31 N.Y.2d 108 | NY | 1972
Defendant was charged by indictment with the crimes of possession of a weapon as a felony, assault in the second degree, resisting arrest and inciting to riot. He was convicted, after a jury trial, of resisting arrest. (Penal Law, § 205.30) and harassment (Penal Law, § 240.25), submitted to the jury as a lesser included crime of assault.
On this appeal, we are asked to pass on the question whether, upon the record below, the trial court erred in refusing a requested charge that self-defense is a defense to the crimes of assault second degree and resisting arrest.
All of the charges against the defendant stemmed from a fracas which occurred on Sunday, July 6, 1969, at about eight
The defendant testified in his own behalf that he had borrowed the 1964 Chevrolet in order to perform an errand and was not aware that a pistol was in the glove compartment. While performing the errand, defendant was driving unlicensed and had no registration for the vehicle. At 125th Street and Park Avenue, he stopped to get frankfurters and a drink for his two passengers. When he returned with the food, he noticed
Defendant contends that the trial court’s instructions as to the defense of justification were inadequate to define his rights of resistance.
We cannot agree. The court adequately instructed the jury as to the elements of resisting arrest pursuant to section 205.30 of the Penal Law — “A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.” In charging the jury, the court gave a careful and detailed explanation of the specific intent necessary for a conviction. Further, the court instructed the jury that the People must also establish that the arrest be lawful and that the crime of resisting arrest does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful. The court’s instructions set forth this element in its description of the resisting arrest count, and in its reading of section 205.30 of the Penal Law. Thus, the court gave two
We conclude that the court’s treatment of the offense of resisting arrest wa's adequate and fair.
Turning now to the issue of whether-the court’s instructions relating to defendant’s rights of resistance were adequate (Penal Law § 35.15)
Here, however, the record afforded no basis for a charge ad to self-defense. The first inkling of any conduct on the defendant’s part which would indicate self-defense came when he swung Patrolman Davis around to use him as a shield. However, prior to that act, the defendant, by his own testimony, had already shown the requisite intent necessary for a conviction of resisting arrest. Defendant testified, “ [Officer Davis] said, ‘ You are under arrest.’ I said, ‘ No, for what? ’ And all the time he was telling, no, I was under arrest and I was asking for what, you know. * * * And he just kept on-saying, * No, you are under arrest, ’ and was grabbing for me ”.
It has been said that “ [i] t is not necessary that a defendant use ' force or violence ’ in obstructing the officer. It is enough that he engage in some conduct with the intent of preventing the officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person ”. (Practice Commentary by Denzer and McQuillan, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 39, Penal Law, § 205.30, p. 677; People v. Simms, 36 A D 2d 23; People v. Lattanzio, 35 A D 2d 313; cf. People v. Williams, 25 N Y 2d
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Fuld and Judges Burke, Sceleppi, Bergan, Breitel and Gibson concur.
Order affirmed.
. Although this court has since held that harassment cannot be a lesser included crime of assault (People v. Moyer, 27 N Y 2d 252), defendant’s failure to object to the charge precludes him, as he concedes, from asserting that the harassment conviction should be reversed on the law.
. “ § 35.15. Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person.
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other pefson.”