Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, a lesser-included offense of the. original charge of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of one and one-half to four years. He appeals as of right, raising three issues.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by holding that the prose
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cutor exercised due diligence in attempting to produce a res gestae witness, David Holley. The determination of due diligence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be overturned on appeal only when a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
People v McShan,
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that due diligence had been exercised. Factually, this case is similar to
People v Fournier,
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred requiring reversal by refusing to give CJI 3:1:12 (Witnesses — Conflicting Testimony) in its entirety. The court agreed to give the instruction except for subparagraph (3). Apparently, the Washtenaw circuit bench believes that subparagraph does not correctly state the law of Michigan.
CJI 3:1:12(3) reads:
"However, if you have a reasonable doubt as to which testimony you believe, it is your duty to accept the testimony favorable to the defendant.”
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Jury instructions must be read as a whole,
People v Johnson,
The omission of subparagraph (3) did not remove an issue from the jury’s consideration. The jury was fully apprised of the claim of self-defense, unlike the omission of an alibi instruction in
People v Crofoot,
Finally, we consider defendant’s third allegation of error. Admission of photographic evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
People v Eddington,
Defense counsel objected to the admission of a photograph taken one week after the incident while the victim was in the hospital. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the photograph was inflammatory because the victim’s hair was shorn and that the photograph was not representative of what occurred on the evening of June 4, 1980. Defense counsel also argued that the photograph was merely cumulative evidence due to the testimony of the victim and the doctor who treated him as to the type, location and size of the injury.
We conclude that the photograph could have been helpful to throw light on the location and extent of the victim’s head wound. In light of defendant’s claim of self-defense, the conflicting testimony regarding the number of blows to the head and defendant’s claim that only the end of the broken board struck the victim’s head, the photograph could have aided the jury in determining the intent or the malice and force with which defendant struck the victim. The photograph could have been instructive and, in light of the fact that the photograph showed a "clean” wound rather than a bloody one, would not have been calculated to excite passion or prejudice. The admission of the photograph was within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of that discretion.
Affirmed.
