THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS RAY STANKEWITZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Crim. No. 20705
Crim. No. 21310
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 5, 1982
In re DOUGLAS RAY STANKEWITZ on Habeas Corpus.
32 Cal. 3d 80
Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Steven W. Parnes, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant and Petitioner.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, Paul V. Bishop, Edmund D. McMurray, Garrett Beaumont and Robert D. Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BIRD, C. J.—This case is before the court on automatic appeal. (
Late in the evening of February 7, 1978, the 19-year-old appellant left Sacramento with his mother and brother, an older man named J. C., and three young companions, Teena Topping, Marlin Lewis and 14-year-old Billy B. Appellant was driving and the group‘s destination was Fresno.
They reached Manteca about 1 a.m. on February 8, and stopped at a 7-Eleven store for oil. Manteca police saw the car “irregularly parked” and ran a check on the license plate. Incorrect information was received that the vehicle had been stolen.3 Several officers approached the car with drawn guns and frisked several of the occupants. The police officers told the group that they suspected that the car was stolen, and requested that they follow the officers to the Manteca police station. After several hours at the station, during which the police were unable to confirm the status of the vehicle, the group was told it was free to leave, but that the car was being impounded. Appellant asked directions to the local bus depot.
The group then went to an all-night doughnut shop near the bus station which was not yet open. After two hours had passed, appellant and J. C. left for about fifteen minutes. When they returned, Billy B. saw appellant give Teena Topping a pistol, and heard him tell her to place it in a bag.
About 8 or 9 a.m., the group went to the bus station. After several hours of waiting, appellant, Billy, Lewis and Topping decided to try to hitchhike. Appellant‘s mother and brother and J. C. remained at the bus station. Appellant and his three friends succeeded in hitchhiking as far as Modesto, but were unable to obtain a ride any farther. When the weather turned rainy and cold, the four walked to a nearby K-Mart store, where they stayed for several hours. Appellant indicated he would hot wire a car so the group could steal it and drive it to Fresno, but a search of the K-Mart parking lot for an unlocked car was apparently unsuccessful. Billy‘s sister in Fresno was called, but she would not come and pick up the group unless they made it as far as Merced.
A plan was formed to follow a K-Mart shopper to her car and then steal it. About 5 p.m., Theresa Greybeal left the store, followed by ap-
Once on the freeway, appellant told Ms. Greybeal not to worry because they were going to let her out in Fresno. Ms. Greybeal, who had been crying, calmed down somewhat and remarked that this would not have happened if she had her dog with her. Appellant displayed the holstered pistol and said, “This would have took care of your dog.” Appellant then passed the pistol back to Lewis, who thereafter held it against Ms. Greybeal‘s back. Topping asked for money, and Ms. Greybeal handed $32 to Lewis. She also gave Topping her wristwatch, with the comment that insurance would cover the loss.
After a drive of between one and one-half to two hours, the group arrived in Fresno and drove to a bar known as the “Joy and Joy.” Teena Topping went into the bar and returned a few minutes later with a woman named Christine Menchaca. Menchaca got into the car and suggested going to the Olympic Hotel, which was around the corner from the Joy and Joy. Topping and Menchaca went in first, then returned after several minutes to get appellant. Several minutes after the three had reentered the hotel, appellant returned and retrieved the pistol from Lewis. A few minutes later, appellant, Topping and Menchaca returned to the car. Appellant then appeared to be moving more slowly, in a generally tired condition, with glassy, droopy eyes.
After their return to the car, appellant and Teena Topping indicated they wanted to go to Calwa to “pick up,” a term indicating they would obtain heroin. The car was driven to a street corner in Calwa. There, Topping told the others to get out and wait because she did not want anyone present when they went to “pick up.” Appellant, Ms. Greybeal, Billy and Lewis got out of the car. Then Topping told Billy to get back in. From inside the car, Billy saw appellant walk toward Ms. Greybeal, who was standing to the rear of the car, looking away. Appellant raised the pistol with his left hand, steadied it with his right hand and shot her in the head from a distance of one foot. Ms. Greybeal fell to the ground, fatally wounded.
