People v. SpencerPeople v. Spencer
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Carter
delivered the opinion of the court:
At the October term, 1913, of the circuit court of Du-Page county the grand jury returned an indictment against the plaintiff in error, Henry C. Spencer, for the murder of Mildred Allison, alias Mildred Rexroat. On a trial before a jury in that county a verdict of guilty was returned and his punishment fixed at death. After motions for new trial and
At about 8:23 o’clock in the evening of September 26, 1913, a freight train on the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern railroad running in a northerly direction was approaching Wayne, in DuPage county, when the engineer saw a dark object on the track ahead. He tried to stop the train but was unable to do so until after it had passed over the object. The train crew went back to the south to ascertain what they had struck, and a short distance south of the caboose they found the body of a woman cut in two just above the hips. On the upper part of the body was a blue jacket. A. lady’s large, blue hat and a pair of gold-rimmed spectacles were found in the vicinity, and a gold bracelet, marked “from W. H. A. to M. A.,” was on one of the arms. The witnesses testified that the body was neither warm nor cold when found. They at once notified the officials of the railroad company and an “undertaker at West Chicago. The undertaker, under direction of the coroner of DuPage county, took charge of the remains and removed them to his morgue at West Chicago. The next morning the coroner of the county found near the scene of the tragedy, close to the railroad track, a lady’s white hand-bag turned inside out, with spots of blood on it. The Aurora, Elgin and Chicago Electric railway runs from Chicago westerly through various towns, and a little west of Wheaton, the county seat of DuPage county, one branch turns northwesterly towards Wayne. ’ About thirty rods south-east of the station at Wayne it crosses on a viaduct over the tracks of the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern railroad. The dead body was just south of this viaduct. The remains were identified the day after they were found as the body of Mildred Allison Rexroat. She had been first married to W. H. Allison, by whom she had three sons. A few months before her death she had been divorced from Allison and shortly after married one Everett Rexroat. Allison’s home was‘in Chicago. Rexroat was from Macomb, Illinois, and
Mrs. Rexroat was rooming, at this time, with Mrs. Ada Johnson, on Eggleston avenue, in Chicago. At about 3 :3o o’clock P. M. on the day she met her death Mrs. Rexroat packed a rattan suit-case and left her boarding place. She
The car in charge of conductor Cargo went to Elgin and returned, arriving at Wayne about 8:12 P. M. The conductor testified that one passenger boarded his car there on -its return trip to Chicago. At Wheaton, Cargo was relieved by conductor C. S. Croumer, who took the car on to Chicago. Croumer testified that Spencer was on his car on that run; that he had to wake him up to get his ticket; that the car arrived at Chicago at 9:30 P. M. At about 10:15 the same evening Spencer appeared at 2215 Michigan avenue, the home of W. R. Patterson, with whom he had been acquainted for about eight years, being known to Patterson by the name of Burke. Mr. and Mrs. Patterson were at home at the time. Mrs. Patterson asked Spencer what was
September 23, 1913, Spencer had rented a room of a Mrs. Schofield, at 3212 Rhodes avenue, Chicago. He did not appear there again until September 26, at about eight o’clock A. M., when he left his grip and went away at once. Mrs. Schofield did not see him again until the next morning, but she testified that he had occupied his room some time during the night of September 26 and for several nights thereafter‘. After he was arrested at the Pattersons’ on the evening of October 5 Capt. Halpin took him to the
Shortly after his arrest Capt. ITalpin took Spencer to the police station in Chicago. He asked Spencer if he wished to say anything, and at the same time stated to him that anything he might say would be used against him upon the trial of the case. Other officers testified to the same effect. No promises or threats of any kind were made to Spencer. Spencer said that he was willing to tell all that he had done. According to the testimony of ITalpin and the others who were present, Spencer then narrated the facts with reference to his meeting Mrs. Rexroat, dancing with her, arranging with her to teach a tango class at Wayne, going with her on the electric line to Wayne, returning on the electric line to Chicago, going to the Patter-sons. He also gave the conversation with Mr. and Mrs. Patterson about the diamond ring substantially as testified to by them, and further stated that when he and Mrs. Rexroat left the electric car at Wayne they walked east to the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern tracks, as he told her it was a short cut to his farm, which he claimed his father left him; that they then walked south under the viaduct of the electric line, he having hold of her right arm with his left hand; that shortly after passing under the viaduct he took the revolver out of his pocket and shot her in the jaw; that she fell without any outcry; that he then placed her body across one of the
