People v. StewartPeople v. Stewart
Lead Opinion
This case is one of statutory interpretation. Under
We hold that a prisoner’s cooperation may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on parole. But the cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of cooperation. Similarly, the statute imposes no limits on when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred.
Cooperation means that a prisoner engages in conduct where the prisoner is working with law enforcement for a common purpose, provides useful or relevant information to law enforcement, or establishes that although the prisoner provided law enforcement any information he or she had, and it turned out not to be relevant or useful, the prisoner never had any relevant
Under these standards, defendant did not meet his burden of initially showing, by affidavit or otherwise, that he had cooperated with law enforcement. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
To the extent that People v Matelic,
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for judicial certification of cooperation.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The police intercepted a package of cocaine at the Saginaw office of United Parcel Service. The police set up surveillance at the house to which the package was addressed and had a police officer deliver the package. David Harrell, a codefendant, signed for the package. A short time later, police officers raided the house. Harrell told the police that defendant asked him if defendant could have packages delivered to Harrell’s house, and that three or four packages had been delivered in 1994. Harrell stated that defendant had come to the house earlier with Bryant Fields, and that defendant had said that Fields would be picking the package up. During the raid, Fields came to the house to pick up the package. When the police arrested Fields, they found two rocks of cocaine wrapped in $50 and a green pager. Fields stated that the pager belonged to the man for whom he was picking up the package; Harrell said that the pager looked like the one that defendant carried. During the
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine,
In 1998, three years after defendant was sentenced, the Legislature revised the statutes. The revisions removed the mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and replaced that punishment with “life or any term of years but not less than 20 years.”
Under
The Defendant states that he had no relevant or useful information to provide to law enforcement officers previously. Additionally, he states that he is “ready and willing to proffer any relevant or useful information that he may have, without undue haste. [”] He, however, fails to allege how he will have any relevant or useful information for law enforcement officials approximately eight years after his arrest. The Court finds that due to a lack of facts, it cannot enter an order of cooperation.
Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2003 (Docket No. 243562).
This Court then granted defendant leave to appeal, asking the parties to address the following:
(1) What constitutes “cooperation” for the purpose ofMCL 791.234(10) , and did defendant’s actions satisfy that requirement? (2) DoesMCL 791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when cooperation must occur? (3) DoesMCL 791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred? (4) Was People v Matelic,294 Mich App 1 (2001), properly decided?[2] (5) Should this case be remanded to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing to deter*631 mine whether defendant has cooperated within the meaning ofMCL 791.234(10) ? [People v Stewart,470 Mich 879 (2004).]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves the interpretation of
III. ANALYSIS
The statute at issue,
If the sentencing judge, or his or her successor in office, determines on the record that a prisoner described in subsection (6) sentenced to imprisonment for life for violating or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) of the public health code,1978 PA 368 ,MCL 333.7401 , has cooperated with law enforcement, the prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole as provided in subsection (6), 2-V2 years earlier than the time otherwise indicated in subsection (6). The prisoner is considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful information to provide. The court shall not make a determination that the prisoner failed or refused to cooperate with law enforcement on grounds that the defendant exercised his or her constitutional right to trial by jury. If the court determines at*632 sentencing that the defendant cooperated with law enforcement, the court shall include its determination in the judgment of sentence.
A
The first issue we must address is what temporal limits
We agree with the conflict panel in People v Cardenas that the only temporal limitation the statute places on a prisoner’s cooperation is that the cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of cooperation. Other than that limitation, the cooperation may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on parole. Specifically, we agree with the following reasoning set out by Judge WILDER in his partial dissent in Matelic and adopted by the Cardenas conflict panel:
“Giving the phrases ‘has cooperated’ and ‘have cooperated’ their plain meaning, then, it is clear that the Legislature intended that the prisoner’s cooperation must have occurred at some time before the prisoner’s application for parole release underMCL 791.234(10) . Similarly, the phrase ‘had no relevant or useful information to provide’, when given its plain meaning and considered in relation to the present perfect tense clause ‘have cooperated,’ expresses the Legislature’s intent that the prisoner must have lacked information before the prisoner’s application for treatment underMCL 791.234(10) , in order to be found as a matter of law to have cooperated.” [Cardenas, supra at 518, quoting Matelic, supra at 31-32.]
We conclude also that the statute imposes no limits on when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred. The statute refers to the sentenc
If the sentencing judge, or his or her successor in office, determines on the record that a prisoner ... has cooperated with law enforcement.... [MCL 791.234(10) .]
The statutory language that a successor judge may make a finding of cooperation indicates that there may be cases where such a finding can and would be made after sentencing. Under the language of the statute, a judge may make the determination that a prisoner has cooperated at any time before an order of parole is entered.
B
The next question to consider is what constitutes “cooperation” for the purpose of
1
The statute specifically provides: “The prisoner is considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful information to provide.”
Defendant alleges that he should be found to have cooperated because he never had any useful or relevant information to provide. Before sentencing, in 1995, defendant stated that he had nothing to say about the offense, that he was being framed, and that he knew the police “let the perpetrators get away scott free.” When petitioning for the certification of cooperation, eight years after his conviction, defendant advised the trial court that at the time he was sentenced he “had no useful or relevant information to provide.” In his brief on appeal to this Court, defendant also asserted that he “answered the questions the police asked of him, but was not able to tell the police anything about drugs and drug sales for he knew nothing about those things.” Because defendant never provided any information to law enforcement, he cannot be considered to have cooperated.
