9 N.Y.2d 168 | NY | 1961
Defendant was convicted by a jury in Queens County Court of the felony of possessing a quantity of the narcotic' drug heroin with intent to sell it (Penal Law, § 1751, subd. 2). The affirming majority in the Appellate Division filed no opinion. The two Justices who dissented wrote that ‘ ‘ it was error, warranting reversal and a new trial, to admit over defendant’s objections, as part of the People’s direct case, evidence that the defendant had pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit the crime charged and, with the court’s consent, had withdrawn such guilty plea and' substituted a plea of not guilty ”. The dissent cited Kercheval v. United States (274 U. S. 220) as its authority and referred to People v. Steinmetz (240 N. Y. 411) and People v. Ariano (264 App. Div. 426).
Although defendant as his own witness at the trial denied his guilt, he does not now dispute that the People’s proof was enough for conviction. He does press on us the point made by the dissenting Appellate Division Justices — that it was injustice and error to lay before the jury as evidence of his guilt his earlier plea of guilty which the court had allowed him to withdraw. This major question of law and justice has not been before us since 1925 when in People v. Steinmetz (240 N. Y. 411, supra) this court ruled that the taking in evidence of proof of an earlier withdrawn guilty plea in the same case was not error. Actually, the Steinmetz case could be distinguished here since the showing that Steinmetz had pleaded guilty came in during his cross-examination (see Steinmetz opinions in the Appellate Division, 209 App. Div. 83). It would not be incorrect, there
Two years after this court decided People v. Steinmetz (supra), the United States Supreme Court in Kercheval v. United States (274 U. S. 220 [1927], supra) unanimously gave a negative answer to the question of whether a plea of guilty withdrawn by leave of court is admissible against the defendant on the trial of the issue arising on a substituted plea of not guilty. The court’s conclusion was that “ the weight of reason is against the introduction in evidence of a plea of guilty withdrawn on order of court granting leave and permitting the substitution of a plea of not guilty.” Justice Butlee’s opinion in Kercheval reasoned it out like this (pp. 223-224): “ A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences. * * * But, on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly
This cogent reasoning soon had its effect not only in the Federal courts (which were bound by Kercheval, supra) but in State court holdings. Faced with a choice between the conflicting rules of Steinmetg (supra) and Kercheval, high State courts from State v. Anderson (173 Minn. 293 [1927]) down to State v. Thomson (203 Ore. 1 [1954]) and State v. Joyner (228 La. 927 [1955]) have held that the admission in evidence of a stricken plea of guilty is reversible error. The question is not whether ■a plea of guilty is a confession of guilt and provable as such. Of course it is (see People v. Bretagna, 298 N. Y. 323, cert. denied 336 U. S. 919; Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N Y 2d 165). But we are inquiring into something quite different. We must say whether it is lawful in New York for a court, after allowing a guilty plea to be set at naught, to allow the jury to use that same plea as proof of guilt. Such a distortion of purpose should not be allowed. The State of New York should scorn to make use of it. As the Federal Court of Appeals for this circuit put it, ‘ ‘ When a court allows a defendant to withdraw a plea of ‘ guilty ’ it is because the court finds that circumstances exist which make it unfair to hold him to it. Such circumstances make it equally unfair to use it against him as an admission ” (United States v. Adelman, 107 F. 2d 497, 499).
The danger and injustice of the affirmative use of a withdrawn guilty plea could not be better illustrated than by this record. Not only was the former plea allowed in evidence on the People’s case over objection but the court’s charge discussed it at length
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Judges Dye, Fuld, Froessel, Yah Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.