Mrs. Johnson, with whom Mrs. Rexroat roomed, testified that just before Mrs. Rexroat left on Friday, September 26, there was a telephone call which Mrs. Rexroat could not understand over the telephone and Mrs. Johnson talked for her; that the person talking made an appointment to meet Mrs. Rexroat at the Fifth avenue station; that the next day (Saturday) a person having the same voice called Mrs. Johnson and told her that Mrs. Rexroat would not be back; that she was going away to marry the person who was talking over the telephone. Mrs. Johnson, after Spencer’s arrest, met and talked with him, in Capt. Halpin’s presence, in’ the police station. The testimony of both Capt. Halpin and Mrs. Johnson is that Spencer adriiitted to them that he was the person that talked with Mrs. Johnson over the telephone on both of these dates, and also admitted that he told her Mrs. Rexroat would not be back because she was going to marry him. He admitted also to Capt. Halpin that he had gone out to Wayne shortly before the crime was
The post-mortem examination of the dead body was held at West Chicago on the afternoon of Saturday, September 27, being performed by Drs. W. L. Guild and Paul Isherwood and the coroner. This post-mortem disclosed a bullet wound in the right corner of the mouth of the deceased, which knocked out a tooth, ranged upward through the jaw and sphenoid bone, through the cortex and cerebrum, and through the parietal bone and out through the skull. No bullet was found. There was only one puncture of the scalp, and that was at the point where the bullet passed through the skull. The hair was matted with a great amount of blood, and blood was found in the mouth. The physicians testified that the wound through the head was the cause of the death of Mrs. Rexroat, and that she was dead when the train struck her, as there was no ex-travasation of blood where the body was lacerated by the wheels of the train. Cap-t. Halpin took Spencer on a trip to Wayne and asked the latter to point out where he claimed he killed Mrs. Rexroat and where he placed the hammer. Spencer pointed out the places, and we judge from the evidence that they corresponded with the actual facts as to the place where the body was found and the location of the hammer.
Plaintiff in error was put on the stand, and in answer to all of the many questions asked him, both upon direct and cross-examination, he answered, substantially, “I don’t know.” His counsel introduced no other testimony on his behalf. He stated in his confession that he did not know
Some question is raised as to whether the corpus delicti was properly proved. While confessions and admissions in themselves are not sufficient to convict without other proof, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of proving the corpus delicti in the same way and to the same extent that it may be for the purpose of connecting the accused with the commission of the offense. It is seldom that either of these can be proved by direct testimony, and therefore they may be lawfully proved by circumstantial evidence, provided it is satisfactory. (3 Greenleaf on Evidence,—16th ed.—sec. 30; People v. See, 258 Ill. 152; Carroll v. People, 136 id. 456.) The circumstances proved in this record, about which there is no conflict in the testimony, satisfactorily proved the corpus delicti of the offense charged in the indictment without taking into consideration the confessions of plaintiff in error.
Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that the court erred in admitting the testimony of the coroner and certain doctors because it was not shown that they were qualified as experts, and also erred as to admitting certain of their testimony as to the character of the wound through the head and what caused it. The record does not showr that any objection was made in the- trial court as to either of these matters. The action of the trial court in admitting evidence in a criminal case cannot be considered in this court
Counsel for plaintiff in error further contend that the court erred in admitting the testimony of Capt. Halpin that Walter J. Blaser, an employee of the electric road, stated to him, in the presence of plaintiff in error, that he recognized Spencer as the man who came with a lady to the Fifth avenue electric station in Chicago on the evening of Friday, September 26, Blaser being the man who told the two that the train to Wayne did not go until 6:3o. Blaser testified on the trial that he was not sure whether he recognized plaintiff in error as the man with the lady on the night in question, but that he thought he looked like him. There is no denial by anyone, however, of the fact that when Capt. Halpin brought plaintiff in error to Blaser before the trial, Blaser told the captain that he recognized plaintiff in error as the man who inquired about the train. It might well be urged that this question is not properly presented in the record, but conceding, for the purposes of the argument, that it was, we cannot see how this testimony injured plaintiff in error. Blaser and Halpin were both witnesses for the State. If they contradicted each other that would tend to lessen the weight of the testimony of one or both of them with the jury.
The argument of counsel for plaintiff in error that the court erred in permitting Capt. Halpin to testify that conductor Cargo identified plaintiff in error as the man who went on his train to Wayne with the lady on the evening of September 26 is without merit, as Cargo himself testified that he recognized the plaintiff in error as the’ man, and does not in any way question by his testimony that he did identify plaintiff in error in Halpin’s presence.