After returning to Fresno, Christine Menchaca suggested going to the Seven Seas bar where she would try to sell the victim‘s watch. Appellant told her to try to get $60 for it. While Menchaca and Lewis were in the bar, police officers approached and asked the occupants for their names and identification. After some brief questioning, the officers left.
When Menchaca and Lewis returned from the bar, appellant suggested going to a house in Clovis where he was supposed to meet his mother. At the house, appellant tried unsuccessfully to sell the victim‘s watch. A girl came out and told 14-year-old Billy that his mother had put out a missing person‘s report on him. Billy asked to be driven home to Pinedale.
When he arrived home, Billy began to cry and told his mother what had happened. She called the police who came and took a statement from Billy. At 11 that evening, police saw Ms. Greybeal‘s car near the Olympic Hotel and arrested appellant, Topping, and Lewis, who were in possession of the car. The pistol that had been used to kill Ms. Greybeal was found in the car, and her watch was found in the jacket of Christine Menchaca, who was arrested nearby.
The foregoing account of the murder came primarily from Billy B. Brown, an accomplice. Other witnesses were presented to corroborate various portions of the testimony. Appellant and his companions were observed in Manteca at the doughnut shop. Billy‘s sister testified regarding the receipt of phone calls from Manteca and Modesto. Other witnesses saw persons resembling Billy and appellant at the K-Mart in Modesto on February 8th. Fresno police officers testified about encountering appellant, Billy, and Topping in Ms. Greybeal‘s car at the Seven Seas bar about 8 p.m. An officer testified about how appellant and the others were ordered out of Ms. Greybeal‘s car and arrested later that night. The officers who discovered Ms. Greybeal‘s body were called, as well as the coroner who performed the autopsy. A criminalist
Also introduced at the guilt phase were 10 handwritten sheets of yellow paper seized from appellant‘s cell on July 7, 1978. The handwriting was identified as appellant‘s. These papers contained narrative scripts for Topping, Menchaca and Lewis, indicating how the kidnaping and homicide assertedly occurred. The killing was blamed on Lewis.
Appellant‘s counsel presented a diminished capacity defense based upon mental defect and, to a lesser extent, drug intoxication. The theory of the defense was that appellant suffered from a mental defect which, although not rendering him incapable of premeditating and deliberating, greatly reduced the likelihood that he had actually done so. If accepted by the jury, this view of the evidence would have constituted a defense to the two special circumstances, since both required a finding of premeditation and deliberation. The diminished capacity defense admitted liability for robbery, kidnaping, and second degree murder, but would have avoided a conviction of first degree premeditated and deliberate murder.4
Dr. Leifer, a clinical psychologist, testified regarding the results of his psychological examination of appellant and his review of prior psychiatric and institutional examinations of appellant from the time he was eight years old. The intelligence tests given to appellant indicated an overall dull-normal level of intellectual functioning, below normal but “somewhat above what is commonly referred to as mentally retarded.” However, performance on various portions of the test varied widely, from extremely retarded to average. These fluctuations reflected a “tremendous unreliability” in appellant‘s intellectual functioning in any given situation. Dr. Leifer concluded that appellant‘s thinking was “wish dominated” and that appellant was unable to consider “the full implications of his actions.” Dr. Leifer conceded on cross-examination that there was no evidence of a major thought disorder or symptoms of psychosis. He also stated that appellant had the capacity to understand the moral and societal sanctions against killing.
The main testimony to support the defense of lack of deliberation was given by Dr. Missett, a psychiatrist. Dr. Missett concluded that appellant‘s ability to deliberate meaningfully and maturely about the nature of his acts was only 5 percent of that of a normal 19-year-old. Dr. Missett also concluded that it was highly unlikely that appellant did in fact deliberate meaningfully prior to killing Ms. Greybeal.
