delivered the opinion of the court:
Thе defendant, Michael Stice, pleaded guilty to rape, attempted aggravated kidnapping, and attempted criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for 14, 14, and 7 years, respectively. Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), was denied after a hearing. On appeal, defendant contends (1) that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently made where the court failed to admonish him regarding the specific nature of his constitutional rights; (2) that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily made when thе factual basis failed to show sufficient corroboration of his confessions; (3) that his conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault must be vacated because the criminal sexual assault statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12 — 12, 12 — 14) is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) that the cause must be remanded for a hearing on the voluntariness of his statements, and if they are found to be involuntary, his pleas of guilty must be vacated.
In his initial contention on appeal, defendant requests that we reverse his guilty plea conviction on the ground that the trial court’s admonitions to him were inadequate. A review of the record reveals that the defendant filed four motions to vacate his guilty plea. In the first two motions, the defendant alleged that the State had coerced him into relinquishing his right to move to suppress his confession. In the second two motions, the defendant attacked the constitutionality of the criminal sexual assault statute. We note that in none of the four motions did defendant raise the issue of the suffi-. ciency of his admonitions. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) states that no appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea shall be taken unless the dеfendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. The rule further provides that upon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion shall be deemed waived. In the case at bar, defendant did not raise the issue of the adequacy of his admonitions in his withdrawal motions. Consequently, he failed to preserve the point for review and it is deemed waived.
Even if the issue had been properly preserved, we find that the guilty plea admonitions substantially complied with Supreme Court Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402). In attacking the adequacy of his guilty plea admonitions, the defendant specifically contends that the admonitions were inadequate because the court failed (1) to explain what a jury trial entailed; (2) to tell him that the presumption of innocence
According to the docket minutes, on December 18, 1984, the defendant was advised of the charges, the possible sentences, and his rights. At the hearing on the defendant’s negotiated plea of guilty, on April 25, 1985, the court ascertained that the defendant, who was represеnted by counsel, understood his constitutional and statutory rights. The court explained to the defendant that if he pleaded guilty, there would be no trial and he would be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. The defendant stated that he had not been threatеned and that he had not received any promises other than those stated in open court. Prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the court gave the following admonition:
“You understand that as you stand there right now you are still presumed innocent in regard to these mattеrs and you are entitled to trial by jury? If you wish to avail yourself or take advantage of the opportunity to be tried by jury, all you need to do right now is tell me that, I’ll return these 3 pleas now and you may tear them up and we’ll proceed as if this here this afternoon had not taken place. Do you understand that?”
After the defendant stated that he understood the admonition, the court accepted his plea.
Supreme Court Rule 402(a), governing admonitions to the defendant, states, in pertinent part, that the court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty, must advise thе defendant that if he pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty, he waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. (107 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(4).) In People v. Krantz (1974),
In the instant case, the judge’s failure to tell the defendant that, in waiving his right to trial, he was waiving his right to confront his accusers did not constitute a substantial defect in the admonitions. Accordingly, the defendant’s plea of guilty was not invalidated.
With respect to thе defendant’s other contentions — that the judge should have explained what a jury trial entailed and should have told the defendant that the presumption of innocence meant that he did not have to present a defense, we note that there are no cases suppоrting these propositions. Rule 402(a) does not contain such a requirement, and the supreme court in Mendoza expressly held that it is not necessary to specifically admonish a defendant as to every consequence of his plea. People v. Mendoza (1971),
Defendаnt’s second contention on appeal is that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily made when the factual basis allegedly failed to show sufficient corroboration of his confessions. In challenging the accuracy of the factual basis, the defendant contends that (1) the prоsecutor’s recitation of the offenses in the language of the charges did not establish that the defendant committed acts constituting the offenses, and (2) the prosecutor did not indicate how, in the event the case went to trial, he would be able to corroborate the defendant’s confession.
With respect to the first aspect of defendant’s second contention on appeal, we find that the prosecutor’s representations in presenting the factual basis sufficiently describe defendant’s conduct so that the court could determinе that it comprised the offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty. The purpose of Rule 402(c) (107 Ill. 2d R. 402(c)), regarding the presentation of a factual basis for a plea of guilty is to enable the judge to determine thát the conduct of the defendant constitutes the offense chаrged. (People v. Warship (1974),
With respect to the remainder of defendant’s second contention on appeal, we find that it was of no consequence whether the prosecutor was in a position to prove that the defendant committed the crimes to which defendant pleaded guilty; the sole consideration was whether the facts which the defendant admitted in open court constituted the crimes. (See People v. Warship (1974),
Defendant’s third contention on appeal is that his conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault shоuld be set aside because the criminal sexual assault statute is unconstitutional. Defendant has waived the issue of the constitutionality of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute by failing to raise it in the trial court. See Peopie
In defendant’s final contention on appeal, he asks the court to vacate his guilty plea conviction and remand the cause for a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession. By pleading guilty, the defendant waived all nonjurisdictional issues, including the admissibility of his confession. (People v. Grammer (1974),
We find that while the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s confession in reciting the factual bases of the defendant’s crimes to the court, it is apparent that the defendant, in pleading guilty, acknowledged the truth of the facts contаined in the confession — and not just the fact that he had made a confession. That the defendant was admitting the underlying facts was established by the following colloquy:
“THE COURT: Mr. Stice, you’ve had an opportunity to hear the State’s attorney state the factual basis. With regard as to Count II, is the factual basis substantially correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: With regard to Count III, is the factual basis substantially correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: With regard to Count VI?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
We conclude that it is of no consequence that defendant’s decision to plead guilty was influenced by the prospect of the admission of his confession. The defendant’s perceрtion of his chances of prevailing on the suppression motion, like his perception of his chances of prevailing at a trial, was a legitimate consideration in the plea negotiations. McMann v. Richardson (1970),
In moving to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant alleged that he wаs “coerced” into pleading guilty by the State’s making its offer of 14 years’ imprisonment contingent upon the defendant forgoing a hearing on his motion to suppress his confession. The Supreme Court
In the instant case, the defendant’s agreement not to challenge his confession was part of a bargain in exchange for which, the State recommended a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment, which was quite leniеnt given the nature of defendant’s acts, which involved separate sexual attacks on three women who were asleep in their homes late at night. The defendant used a knife on two of his victims. One of the victims was only 16 years old, and it was this victim over whose face the defendant рlaced a towel and whom the defendant attempted to kidnap by putting a knife to her neck and threatening to hurt her. Another victim was raped by the defendant, who held a knife at her throat. In pleading guilty to rape, a Class X felony, the defendant could have received a sеntence of 30 years’ imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 11 — 1(c), 1005 — 8— l(a)(3).) The home invasion charge, another Class X felony, was dropped. In entering into his plea agreement, the defendant was able to obtain a sentence of less than half of that for which he was eligible. Defendant has not presented evidence that his confession was coerced, particularly where he admitted the truth of the confession in open court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Effingham County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
EARNS, P.J., and LEWIS, * J., concur.
Notes
Justice Lewis replaces Justice Jones, who retired after the cause was taken under advisement.