Objection was also made to the testimony of Capt. Hal-pin and Mrs. Johnson as to what was said by them and by the plaintiff in error about the telephone conversations between Mrs. Johnson and plaintiff in error. This testimony was clearly admissible as bearing upon the issues involved. Plaintiff in error, by his actions and statements at the time, expressly ratified and adopted such statements as his own. (People v. Tielke, 259 Ill. 88; People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 id. 411.) The same must be said with reference to the evidence, now claimed as erroneous, as to what was said in plaintiff in error’s presence concerning his identity and his conduct at the homes of the Pattersons and the Schofields.
The second time the plaintiff in error made a statement as to his connection with this crime to Capt. Halpin it is claimed by his counsel that this statement was taken down by a shorthand reporter and afterwards transcribed into typewriting. It is admitted that it was not signed by the plaintiff in error. Counsel, however, contend that the oral testimony of Capt. Halpin and others as to what was stated by plaintiff in error was incompetent,—that only the typewritten statement should have been -admitted. This is not the
After motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment had been overruled by the court, counsel for plaintiff in error made a motion in the trial court to set aside the orders overruling these motions, and in support thereof presented affidavits tending to show that at the time plaintiff in error made his confessions or statements to Capt, Halpin which were taken down by the shorthand reporter he also at that time confessed that he was guilty of numerous other crimes which he claimed he had committed at various times and places during the ten or fifteen years previous, and that the court erred in not admitting in evidence his statement as to these other crimes, counsel contending that they would tend to show that the man was not sane. The court refused to vacate and set aside its orders overruling the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment on that ground. We do not think that the court’s ruling should be held error. It is clear from the record that counsel for plaintiff in error not only acquiesced in the trial court shutting out all statements of plaintiff in error as to’ crimes other than the one here in question, but that his counsel requested that such rulings be made by the court. This evidence was not admissible as to the confessions of other crimes which the plaintiff in error confessed he committed, because they had no connection in any way with the crime in question. The general rule
Counsel for plaintiff in error further contend that prejudicial error was committed by allowing his picture to be taken while on the witness stand, pointing his finger at the jury. This objection was first urged on the motion to set aside the orders overruling motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. On the hearing of this question in the court below the trial judge stated positively that he was not present when the picture was taken. The affidavits both for and against this motion, and evidence taken in open court, bear out this statement. There is some controversy in the record as to whether any or all of the jury were present, in the room when the picture was taken. The court refused to set aside the orders overruling the motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment on this ground. Even if it be conceded that the picture in question was taken in the presence of all the jury during a recess of • the court, we cannot see how plaintiff in error would be prejudiced thereby.
These are only a few examples of the many interruptions that were made by plaintiff in error during the trial and will serve to illustrate the character of those interruptions. He was treated with great consideration by court, counsel and witnesses. As stated, when he took the stand he answered practically every question asked him by both his own counsel and counsel for the People, “I don’t know.” When, however, he was asked by the court why sentence should not be pronounced against him he made a long statement, which, while somewhat rambling, shows clearly that he did know and remember all about the various things he was questioned about on the witness stand. Conceding for the purposes of this case, but without attempting to discuss or decide the question, that his actions during the trial were proper to be taken into consideration by the jury in deciding whether or not he was sane, we can reach no other conclusion from this entire record than that the jury were fully justified in finding, from the evidence, that he was a sane man. The
In this connection counsel for plaintiff in error argue that the court should have required the calling of expert witnesses on the question of the insanity of plaintiff in error, claiming that such experts were present in court during most of the trial. Even if this question were properly preserved in the record, no error was committed in not calling such experts.
Counsel further contend that the court erred in permitting the State’s attorney to have another lawyer assist him in the prosecution of the case; that the defense was over-matched in the presentation of the questions to the jury, as plaintiff in error had only one attorney. We agree fully with counsel that it is the duty of the trial court, as well as of this court, to, see to it that every person charged with crime is given a fair trial. It appears from this record that - when plaintiff in error was first arraigned in the trial court and stated that he was without counsel the court appointed two reputable attorneys of DuPage county to defend him; that shortly thereafter Anton Zeman, one of the counsel in this court for plaintiff in error, was made sole counsel on Spencer’s own request, the other two attorneys theretofore appointed by the court withdrawing from the case. We find no error in this regard.
We have considered all the questions raised, directly or indirectly, by counsel. The evidence fully justifies the verdiet,
The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order fixing the period between nine o’clock in the forenoon and five o’clock in the afternoon on the 31st day of July, 1914, as the time when the original sentence of death entered in the circuit court of DuPage county shall be executed. A certified copy of that order will be furnished by the clerk to the sheriff of DuPage county.
Judgment affirme±