According to Dr. Missett, appellant suffered from a mental defect in that he functioned on the emotional and mental level of an impulse-ridden 14- or 15-year-old. Dr. Missett‘s opinion was based on an interview with appellant, the psychological tests of Dr. Leifer, and psychiatric and other reports of appellant‘s personal history. Dr. Missett conceded appellant‘s mental capacity to premeditate the murder and form the intent to kill. Although conceding appellant‘s abstract mental ability to reflect meaningfully and maturely prior to an act, Dr. Missett stated that it was highly unlikely that appellant in fact so deliberated prior to the killing.
The prosecution obtained an order for an examination of appellant by another psychiatrist, Dr. Zeifert. Dr. Zeifert testified that appellant had refused to cooperate in the examination. Nevertheless, on the basis of what appellant did say and on the other available records, Dr. Zeifert concluded that appellant did not suffer from any mental defect or any lack of capacity to deliberate and premeditate a homicide.
After the jury convicted appellant of all the charges and found all allegations to be true, the penalty phase commenced. The prosecution introduced as aggravating circumstances evidence of several incidents
Both before and during trial, appellant‘s relations with his appointed counsel, a deputy public defender, became a matter of dispute. Appellant‘s trial was initially set for July 5, 1978. On July 3, 1978, appellant‘s public defender informed the court that he had come to doubt appellant‘s mental competency to stand trial. The public defender testified that over the prior weekend a fundamental dispute had come to a head between himself and appellant as to how the trial should proceed. It was counsel‘s opinion that no amount of further discussion could resolve that dispute. Counsel indicated that he believed his client‘s position was irrational and, based on discussions with the psychiatrists who had previously examined appellant, was the product of a mental condition.
The trial judge appointed Dr. Glenn to examine appellant and to testify concerning appellant‘s competency to stand trial. This testimony was to be used to resolve the preliminary issue of whether there was reason to doubt appellant‘s competency, so that a full-scale competency examination and hearing pursuant to
In the psychiatrist‘s opinion, appellant had alternating feelings of persecution and grandiosity. Among these were paranoid delusions that his public defender was in collusion with the prosecutor, that people were talking about him behind his back, and that he could join the mafia in jail and have the jury killed if they convicted him. Dr. Glenn indicated that appellant‘s delusional system “interfered with his ability to cooperate in the conduct of his defense.” Appellant appeared capable of cooperating with another attorney who was not a public defender, because he indicated to Dr. Glenn that he would accept a private attorney‘s evaluation that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to convict him of the killing. During the psychiatrist‘s testimony, it became clear that the dispute between appellant and his public defender was over whether the defense should contest the issue of whether appellant was the perpetrator of the charged offenses or whether a psychiatric defense based on appellant‘s mental condition should be presented.
After this discussion, appellant waived the attorney-client privilege so that counsel could tell the court the content of the discussion. Counsel informed the court that appellant wished to defend against the charges based on lack of evidence to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses, while counsel wished to present a diminished capacity defense.
Under questioning by the prosecutor, counsel indicated that appellant understood that the diminished capacity defense urged by counsel would involve a concession and confession of an act that imposed some criminal responsibility.
Appellant had also repudiated his statement to Dr. Glenn that he would follow the advice of a private attorney, by saying that only if a private attorney would agree to defend on identity would he follow that attorney‘s advice. The public defender indicated that appellant was convinced that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he committed the offenses. Appellant had rejected his counsel‘s advice to proceed with a diminished capacity defense, saying, “Gotta fight it.”
Appellant spoke up at this hearing to say that the only way he would take another attorney was if that attorney would do it his way, by fighting the charges. He then asked for a substitution of attorneys. The public defender did not join in the motion, but reiterated that he and his client had reached an impasse on whether the defense should be diminished capacity or identity, and he felt a full competency hearing should be conducted.
The trial court again refused to order a hearing on the issue of appellant‘s competency to stand trial and denied appellant‘s motion for substitution of counsel.
The next morning, the trial judge inquired of appellant if he wished to make a motion for self-representation. Appellant replied that he had nothing to say, that the court had “already denied everything.”
