delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Reginald Stachelek was indicted for murder. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder and was sentenced to a term of 35 years. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest because it was made without probable cause, erred in not suppressing his statements as being involuntary and the product of an illegal arrest, erred in admitting bloodstained clothes as evidence, and erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of withdrawal. He further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
On January 25, 1983, at 2:30 a.m., James Garcia was found with multiple stab wounds on Western Avenue in Chicago. He later died of the wounds. Police officers on routine patrol saw two men running from the scene. They caught and arrested Victor Lopez. At 3:30 a.m., Officers Leuser and others were assigned to the case. At 4 a.m., they interviewed Lopez and discovered where the stabbing had occurred and that several other people were involved. Between 4:45 and 5 a.m., a female identifying herself as Reginald Stachelek’s sister telephoned the police station and requested information about her brother’s arrest in connection with the stabbing on Western Avenue. The officer told her that no one by that name was in custody. The officer then told Leuser about the telephone call and he in turn informed Officers West, Lahm and Dorich.
The officers proceeded to the apartment building where the stabbing took place and canvassed the building for witnesses. Officer West testified that an interview with a tenant, Rosa Montes, revealed that shortly after 2 a.m., Montes heard someone banging on her door shouting “Call the police. They are going to kill us.” Montes opened the door and saw a stranger clutching his chest and yelling. Behind him were three or four persons including one she recognized as a neighborhood resident known as “Nervous” or “Nervy.” The lights suddenly went off and Montes slammed her door. She ran to the window and saw four people, including Nervy, run from the building. Officer West testified further that Montes described Nervy as a black African, 17 or 18 years old, 5 feet 6 or 7 inches tall, with straight, black hair. Montes also told the officers where Nervy lived.
At approximately 6 a.m., Officers West, Lahm and Dorich went to Nervy’s apartment. Hassan Khan opened the door, and the officers identified themselves and stated that they were investigating the knifing. The police then saw a man walk up behind Hassan Khan. The officers recognized Nooir (Nervy) Khan from Montes’ description. When asked his name, the man responded “Nervy Khan.” The officers entered the apartment and placed Nervy under arrest.
Officer West heard a noise from the rear of the apartment, but Nervy stated that no one else was present. Fearing for his safety, West went to investigate the noise. The other officers accompanied Hassan and Nervy to the rear of the apartment. There they found defendant arising from a bed. He identified himself as Reginald Stachelek. West noticed that defendant’s trousers and shoes were stained with blood.
Defendant, who was 15 years old, was taken to the police station shortly before 7 a.m. He waited in an interview room until approximately 8:30 a.m., when a youth officer arrived. West informed defendant of his Miranda rights, and that a juvenile could be tried as an adult. Defendant acknowledged that he -understood', but still wished to make a statement. Defendant stated that he, Nervy, Victor Lopez, John Martinez and John Aquino beat Garcia as punishment for Garcia’s expressing the desire to become a member of a different gang. Defendant subsequently warned Garcia that Aquino and Martinez were going to do something worse to him. Garcia began beating on the door of an apartment, and Martinez pulled out a knife and stabbed Garcia repeatedly. Defendant ran down the stairs. Garcia also ran into the street, chased by Aquino and Lopez.
At approximately 1 p.m. that day, West and the youth officer spoke with defendant, first reminding him of his Miranda rights. The officers told defendant that the other participants in the stabbing had told different stories. Defendant made no statement.
At 3:30 p.m. on the same day, police officers and an assistant State’s Attorney again spoke with defendant, first reading him his Miranda rights. Defendant repeated the same statement he had given at 8:30 a.m. Defendant was again reminded that the other participants in the crime had given different accounts. Defendant then changed his statement, and also made a written statement at 4:30 p.m., before which his Miranda rights were repeated. In his statement, defendant repeated substantially the same facts told earlier but stated that he, not Martinez, had stabbed Garcia 10 to 15 times.
Subsequently, the court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and to suppress both his statement and his bloodstained clothing. At the hearing, the officers stated that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before each statement was taken, and that defendant indicated that he understood those rights and wished to speak to the officers. The State’s witnesses also testified that defendant was not beaten or mistreated at any time, that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that defendant did not ask to make a telephone call. Defendant’s written statement included an acknowledgement that he had been treated well, that he had been given cigarettes and food, and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Defendant testified at the hearing that at the time of his arrest an officer stomped on his foot and slapped him. He did not report this injury to the doctor who examined him at the police station. At the 8:30 a.m. interview he had told the police that he had feared for his safety, and they assured him that if he gave information about the crime his identity would be protected. Despite these promises, defendant was taken in a squad car to point out the homes of the others involved in the crime, and Martinez and Aquino were brought back to the police station in the same car with defendant. Defendant also stated that the police refused his requests to make telephone calls from the Khan residence and the station.
