delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе appellee was indicted on one count of intimidating a witness, 1 and two counts of pimping. He moved to dismiss the pimping charges on the ground that the pimping statute 2 is unconstitutional on its face. The trial court granted the motion, and the People appeal. We reverse and remand for furthеr proceedings.
The statute in question provides as follows:
*112 “18-7-206. Pimping. Any person who knowingly lives on or is supported or maintained in whole or in part by money or other thing of value earned, received, procured, or realized by any other person through prostitution commits pimping, which is a class 5 felony.”
The trial court’s principal basis for holding the statute unconstitutional on its face was that its language could be construed to apply to nеarly anyone knowingly selling goods or services to a prostitute, including doctors, lawyers, grocers, аnd tradespersons generally. Because of this alleged infirmity, the court found that the statute violated due process and equal protection, and was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
We hold that the trial court should not have addressed the merits of the appellee’s facial unсonstitutionality arguments, because the appellee did not have standing to raise those questions. When a butcher, baker or candlestick maker is prosecuted for pimping in selling meat, bread or candles to a prostitute, those issues may be brought before us.
Under the usual rules of standing develoрed in Colorado and other jurisdictions, one who is not personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted is not entitled to assail the constitutionality of a statute.
Veterans of Foreign Wars
v.
City of Steamboat Springs,
“We do not examine the outer bounds of statutes where the alleged conduct falls clearly within the statute’s prohibition. While, as suggested by the defendаnts, doubts as to the applicability of the statutory language in marginal fact situations may be conсeived, we think the statute gives defendants adequate warning that their [conduct] was a criminal offense.”544 P.2d at 390 .
In other words, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard tо challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court.
E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
The appellee further argues, however, that the pimping statute infringes upon First Amendment freedoms of “economic association” by “chilling” the generаl public’s freedom to transact business with all people, including prostitutes. Thus, he contends, this casе falls within a recognized exception to the usual standing rules. We do not agree.
*113
When important First Amеndment freedoms have been involved, courts have sanctioned attacks on overly-broad stаtutes without requiring the person making the attack to demonstrate that his or her conduct could not be regulated by a sufficiently specific statute.
E.g., Bigelow
v.
Virginia,
Those cases have repeatedly emphasizеd, however, that invalidation of a statute for facial overbreadth is an extreme remedy, and has been used only sparingly and as a last resort. Bigelow v. Virginia, supra; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra. In this case, neither the interests claimed to be at stаke nor the nature of the statute’s alleged infringement on those interests warrants such extreme reliеf.
In the first place, the appellee has cited no First Amendment cases supporting his conсern for the type of “freedom of economic association” he seeks to invoke in this case.
Cf. People
v.
Hassil,
In short, the overbreadth doctrine is intended to рrotect weighty constitutional interests, and the appellee’s conjectural assertions rеgarding the reach of the pimping statute are insufficient to warrant the doctrine’s extension to the facts of this case. See People v. Blue, supra.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE LEE does not participate.