On August 31, the fourth of five days of prosecution evidence, appellant again asked for another attorney, stating, “It‘s a big conflict.” The motion was referred to another judge. Appellant presented a handwritten statement to the court which stated that the public defender “has persistently denied me the right to subpoena and produce witnesses helpful to my defense and continues to proceed on a course of action contrary to my interests despite my repeated objections.” When the court requested specific information on what witnesses appellant wanted to call and what testimony they wanted to provide, counsel invoked the attorney-client privilege. The court then held an in camera hearing, from which the prosecutor was excluded.5 The motion for substitution was denied.
On September 12th, Dr. Missett testified on direct examination that appellant had admitted to him the killing and various details about the crime which were consistent with Billy B.‘s testimony.6 After the jury had been excused, appellant told the court that he wanted the doctor‘s testimony stricken. This request was repeated the next morning before the jury was brought in. Appellant said that Dr. Missett “lied up
When appellant asked for a decision on his motion to strike Dr. Missett‘s testimony, the court responded that there was no such motion. The public defender stated that the motion was procedural, under his control as counsel and that he was not making such a motion. Appellant then struck his public defender with his fist. Appellant was restrained, but the restraints were removed when appellant promised there would be no further outbursts.
II.
Appellant contends that reversal of the judgment is required by the trial court‘s denial of his request for a competency hearing pursuant to
This court has previously defined the preliminary showing of incompetency which is necessary to trigger the mandatory competency hearing procedure of
The testimony of Dr. Glenn, who was a qualified psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine appellant, satisfied the Pennington-Pate substantial evidence test. According to that testimony, appellant suffered from a mental disorder that prevented him from assisting his counsel in his defense in a rational manner. The psychiatrist‘s opinion was somewhat unusual in that it stated that appellant‘s problem was with his particular appointed counsel, due to a paranoid delusion focused upon the public defender‘s office. The psychiatrist also gave the opinion that due to the nature of appellant‘s mental disorder and the fixation upon the public defender, appellant might well be able to rationally assist a counsel appointed by the court from the private bar.
Based upon this aspect of the psychiatrist‘s opinion, the trial judge chose to cast the issue in terms of whether there should be a substitution of counsel, while agreeing that appellant “could not cooperate in a rational manner with the Public Defender.” When the trial court denied the substitution motion, appellant was left with a counsel whom appellant was unable to rationally assist, according to the court-appointed psychiatrist. All further proceedings were conducted with appellant represented by this counsel.
Respondent contends that a full competency hearing was not required because appellant later stated to the court that he would not accept an attorney who would not contest the identity issue. According to respondent, this statement by appellant was in conflict with statements relied
This contention, if accepted, would permit the trial court to reject substantial psychiatric evidence of an accused‘s mental incompetence and credit conflicting evidence to deny a hearing on competency. The Pennington and Pate decisions rejected this line of argument in holding that once substantial evidence in the form of a psychiatric opinion of incompetence was presented, the court was required to hold a competency hearing. The rejection was explicit: “Once such substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the sanity of the accused exists, no matter how persuasive other evidence—testimony of prosecution witnesses or the court‘s own observations of the accused—may be to the contrary.” (People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 518, italics added.)
Additionally, rather than “undermining” Dr. Glenn‘s opinion of appellant‘s limited incompetence, appellant‘s seemingly increasing resistance to advice from any counsel might well have indicated an even broader-based mental disorder than that found by the psychiatrist. Had either the trial judge or the prosecution believed that appellant‘s later statements negated Dr. Glenn‘s opinion, Dr. Glenn could have been recalled to determine if he still adhered to this opinion.