Rosa Montes testified for defendant at the hearing. She stated that she only saw one man when she opened her door on the night in question, and that she did not remember telling the officers three or four men were present. She remembered generally describing Nervy to the police, but not specifically telling them Nervy was 17 or 18 years old, had a stocky build and medium black complexion.
Assistant State’s Attorney Gordon Greenberg testified that he visited Rosa Montes on February 17, 1983, at 11 a.m. At that time, Montes told Greenberg that her earlier statements to the police were true.
The trial court found that probable cause existed to arrest defendant. The court also found that all of the statements made by defendant were voluntary. The court stated that it took into consideration the fact that defendant had experience with the police. The court, however, found deficiencies in the Miranda warnings given at 8:30 a.m. and therefore suppressed the statements made as a result of that interview. The Miranda warnings given at 3:30 and 4:30 p.m. were found to be proper and statements made at those interviews were not suppressed.
At trial, defendant testified that he had been forced to join the gang at age 10, and that Garcia was his friend. On the night of the stabbing, Garcia was being beaten as a gang punishment, but defendant did not participate. Later, he wanted to help Garcia, and told Garcia he thought the others were planning on seriously injuring Garcia. Defendant remained on the landing of the apartment building stairway because he did not wish to be part of the beating. Martinez subsequently stabbed Garcia. Garcia ran down the stairs, bumping into defendant on the landing. Later, Martinez told defendant that, if they were caught, defendant should take the blame because he was the youngest. If he did not do so, Martinez would kill defendant or his family. Defendant testified further that he originally identified Martinez as the killer but later in the day, after he rode with Aquino and Martinez in the police car, defendant’s fear of Martinez’ earlier threats caused him to change his statement and take the blame for the murder. On cross-examination, defendant testified that his gang was an enemy of the gang which the victim wished to join. Defendant interpreted various gang symbols that showed this rivalry. Defendant also stated that his brother had previously encountered trouble with the rival gang. Defendant further testified that he had never been given Miranda warnings prior to January 25, 1983. Defense counsel stipulated that defendant had received Miranda warnings on two prior occasions.
Greg Owens, a former assistant State’s Attorney, testified for defendant that older gang members often force younger members to take responsibility for crimes because the court will be more lenient with young people. Owens also testified that gangs retaliate against members for helping the police. Owens testified that a “violation,” or punishment, could be death and that a member’s intention to switch to a rival gang would be considered sufficient motive for killing that member.
At the trial, the bloodstained clothing of defendant, Martinez, Aquino, Khan and Lopez was admitted into evidence. The victim had type A/MN blood. A police crime laboratory microanalyst testified that the bloodstains on defendant’s jacket were type A, which was consistent with A/MN blood type. The bloodstains on defendant’s pants were type 0. The bloodstains on defendant’s gym shoes and on some of the other clothing were human, but were of insufficient quantity to allow accurate typing. The various bloodstains on the others’ clothing were types A, AB, AO, and B. The clothing was admitted into evidence without objection.
Defendant first contends that the court erred in denying the motion to quash his arrest because no probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest. A person may be arrested without a warrant when a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe he has committed a crime. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 107 — 2(1)(c).) The statutory standard is the equivalent of the constitutional requirement of probable cause. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, sec. 6; People v. Tisler (1984),
The officers’ judgment that probable cause existed to arrest defendant resulted from a chain of events which occurred rapidly during the first few hours of the police investigation. At approximately 4 a.m., Lopez informed the police that several other persons had participated in the crime. At 5 a.m., only 2V2 hours after the stabbing occurred, defendant’s sister telephoned the police, identified herself and the location of the crime, and informed the police that she believed her brother was being held for the crime. Shortly before 6 a.m., Rosa Montes informed the police that Nervy Khan was one of several persons seen running from her building as the stabbing and beating took place. At 6:15 a.m., defendant was found by the police in Nervy’s apartment, with what appeared to be blood on his clothing. Defendant identified himself as Reginald Stachelek, the name which the officers knew had been linked to the crime earlier.
