublesome question. Plaintiff in error relies heavily upon the recent cases of People v. Griffin, 402 Ill. 247, and People v. McMullen, 400 Ill. 253. He also cites a number of other cases. In all of them the sentences were imposed to run concurrently and were upheld on the basis that it did not appear that plaintiff in error’s rights were prejudiced. The Griffin case follows the McMullen case and in the latter we said, “A conviction of the offense pleaded in the indictment did not permit the imposition of penalties as for separate and distinct offenses, but it does not appear that plaintiff in error’s rights are prejudiced.” In People v. Quidd, 403 Ill. 15, wherein it was urged that the court, in sentencing the defendant on each of two counts relating to the same transaction, committed reversible error, we said: “Where there are two counts in an indictment growing out of the same transaction, the effect of two verdicts is the same as a finding that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment. Whether there is one general verdict or two separate verdicts is of no consequence. The sentences were not imposed to run consecutively. They necessarily run concurrently, as both offenses are but one transaction, and defendant was not prejudiced thereby.” Conversely, when the sentences are imposed to run consecutively the defendant is necessarily prejudiced thereby, and where two related counts are joined in the same indictment the verdict rendered must necessarily be a general verdict and there can be only one imposition of sentence thereon. We think the People, when, they elect to prosecute two separate felonies under two counts in the same indictment, are entitled to only one satisfaction. The State has cited no cases within this jurisdiction to support its position that the two consecutive sentences are valid and we are unable to find any authority in this State for the proposition that consecutive sentences may be imposed under the facts and circumstances shown here. There is a wealth of authority intimating such an imposition of sentences would prejudice the defendant and would violate his constitutional rights. We agree it would have this effect.
Judgment affirmed.