The essential point is that substantial evidence indicating appellant‘s inability to rationally assist his public defender had been presented. Whether that evidence would be sufficiently well-based to result in a finding of incompetency should have been determined in a full competency hearing conducted as required by
In the particular circumstances of this case, a substitution of counsel might have avoided altogether the necessity for ordering a full competency hearing. Dr. Glenn‘s testimony concerning appellant‘s inability to
Counsel‘s own testimony—confirmed by appellant—explicitly indicated the existence of a “fundamental dispute” between counsel and client which “no amount of discussion ... could resolve ....” Given Dr. Glenn‘s belief that these problems might not arise with different counsel, it is conceivable that a substitution of counsel could have alleviated the entire tangle. At least, this was an alternative which the trial court could have tried in hopes of avoiding any need for a full competency hearing.
The basis of this disagreement was not over some trivial or unimportant matter. It went to the very heart of the trial. As was pointed out in Brown v. Craven (9th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170, “to compel one charged with [a] grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever. [Citations.]”8
In view of the state of the record before it, the trial court had to take some action to unravel the fundamental dispute presented to it. The court may not have been required to hold a full competency hearing if the problem could have been resolved by a substitution of counsel. But the court should not have chosen to do nothing at all. Since that is how it responded, this court has no choice but to find this inaction to be error.
The error requires reversal of the judgment. As Pennington held, an erroneous pretrial denial of a competency hearing compels reversal of the judgment, since “the trial court has no power to proceed with the trial once a doubt arises” as to the competency of the defendant. (People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 521.) “In such cases the error is per se prejudicial. Nor, as the United States Supreme Court specifically held in Pate v. Robinson ..., may the error be cured by a retrospective determination of defendant‘s mental competence during his trial.” (Ibid.)
Since the reversal of judgment is necessitated by the errors discussed above, numerous other contentions of error raised by appellant will not be reached.
The judgment is reversed. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising issues decided in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301], is denied for the reasons stated in the Hovey opinion.
Mosk, J., and Kaus, J., concurred.
BROUSSARD, J.—I concur. I write separately because I would not rest reversal of the judgment solely on the rule that erroneous denial of a competency hearing is reversible error per se. (See People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 521 [58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942].) Instead, I would emphasize the failure of the trial court to take action to prevent “a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant‘s right to effective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 [85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710]; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 [88 Cal.Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008].)
According to Dr. Glenn, the court-appointed psychiatrist, defendant suffered from a paranoid suspicion of the public defender‘s office which prevented him from cooperating with the deputy assigned to represent him. As the Chief Justice points out, the trial court on hearing that testimony could have initiated a competency hearing under
The trial court neither substituted counsel nor initiated a competency hearing, but required defendant to go to trial in a capital case with counsel with whom he could not cooperate (according to the psychiatric testimony) and whom he did not trust. This breakdown in the attorney-
We know from experience that trust and cooperation between client and counsel are essential, that without them even competent counsel may not be able to present an effective case. Thus, “to compel one charged with grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever.” (Brown v. Craven (9th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170.) In accord with that reasoning I concur in reversing the judgment in order to enable defendant, on trial for his life, to be represented by counsel with whom he is able to cooperate in presenting a defense.
NEWMAN, J., Dissenting.—I believe that the motion for a hearing on appellant‘s competency to stand trial (
The Glenn testimony repeatedly based the doubt of competency on appellant‘s stating that he would believe advice from a private attorney—but not from the public defender—that the prosecution‘s evidence was sufficient to convict him.1 Thus the conclusion of this doctor was
It is suggested that the effect of that statement was simply to enlarge the doubt suggested by the expert to encompass an inability to cooper-
he would not believe him. That led us into the—he started talking about the Public Defender‘s Office, and that the Public Defender was different than a regular attorney, that he didn‘t trust the Public Defender to a point, that he might be working for the District Attorney, and that the Public Defender gets most of his information from the District Attorney, that they work in the same office, they drink coffee together, and that they smile at each other after the proceedings. And I asked, you know, what that meant to him, and to him that means that there was the intimation that there might be some kind of a collusion. I then asked—we talked about the difference between the Public Defender, and he mentioned a Mr. Roger Nuttall, a private attorney, and stated that if he had a private attorney, that kind of thing wouldn‘t go on. And I asked him what if he had—if he had a private attorney, and that attorney told him a similar thing, that there was enough evidence, for example, to convict him, and he stated that he would believe a private attorney where he would not believe a Public Defender, because of the things that I had mentioned before. He stated private attorneys have more knowledge than Public Defenders, and that a Public Defender is an appointed attorney to him, not someone that he has paid for or asked for himself. He made some specific statement that he does not trust Mr. Sciandra, and then went on to state that the Judge was in it, too, because the Judge could have appointed Mr. Nuttall, if he had wished, but the Judge was giving him a railroad job, and that he wasn‘t giving him an attorney that had enough knowledge.”