Defendant attacks the State’s case by isolating each of these facts from the others. Any one of these facts standing alone, or even a combination of any two facts, might not establish probable cause. (See People v. Gutknecht (1984),
Another relevant factor is an officer’s viewing of what appear to be bloodstains on the person’s clothing. (People v. Kraman (1981),
Defendant also argues that the telephone call from defendant’s sister created nothing more than a mere suspicion, and that defendant’s presence in Nervy’s apartment cannot be a basis for finding probable cause to arrest. (See People v. Lumpp (1983),
Based on a totality of these circumstances, we find that a reasonable person having this knowledge would believe that defendant committed the crime, keeping in mind that the officer rests his decision to arrest a person on probabilities and not on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Summers (1981),
Defendant also contends that his arrest should have been quashed because the police made a nonconsensual entry into Nervy Khan’s apartment. Defendant, however, has failed to meet the threshhold requirement of standing to challenge the legality of his seizure because he has not shown that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment where he was arrested. (People v. Seider (1981),
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress defendant’s statements as being involuntary and the product of an illegal arrest. Because we have found the arrest to be based on probable cause, we will only address the question of the voluntariness of the statements. The test of whether a confession was admissible at trial is whether the statement met its burden of showing that the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether defendant’s will was overcome when he made the statement. (People v. Prim (1972),
In the present case, defendant made an oral statement at 8:30 a.m., an oral statement at 3:30 p.m., and a written statement at 4:30 p.m. Defendant maintains that his 3:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. statements were involuntary for several reasons. Defendant points out that since he was a juvenile the circumstances surrounding his confessions should be scrutinized with special care. (People v. Travis (1984),
Defendant also points to his physical discomfort as support for his contention that his statements were involuntarily coerced. Defendant states that after an early morning arrest he was held in a bare, locked room for nearly eleven hours with inadequate attention to his physical needs. The fact that defendant was awakened at 6 a.m. or that the interview room lacked comfortable furnishings fails to indicate the existence of a coercive element in the circumstances surrounding the confessions. In addition, defendant has failed to sufficiently contradict the testimony of the State’s witnesses that he received adequate food, drink, and bathroom accessibility, or that being kept in the interview room for the entire day was abusive. (See People v. Hester (1968),
Defendant next contends that the existence of coercion was indicated by the police’s broken promise when they transported Martinez and Aquino to the station with defendant. Even assuming the truth of this promise, the deception would not invalidate the confession as a matter of law. The circumstance would be only one factor to consider when making the determination regarding voluntariness. See People v. Martin (1984),
Defendant states that lack of voluntariness is evidenced by the suppression of the 8:30 a.m. statement, which was accompanied by inadequate Miranda warnings. Initially we note that defense counsel expressly waived any objection to the admission of this statement. Its admission, however, was proper even without the waiver. Defendant argues that if the State cannot show that the previous coercive influence had been dissipated, then suppression of the first statement will result in a presumption that any subsequent statements were also inadmissible. Defendant relies upon People v. Reed (1984),
In view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements made by defendant at 3:30 and 4:30 p.m., we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that these statements were made voluntarily was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we will not disturb the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant contends further that the trial court erred in allowing bloodstained clothing into evidence when the clothing was inconsistent with the victim’s blood type. The admission of this evidence was not objected to at trial and was not included in defendant’s post-trial motion. Thus, defendant has waived any right to review of this alleged error. People v. Ross (1968),
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 5.04 (2d ed. 1971), regarding the withdrawal exception to the accountability rule. Defendant argues that his warning Garcia that more serious harm might come about sufficiently constitutes evidence of withdrawal from participation in the crime. The statutory definition of withdrawal provides that a person is not accountable for the conduct of another when:
“Before the commission of the offense, he terminates his effort to promote or facilitate such commission, and does one of the following: wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in such commission ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 5— 2(c)(3).
In the present case, although defendant testified that he terminated his criminal conduct before the murder was committed by warning defendant and leaving the apartment hallway, there is no evidence adduced going to the second element requiring defendant to deprive his prior efforts of effectiveness. (See People v. Cooper (1975),
Defendant next contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He asserts that this finding is mandated by the disciplinary action taken against his attorney for neglect of a nonrelated case, and also by the various acts or omissions of counsel. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the incompetence. (Strickland v. Washington (1984),
In support of his argument that counsel was incompetent, defendant points to his attorney’s six months’ suspension from the practice of law. The supreme court suspended the attorney for six months beginning on February 22, 1985, due to his neglect of two personal injury cases which were handled during the period of 1975 through 1982. Counsel began representing defendant here in April 1983. This trial and counsel’s disciplinary case both took place in 1983. Defendant fails to show, however, any evidence that the disciplinary proceedings preoccupied the attorney to such a degree that it interfered with preparation of defendant’s case. (See People v. Williams (1985),
As to the other claimed errors by counsel, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was incompetent before determining whether defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland v. Washington (1984),
Defendant lists various acts and omissions made by his counsel, including: accepting a juror who indicated she did not approve of youth gangs; objecting to the admission of evidence showing the identity of defendant’s sister as the person who initially called the police, without objecting to the substance of the call; waiving objections to the State’s introduction of defendant’s first statements during which he accused Martinez of the stabbing and exculpated defendant; failure to make proper objections when defendant was asked to explain certain gang symbols, when defendant was asked about his brother’s involvement with the gang, and when defendant was asked whether he previously received Miranda warnings; and use of former prosecutor to testify for defendant as an expert witness.
Defendant argues that he probably would not have been convicted if his counsel had not made those alleged errors. Our review of the record demonstrates otherwise. Even if the alleged errors did occur, defendant suffered no prejudice. The evidence was overwhelming against defendant, particularly his own numerous statements wherein he first described himself as an active participant in the beating and later as the person who actually stabbed the victim. We conclude defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
McGILLICUDDY and WHITE, JJ., concur.