Further, despite defendant’s protestations of innocence, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine. We note that
Defendant could have disclosed to the police the name of the person who shipped the cocaine to him, the names of the other people involved in the drug ring, and how he was planning to distribute the drugs. At the time of defendant’s arrest or conviction, this information would have been relevant or useful. Because defendant had relevant or useful information to provide and chose not to provide this information, defendant cannot be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.
11
Cooperation can also include providing useful or relevant information to law enforcement.
We note that the statute does not limit the relevant or useful information to information about the crime for which the prisoner was convicted. If a prisoner who was convicted of possession with intent to deliver over
Defendant alleges that he should be found to have cooperated because he is willing to provide relevant and useful information to law enforcement in the future. Defendant’s statement in his petition for certification of cooperation that he was “ready and willing to proffer any relevant or useful information that he may have, without undue haste,” is an offer of future cooperation. But, as we stated in part 111(A) of this opinion, a prisoner’s cooperation must have occurred before the petition for certification of cooperation is filed. It is not sufficient for defendant to allege that he would be willing to cooperate in the future.
Ill
Finally, defendant alleges that on the basis of his conduct before and following his arrest, he should be found to have cooperated with law enforcement. “Cooperate” is defined as “to work together; 1) to act or work together with one another or others for a common purpose.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition. Considered in light of the statute, cooperation would include conduct such as participating in a controlled drug buy or a sting operation, or engaging in some other conduct to work with law enforcement toward a common goal.
Defendant asserts that he should be found to have cooperated with law enforcement on the basis of the following conduct:
[Defendant did not endeavor to hide or destroy evidence after his co-defendants[’] arrest; and he did not tamper with or intimidate witnesses. Defendant did not flee to avoid prosecution prior to his arrest nor during the interval between his release on bond and subsequent conviction. At all times Defendant was polite and courteous to investigating officers and officers of the court. [Defendant’s August 6, 2002, brief in support of motion for certification of cooperation, p 6.]
But defendant’s alleged conduct does not constitute cooperation under the statute. Defendant’s actions in not hiding or destroying evidence, not intimidating witnesses, not fleeing to avoid prosecution, and being courteous to the investigating officers did not amount to working with law enforcement for a common purpose. Defendant refrained from impeding law enforcement personnel in their purpose, but did nothing to work toward that purpose with the law enforcement personnel.
c
The final question concerns when a prisoner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prisoner has cooperated within the meaning of
We agree with the Cardenas conflict panel that the prisoner has the burden of initially showing, by affidavit or otherwise, that he or she has already cooperated with law enforcement or that he or she provided any information he or she had to law enforcement, but at no
Here, we have already found that defendant’s alleged conduct did not constitute cooperation; defendant has not alleged that he has provided any useful or relevant information; and we have concluded that defendant cannot be considered to have cooperated because he previously had useful or relevant information that he did not provide to the police. Defendant has not met his burden of initially showing that he has cooperated with law enforcement and, therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
IV CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for judicial certification of cooperation.
Notes
The substance of
2 This issue is now irrelevant because People v Matelic was largely overruled by a conflict panel in People v Cardenas,
The discussion of whether conduct, rather than providing information, can constitute cooperation under
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I agree with the majority that defendant has not met his burden of establishing that he has cooperated with law enforcement, and, thus, I agree with its affirmance of the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for certification of cooperation. I write separately to set forth two areas of concern.
First, I disagree with the majority that “a prisoner who never provided any information . . . cannot be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.” Ante at 633-634. While this may be reasonable as a matter of policy, it is simply inconsistent with the
Second, I would not address, in dictum, as the majority does, whether “cooperation” under
I am puzzled by the majority’s assertion that its discussion of these matters does not constitute dictum. Ante at 636 n 3. The prosecutor has not argued that defendant did not “cooperate” by failing to participate in a controlled drug buy, and defendant has not argued to the contrary. And the prosecutor has not argued that defendant did not “cooperate” by failing to provide information about an unrelated crime, and defendant has not argued to the contrary. That defendant has asserted one form of conduct as “cooperation” — namely, his failure to resist the police, an absurd argument correctly rejected by the majority — does not properly allow the majority to decide whether every other conceivable form of “conduct” constitutes “cooperation.”
Concurrence Opinion
oconcurring in result only). I concur that defendant did not qualify for a certificate of cooperation. However, I disagree with several crucial aspects of the majority’s interpretation of
The majority opinion creates the requirement that, to be eligible for credit for cooperation under
One might reflect that a prisoner providing less than all the information he possesses about a crime could nonetheless be very helpful to law enforcement. That may explain why the Legislature chose to confer the benefit of early parole eligibility using such general terms. It permitted the benefits to be conferred if the prisoner is shown to have “cooperated with law enforcement,” and it refrained from indicating what constitutes cooperation and how much cooperation is enough.
Moreover, the Legislature chose not to limit the statute’s benefit to prisoners who provide information that is relevant and useful. Rather, it specified that the prisoner may be found to have cooperated with law enforcement even if the court determines that he had no relevant or useful information to provide.