“Q: Can you render an opinion to that hypothetical question? A: Yes. I believe he has the mental capacity to analyze the set of facts. What I feel he is lacking is the ability to take that analysis related to the fact that you have stated, or this hypothetical person and apply them to—to his defense, because he stated can I switch back to the real person? THE COURT: Yes. MR. SCIANDRA: Yes, I think it‘s obvious—THE COURT: That‘s who we‘re talking about, so it‘s all right with me. MR. ARDAIZ: Hypothetically speaking, of course. THE WITNESS: Because he stated to me, you know, flatly that he believes, that he truly believes, that there is not enough evidence to convict him, and that if his attorney, the Public Defender, states that there is, he would not believe him. And if another attorney, privately appointed, told him that same thing, he would believe him, and that‘s where the delusional system and paranoid thinking comes into effect. The paranoid feelings are related fairly specifically to the Public Defender. Q: Doctor, considering the opinion that Mr. Stankewitz has the conditions you testified to, do you have an opinion as to whether he would be able to rationally aid counsel in his own defense? A: Current counsel? Q: Yes. A: Yes, I do. I don‘t think he will be able to rationally plan his defense with this counsel. Q: Okay. If a private attorney did give him his opinion that there was enough evidence to convict him, is there anything in your examination which would indicate that Mr. Stankewitz would then develop the same paranoid feelings against this attorney? A: No, there is nothing in my examination that would indicate that. Q: Would that be revealed in further examination? A: Yes. Q: So, it‘s your opinion that if there was further evaluation, you could come to a determination as to whether or not he would be able to rationally cooperate in his own defense with even a private attorney? A: Well, at this point in time, based upon this examination, I would feel that he could cooperate with a private attorney.”
The majority argue, “Had either the trial judge or the prosecution believed that appellant‘s later statements negated Dr. Glenn‘s opinion, Dr. Glenn could have been recalled to determine if he still adhered to that opinion.” (Ante, p. 93.) The failure of the public defender to request recall, despite his ardent support of the motion and his familiarity with Dr. Glenn‘s views from a prehearing interview, indicates that further testimony would not have filled the gap left by appellant‘s recantation. There was, I submit, no substantial evidence of incompetency to stand trial.2
After expounding the need for a competency hearing the majority point to “strong indications of a breakdown in the relationship between appellant and his state-appointed trial lawyer” and suggest that “[t]he court may not have been required to hold a full competency hearing if the problem could have been resolved by a substitution of counsel.” (Ante, p. 94.) Justice Broussard, concurring, states he would “emphasize the failure of the trial court to take action to prevent a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant‘s right to effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 [85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710]; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 [88 Cal.Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008].)”
The only attorney-client differences shown in the record, however, were over whether to present the identity defense demanded by appellant or the diminished capacity defense that counsel preferred. As Williams points out, disagreement about trial tactics does not necessarily call for substitution; and “[w]hether to call certain witness is generally a matter of trial tactics.” (Id., at p. 905.) Appellant made clear to the court when he requested substitution on July 5 and August 31 that his only objection to the public defender was the latter‘s refusal to present an identity defense through witnesses whom appellant wished
Further, the in camera hearing in connection with the August 31 motion appears to have convinced the court, with reason, that the identity defense was so untenable that any competent substitute counsel would have rejected it. A trial court should not be required to discharge appointed counsel for refusal to accept a strategy that the court itself has good cause to believe would not be viable.
Richardson, J., concurred.